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ABSTRACT  
   
Municipal courtrooms are brimming with a variety of positive and 
negative emotions from defendants who are primarily encountering the criminal 
justice system for the first time. Municipal court judges and bailiffs must work 
together and find ways to communicate important information about courtroom 
processes to up to 70-120 defendants a day. This dissertation investigates how 
municipal court judges and bailiffs from two municipal courthouses respond to 
three organizational challenges associated with emotion—defendant confusion 
about courtroom processes, handling high caseloads while treating defendants as 
customers of the court, and managing the serious and tedious emotional moods of 
the courtroom environment. Using qualitative methods of observation and 
informal and formal interviews, this dissertation analyzes how emotion cycles 
between judges and bailiffs help give sense to and break sense of defendants 
while simultaneously helping them navigate the challenges of their work.  
Findings detail the nature of work in municipal court—explaining the 
challenges associated with emotion that judges and bailiffs face on a daily basis. 
The data also describes the emotional roles that judges and bailiffs employ in the 
courtroom. The judges’ emotional roles include tension relievers, order enforcers, 
and care takers. Bailiffs’ emotional roles comprise rule enforcers, toxin handlers, 
and do gooders. The heart of the analysis explores how judges and bailiffs give 
sense to defendants when unexpected situations manifest in the courtroom and 
break sense of defendants who hold incorrect or less favored beliefs about 
courtroom procedures. The emotional displays and responses of judges, bailiffs, 
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primary defendants (defendants before the judge), and third party defendants 
(those watching in the audience) enable sensegiving and sensebreaking to occur. 
The emotion cycles allow courtroom staff to impact the sensemaking process of 
defendants in a fast and efficient manner. Theoretical implications include 
extensions of emotion cycle research through a consideration of the displays and 
responses of primary agents, intermediate agents, and primary recipients of 
emotional displays. Practical implications describe how specific training practices 
and space for employee discussion could enhance the workplace wellness of 
judges and bailiffs. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: RATIONALITY AND EMOTIONALITY IN THE 
MUNICIPAL COURTROOM 
Some people sit there and you can just read on their face—you know I 
hadn’t thought about it that way—and that’s the kind where I feel good, 
that I’ve explained something. Others it’s just, I’m just tolerating the SOB 
because he’s in the black robe and I’m down here, and you can just read 
that body language. I’m not really happy with what I hear but I gotta take 
my licks and get out of here. Some people walk out of the courtroom and 
you hear bullsh*t and you hear the f-word as they storm out under their 
breath because they’re mad. There’s just a whole range of emotions in 
there. 
- Judge Adams 
  Organizations are environments influenced through both cognitive and 
affective processes. Yet, in the past twenty five years there has been a noticeable 
increase in the study of affect, emotion, and mood in organizations (see Elfenbein, 
2007 for a review). Scholars in diverse fields, such as sociology, management, 
and communication have become especially focused on the ways affective 
processes influence a variety of work outcomes (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & 
Staw, 2005; Fineman, 2008; Lutgen-Sandvik, 2003, 2006; Staw & Barsade, 1993; 
Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994; Tracy, 2000, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Tracy, Myers, & 
Scott, 2006; Tracy & Scott, 2006; Tracy & Tracy, 1998). This research has 
exposed that reliance on pure rationality or pure emotionality does not accurately 
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reflect the experiences of organizational members (Mumby & Putnam, 1992). 
Furthermore, affect is related to a number of organizational outcomes and 
cognitive processes, such as creativity (Amabile et al., 2005), stress and burnout 
(Wharton 1993, 1999), and socialization (Scott & Myers, 2005). 
 One particular cognitive process that is influenced by affect is 
organizational sensemaking. Sensemaking manifests after an organizational event 
creates uncertainty (the loss of meaning) or ambiguity (multiple meanings) 
through “efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occur[ed]” 
(Weick, 1993, p. 635). Organizational sensemaking as a theoretical perspective is 
quite different from the everyday phenomenon of “making sense” that occurs at 
an individual level (Weick, 1995). Rather than a specific focus on the making of 
meaning that only occurs inside an individual, sensemaking as a theoretical 
perspective centers on the movement of meaning-making amongst the individual, 
relational, and group levels (Weick, 1995). Thus, organizational sensemaking is a 
complex process that facilitates the interaction and communication of both 
rational and emotional experiences.  
 Organizational sensemaking has been studied in a variety of contexts, such 
as aircraft carrier organizations (Weick & Roberts, 1993), fire disasters (Weick, 
1993), Amway distribution centers (Pratt, 2000), and through stakeholders and 
leader experiences (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005). Researchers have 
examined the ways that sensemaking influences storytelling (Boje, 1991), 
interpretation systems and schemas (Bartunek, 1984; Daft & Weick, 1984), power 
and social influence (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993), and communication and culture 
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(Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 1986; Harris, 1994). Additionally, researchers have 
expanded the study of sensemaking through the consideration of how leaders 
redefine situations in organizations and give sense to others through sensegiving 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) and break down meaning through sensebreaking 
(Pratt, 2000). In communication research, studies have illustrated the relationship 
between humor and sensemaking (Lynch, 2009; Tracy et al., 2006) and 
rationality, emotionality, and sensemaking (Dougherty & Drumheller, 2006). 
Communication researchers have also examined sensemaking in specific 
situations including a temporary organization (Kramer, 2009), stakeholder 
conflict in multiple organizations (Brummans et al., 2008), work-life issues 
(Buzzanell et al., 2005; Golden, 2009), and high reliability organizations (Larson, 
2003; Scott & Trethewey, 2008), among others. 
 Even though organizational sensemaking as a theoretical perspective has 
the potential to extend and complicate current understandings of affective and 
emotional experiences at work, research considering these relationships has been 
somewhat limited in scope. Past research has proposed that emotion is expressed 
during sensemaking when interruptions, or changes in the environment, occur and 
that the expression and feeling of emotion may influence subsequent attempts at 
sensemaking (Dougherty & Drumheller, 2006; Weick, 1995). Yet the relationship 
between emotional expression, emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking is 
underdeveloped.  
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 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how municipal court judges 
and bailiffs1 express emotion and how this emotion cycles through the courtroom 
to give sense to and break sense of defendants. A courtroom context is fruitful for 
these investigations because judges and bailiffs encounter a large number of 
individuals who are distressed or upset on a daily basis during arraignments and 
hearings. Of particular interest for this dissertation is how courtroom employees 
navigate and cope with these emotional situations while simultaneously managing 
macro- and micro- level organizational challenges in their every day work lives. 
This research is valuable because it sheds light on the ways that emotional 
expression can influence various levels of understanding (individual, relational, 
and group) in specific organizations. Furthermore, learning about the relationship 
amongst these concepts may help the courthouses under study address practical 
issues such as efficiency concerns and employee well-being.  
 Indeed, municipal court judges experience pressure from the organization 
to resolve or terminate cases at early stages. That is, there is an organizational 
expectation that courthouse employees process as many cases as possible while 
simultaneously providing the highest quality of service to defendants. Specifically 
in municipal court, employees are expected to close between 70-120 cases in a 
day during arraignments. Thus, courtroom employees could potentially benefit 
from learning how to process cases in ways that ensure feelings of fairness in 
defendants while also teaching them how the courtroom functions. 
                                                 
1
 The bailiff and clerk position were interchangeable in the courtrooms I observed. Thus, I use the 
term bailiff to refer to individuals in either position here and throughout the dissertation. 
  5 
 Emotion cycles among judges, bailiffs, and defendants may help 
courtroom employees address organizational challenges. Yet judges are not 
trained to employ emotions and are instead expected to be “rational” professionals 
(see Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007). As discussed in chapter two, current legal 
research primarily discusses judges’ sentence-making decisions and rarely 
explores how communication during the legal process2 impacts the processing of 
cases. Additionally, current research on the courtroom workgroup, which includes 
bailiffs, similarly focuses on sentencing decisions and group responses to specific 
changes in the law—leaving out a detailed look at the work bailiffs actually 
perform in the courtroom. Communication researchers are uniquely situated to 
attend to these gaps in the literature through a qualitative exploration of emotion 
cycles and their impact on sensegiving and sensebreaking in municipal court. 
Preview of Dissertation 
 First, this dissertation opens with an exploration of past research on judges 
and the courtroom workgroup from other disciplinary viewpoints. In doing so, I 
reveal the gaps in this literature and the need for an in-depth, qualitative study of 
the municipal courtroom from a communication perspective. Second, I review the 
state of the research upon which this study is based including emotional 
expression, emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking. Throughout the 
literature review, I propose specific research questions to address the gaps in the 
literature. Third, I describe the research methods employed to answer these 
questions and detail my research design, including sources and sites, protocol and 
                                                 
2
 I am defining the legal process as the time before and after the judge’s decision is made when he 
or she is communicating with the defendants, courtroom staff, lawyers, and/or jurors. 
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logistics, data collection, data analysis, and self-reflexive and ethical 
considerations. Fourth, I provide three results chapters that explore the nature of 
work in municipal court, the emotional roles of judges and bailiffs, and the 
relationship among emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking. Fifth and 
finally, I offer conclusions, theoretical, methodological, and practical 
implications, and directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGES AND THE COURTROOM WORKGROUP 
Judges and the courtroom workgroup have an important and well-noted 
impact on courtroom decisions. The courtroom workgroup includes members of 
the court who work together to process cases including judges, bailiffs, clerks, 
prosecutors, and public defenders, among others. The individuals in the 
courtroom workgroup share “a common task environment and work together to 
achieve the common goal of disposing of cases” (Haynes, Ruback, & Cusick, 
2010, p. 127). In the municipal court, the courtroom workgroup includes 
primarily judges and bailiffs. Since there is a dearth of research on bailiffs, 
specifically, I review relevant research on the courtroom workgroup below 
followed by a discussion of specific research on judges.  
The Courtroom Workgroup 
 Most research on the courtroom workgroup is primarily concerned with 
how the traits of these workgroups, such as years working together, impact the 
sentencing of offenders. Eisenstein and his colleagues conducted various studies 
to examine how courtroom workgroups move cases through the system 
(Eisenstein, Flemming, & Nardulli, 1988; Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Nardulli, 
Eisenstein, & Flemming, 1988). Taken together these studies suggest that 
different courtroom workgroups perceive offenders and sentencing in myriad 
ways which creates unique patterns in sentencing.  
 Other researchers have extended earlier research on courtroom 
workgroups by exploring traits of the group. For example, research has shown 
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that similarity in characteristics such as race, gender, and political party affects 
sentencing decisions—suggesting that similarities in individual traits correlate to 
similar preferences in sentencing (Haynes et al., 2010). Furthermore, scholars 
have described the ways an entire courtroom community can influence sentencing 
decisions and punishment preferences (Ulmer, 1994). In an extended ethnography 
of courtrooms in Pennsylvania, research found that courtroom workgroups, 
including judges and attorneys, used relationships with public defenders and the 
District Attorney’s office to move cases through the system (Ulmer, 1994). For 
example, the courtroom workgroup used strategies such as case scheduling 
pressure, alignment with public defenders, and lenient sentences as a reward for 
guilty pleas to help avoid the long wait of moving cases to trial (Ulmer, 1994).  
 Courtroom workgroup research has also examined responses to 
organizational changes and law changes in court. Researchers investigating 
responses to the War on Drugs found that courtroom workgroups worked 
interdependently to adapt to new laws—relying on a courtroom model of 
efficiency (Engen & Steen, 2000). Furthermore, a qualitative study of responses 
to a new juvenile justice policy described how courtroom workgroup members on 
the frontline (i.e., bailiffs and clerks) adjusted to differences in their workload 
(Gebo, Stracuzzi, & Hurst, 2006). In this study, employees who perceived their 
workload to be increased did not support the reform and rather tried to subvert it 
(Gebo et al., 2006).  
 Courtroom workgroup research in misdemeanor, or municipal court, has 
examined the impact of routines and deviations on processing cases—perhaps 
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most interesting and related to the dissertation at hand. Courtroom workgroups in 
these settings face tensions between social expectations and the reality of 
courtroom experiences (Lipetz, 1980). In other words, the courtroom workgroup 
mediates the relationship between formal laws and the day to day work of 
managing high caseloads. For example, judges in municipal courts must 
communicate the meaning of complicated traffic laws to individuals unfamiliar 
with the system or court processes. Indeed, one study found that workgroup 
members “devised a set of norms that allow work to be accomplished quickly, 
efficiently, and with minimal uncertainty” (Lipetz, 1980, p. 47). Workgroup 
members helped to create a predictable environment and a high court clearance 
rate—leaving defendants with a feeling of satisfaction. Other research that 
focuses on courtroom communities also reveals how the context and norms of 
interaction impact outcomes and sentencing decisions (Ulmer, 2011); however, 
research on the communication processes that help shape and form these norms is 
underdeveloped. And because bailiffs are an integral part of the municipal 
courtroom workgroup, there is a need to study their unique roles, voices, and 
experiences in this setting. Whereas an understanding of experiences unique to 
bailiffs is lacking in courtroom literature, judge decision-making and sentencing 
has been a primary area of concern. 
Judges’ Decision-Making vs. Legal Process 
Judges have been studied by a number of legal, sociological, and criminal 
justice researchers in the past. Most of this research has utilized quantitative or 
archival methods and has been concerned with judges’ decision-making and 
  10 
sentencing. Scholars have discussed the impact of the judge’s race (George, 2003; 
Graycar, 2008; Steffensmeier & Britt, 2001; Steffensmeier & Hebert, 1999), 
gender (Coontz, 2000; Kenney, 2008; Songer & Crews-Meyer, 2000), and 
ethnicity (Spohn, 2009) on sentencing decisions (Spohn 1990a, 1990b), job 
satisfaction (Anleu & Mack, 2009), professional identity (Bogoch, 1999), and 
ambition (Jensen, & Martinek, 2009). Additionally, research has examined the 
impact of offender characteristics on judges’ decisions including employment 
status, prior criminal history, and seriousness of the offense (see Spohn, 2009 for 
a review). There have also been studies of the emotional components of the legal 
and judicial profession including magistrates or judges in Australia (Anleu & 
Mack, 2005), barristers (Harris, 2002), and lawyers and paralegals (Lively, 2000; 
Pierce, 1995, 1999). More recently, legal scholars have called for the study of 
emotion in legal decision-making (see Bornstein & Wiener, 2006; Feigenson & 
Park, 2006; Maroney, 2006; Wiener, Bornstein, & Voss, 2006). The following 
paragraphs provide a glimpse into some of the highlights of this research. 
 Many legal and criminal justice scholars have employed archival analysis 
of court documents and statistical analyses of the impact of judge identity 
characteristics on sentencing decisions, job satisfaction, and ambition. Male 
judges have been found to posses higher levels of job satisfaction than female 
judges especially in regard to autonomy and opportunities (Anleu & Mack, 2009). 
Research has determined that female and nonwhite judges have a higher level of 
ambition than white male judges (Jensen & Martinek, 2009). However, the 
research on sentencing has provided mixed results. Some scholars have found that 
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female judges decide more liberally than male judges (Songer & Crews-Meyer, 
2000), while others have claimed that female judges are actually harsher on crime 
than male judges (Steffensmeier & Herbert, 1999; Spohn, 2009). In addition, male 
judges are consistently more lenient on female offenders than female judges. 
Researchers argue that this finding is due to the tendency of male judges to 
employ a chivalrous or paternalistic lens when dealing with female offenders 
(Spohn & Beichner, 2000).  
 The impact of the judge’s race has also produced mixed findings. In one 
study, the research revealed that black and white judges decide cases similarly but 
that black judges are more likely to sentence all offenders regardless of race to 
prison (Steffensmeier & Britt, 2001). Conversely, another study found that black 
judges were more likely than white judges to send white offenders to prison 
(Spohn, 2009). Thus, the research on gender, race, and judge decision-making is 
varied and primarily focused on the outcome (e.g., the decision), rather than the 
process leading up to that outcome.  
As aforementioned, this past research relies primarily on archival data and 
quantitative methods. And while these pieces are valuable because they provide 
us with snapshots of differences in judge behavior, they fail to describe how these 
differences are constructed by and through communication in the courtroom, and 
how they affect organizing processes on a daily basis. Indeed, a detailed 
qualitative examination that captures the richness and detail of courtroom 
organizing processes is warranted. However, it is necessary to understand other 
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research on emotional work in criminal justice occupations before specifically 
focusing on how a study of process in the courtroom can add to this literature.  
 Some scholars have explored emotional expression associated with the 
legal and judicial systems. Examinations have included the study of paralegals 
(Lively, 2000, 2002; Pierce, 1995, 1999), barristers (Harris, 2002), and 
magistrates, or judges, in Australia (Anleu & Mack, 2005). These studies have 
contributed to better understanding a concept called “reciprocal emotion 
management” (Lively, 2002), or simultaneous emotion management between 
paralegals and lawyers, the suppression of inappropriate emotions in law 
proceedings, and the neutrality of judges in the courtroom. Furthermore, 
scholarship has explored the triadic level of emotional management among 
paralegals, clients, and lawyers (Lively, 2000), and the challenges of displaying 
“appropriate” femininity in the work of paralegals (Pierce, 1995). This research 
provides numerous details on the emotional experiences of some criminal justice 
occupations. However, these studies were not designed to interrogate the ways in 
which the emotional experiences of judges and bailiffs influence each other and 
courtroom outcomes. Instead, they provide a picture that compares and contrasts 
different employee groups rather than centering on the ways a group of courtroom 
employees organizes together. 
 Finally, in other research, legal scholars have called for considerations of 
emotion in the legal decision-making process which begs for investigations that 
foreground qualitative and ethnographic methods over archival and quantitative 
data. For example, scholars suggest that “legal analysis requires decision makers 
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to consider the emotional reactions of others when classifying certain offenses for 
purposes of criminal culpability” (Bornstein & Wiener, 2006, p. 115). Although 
the current research is not focused on the classification of offenses of criminal 
culpability per se, it speaks to the importance of using qualitative data to 
understand the role of emotion in courtroom proceedings and decisions. 
Furthermore, there is a dearth of research that specifically details how 
communication of emotion by judges and bailiffs during the legal process impacts 
decisions, defendant satisfaction, employee well-being, and case processing.  
Summary 
 This chapter reviewed past criminological, sociological, and legal 
perspectives on the work of judges and the courtroom workgroup. Research on 
judges has primarily focused on differences in sentencing decisions based on 
characteristics of the judge such as biological sex and/or race. Additionally, 
research on the courtroom workgroup has detailed how similarities between 
employees relate to sentencing outcomes and how law changes impact their daily 
work. The chapter revealed that there is a need to investigate the communicative 
and emotional processes of courtroom employees to better understand courtroom 
organizing. Furthermore, there is more to understand about the work of 
misdemeanor, or municipal courts, and the experiences of municipal court 
bailiffs. In the next chapter, I review literature on emotional expression, emotion 
cycles, and sensemaking—moving away from previous criminal justice and legal 
perspectives on the courtroom workgroup and judges to explore how 
communicative practices may impact the legal process.  
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Chapter 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW: EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION, EMOTION CYCLES, 
AND SENSEMAKING 
Municipal courtrooms are settings in which the emotional expression of 
judges and bailiffs has important consequences for courtroom processing and 
organizational actor meaning-making. Individuals in the courtroom display a wide 
range of positive and negative emotions, and judges and bailiffs must 
communicate to effectively manage their own and other individuals’ emotions. 
Furthermore, the emotions judges and bailiffs express may help courtroom 
visitors, such as defendants, better understand how the court process works. 
This chapter reviews past research to describe how the use of emotion by 
individuals impacts organizations. Next, I explore emotional contagion and 
emotion cycles to illustrate how the expression of emotion by one employee can 
influence other employees and individuals in the setting. Finally, I discuss 
research on sensemaking, sensegiving, and sensebreaking to explain various ways 
meaning-making occurs in organizations. To understand the emotional 
experiences of judges and bailiffs, the following reviews past research on 
emotional experiences at work and specific types of emotional expression such as 
emotional labor, emotional contagion, and emotion cycles. 
Affect, Emotion, and Types of Emotional Expression in Organizations 
 Affect and emotion have been studied frequently in relation to 
organizational life. According to Barsade and Gibson (2007): 
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 Affect can be thought of as an umbrella term encompassing a broad range 
of feelings that individuals experience, including feeling states, which are 
in-the-moment, short-term affective experiences, and feeling traits, which 
are more stable tendencies to feel and act in certain ways. (p. 37) 
Feeling states can be broken down into the categories of emotions and moods and 
the feeling traits as dispositional affect (i.e., positive affectivity or negative 
affectivity).  
 Affect influences work outcomes. For instance, positive affect has a direct 
linear relationship on creativity for a one day incubation period (Amabile et al., 
2005). Furthermore, positive affect increases cognitive variation (Isen 1999a, 
1999b). Positive affect and emotion also increase an individual’s cognitive 
repertoire. In fact, “experiences of positive emotions prompt individuals to 
discard time-tested or automatic (everyday) behavioral scripts and to pursue 
novel, creative, and often unscripted paths of thought and action” (Frederickson, 
1998, p. 304).  
 Emotions are “elicited by a particular target or cause, often include 
physiological reactions and action sequences, and are relatively intense and short-
lived” (Barsade & Gibson, 2007, p. 37). In the municipal courtroom, emotion is 
displayed by the defendants, lawyers, clerks, bailiffs, and judges in reaction to a 
wide-range of experiences and decisions (Anleu & Mack, 2005). Emotional 
experiences in organizations have become a research topic of increased interest 
since the late eighties and nineties (Brief & Weiss, 2002). Scholars from a wide 
range of disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological approaches have centered 
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on how the emotional expression of employees has direct impacts on the 
processes of organizing. One particular type of emotional expression that has 
arguably received the most attention from scholars—and relates to the work of 
judges and bailiffs—is emotional labor. Additionally, the topics of feeling rules 
and emotional roles—closely related to emotional labor—are detailed below. 
 Emotional labor, feeling rules, and emotional roles. In 1983, a 
sociologist named Arlie Hochschild changed the study of emotions at work 
through her book The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human 
Feelings. Her book “brought emotions to the fore” through a focus on the 
commodification and control of emotions in the service industry (Meanwell, 
Wolfe, & Hallett, 2008, p. 538). This investigation built on Goffman’s research of 
interaction and Marx’s study of factory workers to propose that people 
consistently alter their emotions to match job expectations (Hochschild, 1983). 
More specifically, emotional labor can be defined as “the display of largely 
inauthentic emotions, emotions that . . . can be controlled, trained, and prescribed, 
in employee handbooks” (Miller, Considine, & Garner, 2007, p. 233). For 
example, emotional labor occurs when a judge communicates fairness and 
neutrality, whether or not it is internally felt, toward defendants because he or she 
is mandated to by the courthouse organization. In other words, emotional labor is 
significant because it is mandated by the norms, or rules, of the organization and 
not always consistent with employees’ feelings. 
 Not surprisingly, there has been a high level of interest, debate, and 
research on emotional labor since the germinal work of Hochschild (1983). 
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Scholars in management (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Ashforth & Tomiuk, 
2000; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987), organizational communication (Conrad & Witte, 
1994; Miller et al., 2007; Scott & Myers, 2005; Tracy, 2000, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; 
Tracy & Tracy, 1998), and sociology (Fineman 2005, 2008; Meanwell et al., 
2008) have focused on issues of emotional expression, management, control, and 
commodification. However, many investigations have been conducted in relation 
to service workers (for exceptions see Anleu & Mack, 2005; Harris, 2002; Lively, 
2000, 2002; Tracy, 2005) rather than other types of professionals. This is to be 
expected given that many scholars have assumed emotional labor to be “an 
embedded activity that facilitates the provision of service” (Tracy, 2005, p. 263).  
 This emphasis on service workers is often confined to highly scripted 
occupations including Disney ride operators (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989), 
cruise ship staff (Tracy, 2000), Delta flight attendants (Hochschild, 1983), 
convenience store clerks (Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988), and bill collectors 
(Hochschild, 1983; Sutton, 1991). However, it is important to note that some 
service positions are not always low status and can include employees involved in 
professional work such as the professions of legal, theological, medical, and 
engineering (Fineman, 2008). In these positions, professionals “have 
responsibility for managing their own, as well as others’ emotions” (Fineman, 
2008, p. 678). Furthermore, professional workers are often mandated to express 
the “right feelings” as a way to communicate professionalism and use emotional 
labor to accomplish in their myriad work roles (Yanay & Shahar, 1998). Thus, the 
emotional labor of professionals can be implicit, based on the norms of the 
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organization, and influenced by the differing roles professional employees occupy 
in their work (Morris & Feldman, 1996). 
 As aforementioned, there are several occupations within the legal 
profession that are expected to employ emotional labor and engage in specific 
emotional roles, including judges, attorneys, solicitors, and paralegals. In this 
context, emotional labor is “interactive amongst them with their clients, 
reflecting, and sometimes challenging, pecking orders” (Fineman, 2008, p. 678). 
For example, paralegals have to function as emotion managers in a complex and 
gendered environment—working in emotional roles of care takers and educated 
assistants (Lively, 2000; Pierce, 1995, 1999). Moreover, attorneys often describe 
their jobs as emotionally draining and time consuming. Judges, on the other hand, 
are primarily expected to express neutrality and fairness (Anleu & Mack, 2005). 
Recent research on professional identities has also examined the ways in which 
municipal court judges break or violate these feeling rules of neutrality and 
fairness through both explicit and implicit communicative practices that are 
intricately related to privilege (Scarduzio, 2011). 
 In addition to the specific types of jobs that require emotional labor and 
the differing experiences of professional employees, other research has detailed 
the positive and negative effects of expressing emotional labor (Ashforth & 
Tomiuk, 2000; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Wharton 1993). Research has suggested 
that emotional labor can be stimulating, fun, and challenging (Fineman, 2008; 
Schuler & Sypher, 2000). Emotional labor is also considered a valuable 
workplace skill that assists with socialization in the work of firefighters (Scott & 
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Myers, 2005). Negative effects of emotional labor on workers include alcoholism, 
absenteeism, stress, and headaches (Erickson & Wharton, 1997; Hochschild, 
1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Wharton, 1993).   
 Early research on emotional labor was also primarily concerned with 
worker’s display of positive emotions, such as friendliness, cheerfulness, and 
happiness. However, the literature has also examined negative emotions such as 
hostility (Hochschild, 1983; Sutton, 1991). More recent scholarship has moved 
away from descriptions of “positive” and “negative” emotions toward a deeper 
understanding of the wide range of emotions expected in various occupations. For 
example, correctional officers are expected to display a variety of emotions and 
sometimes employ emotions strategically—performing emotions of “good cops” 
and “bad cops” (Tracy, 2004a, 2005). In addition, 911-call takers often expressed 
neutrality rather than a definitive emotion in order to keep callers calm (Tracy & 
Tracy, 1998).  
 A key concept related to emotional labor is feeling rules. Feeling rules are 
the organizational norms that determine how employees should feel, act, 
emotionally communicate, and respond in workplace situations (Hochschild, 
1983). People consistently manipulate their emotions at work to match the feeling 
rules of the organization (Hochschild, 1983). Research that explores feeling rules 
typically involves discussions of the match or mismatch between feeling rules of 
emotional expression, employee internal feelings, and employee expressed 
emotion (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987).  
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Past research has also examined the emotional roles, or roles employees 
embody through the expression of emotion, in a variety of occupations. Paralegals 
have been found to work in roles of professionalism, deference, and caretaking 
(Lively, 2000). Korean immigrants who work in nail salons perform roles of 
pampering, artistry, and competence (Kang, 2003). Correctional officers work as 
nurturing rehabilitators and suspicious disciplinarians in their interactions with 
inmates (Tracy, 2005). Additionally, border patrol agents play emotional roles 
that include aggressive agent presence, being professional and stoic, and 
demonstrating care and compassion toward immigrants (Rivera, 2010). These 
findings suggest that depending upon the organization, the type of occupation, 
and the norms of each specific occupation, employees may occupy various 
emotional roles.  
In the courtroom, courthouse administrators provide little guidance about 
the feeling rules and/or emotional roles of judges and bailiffs besides the mandate 
to “be neutral”—which has been documented in past research (Anleu & Mack, 
2005). However, even though the legal system focuses on rationality there are still 
emotional components of judge and bailiff work. Yet, there is a lack of 
understanding about how judges and bailiffs use emotion in their daily work and 
what types of emotional roles they embody to influence organizing and macro-
level expectations. Therefore, the following research questions are proposed: 
RQ1: What are the emotional roles of judges and bailiffs in municipal court? 
RQ2: How does the emotional expression of judges and bailiffs help them manage 
organizational challenges? 
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Additionally, another gap in the literature includes how the emotional roles of 
judges and bailiffs influence each other—issues that research on emotion cycles 
and emotional contagion can help clarify. 
 Emotional contagion and emotion cycles. Emotional expression in 
organizations, especially in communication, has centered primarily on a within-
person view. In other words, the research has focused on how employees adjust 
their emotional expression to achieve organizational goals. Research on emotional 
contagion and emotion cycles expands emotional labor research by revealing the 
importance of the transfer of emotion between organizational actors (Barsade, 
2002). Indeed, the creation of group level emotion is “what defines a group and 
distinguishes it from merely a collection of individuals” (Barsade, 2002, p. 644). 
Specifically in the courtroom, the emotion of not just one employee—but how 
this emotion moves between the judge and bailiff, influences daily organizing and 
constructs meaning-making. 
 Emotional contagion is defined as a “process in which a person or group 
influences the emotions or behavior of another person or group through the 
conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes” 
(Schoenewolf, 1990, p. 50). Emotional contagion occurs at both a conscious and 
subconscious level (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992, 1994). Hatfield et al. 
(1992) introduced “primitive emotional contagion” and described it as an 
automatic and subconscious type of nonverbal mimicking. Thus, much of the 
research on emotional contagion focuses on how the emotional expression of an 
individual through nonverbal communication is transferred and perceived by 
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group members (Mehrabian, 1972). Interestingly, more recent research has also 
found mimicking to occur through verbal interaction—revealing that emotion can 
be transferred via verbal or nonverbal communication (Rafaeli, Cheshin, & 
Israeli, 2007). At a conscious level emotional contagion can manifest through 
cognitive processes. In these situations, emotions are caught through a type of 
social comparison process where individuals match their emotion to the 
environment and the emotions of others around them (Adelman & Zajonc, 1989; 
Sullins, 1991). For example, when a judge expresses anger toward a defendant, 
the defendant may express an emotion of guilt or remorse to match the emotional 
display of the judge and the seriousness of the courtroom environment. 
 Emotional contagion significantly influences work outcomes (George, 
1989, 1990; George & Brief, 1992). In an examination of nurses, research found 
how their moods were related even after controlling for important variables such 
as work problems (Totterdell, Kellett, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998). In another 
study, researchers discovered that both the individuals in the work group and 
outside observers of the work group were able to recognize and name the same 
work-group mood (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). Furthermore, researchers found 
high arousal moods as easier to recognize and claimed that “affective 
convergence is more likely to occur for high-energy than for low-energy 
emotions” (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000, p. 222). Similarly, the expression of positive 
emotion via emotional contagion has been shown to encourage cooperation and 
task performance of group members (Barsade, 2002). This would suggest that it 
may be easier to transfer positive emotion than negative emotion in courtroom 
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environments and the expression of positive emotion may help judges and bailiffs 
increase task performance. 
 Work groups with high levels of task interdependence may benefit from 
emotional contagion to complete tasks together (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). 
Furthermore, emotional contagion is likely to occur in organizational settings 
where there are repeated situations and a need to monitor behavior—issues 
especially related to the work of municipal court judges and bailiffs (Bartel & 
Saavedra, 2000). Additionally, emotional contagion directly impacts employees in 
customer service contexts. Customer service workers who display positive 
emotion are able to transfer these feelings to customers and create higher levels of 
customer satisfaction (Pugh, 2001). Conversely, workers who are surrounded by 
customers in negative moods may be stressed due to the repeated exposure to 
upset individuals (Barsade, 2002). Emotional contagion may also be impacted by 
organizational power relationships between supervisors and employees (Barsade, 
2002). For example, entrepreneurs have been shown to transfer their feelings of 
passion toward employees below them in the organizational hierarchy (Cardon, 
2008). Taken together, this research suggests that emotional contagion may be 
especially relevant in a fast-paced and repetitive environment where task 
interdependence is used to process cases, such as municipal court. Also, the 
spread of emotion between judges and bailiffs is potentially impacted by the 
power position each judge holds. What is potentially interesting is how emotional 
contagion influences organizing in the court and further how the emotion is then 
cycled through the courtroom. 
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 As mentioned, a great deal of emotion research has centered on a within-
person view, or the effects of one employee’s emotional expression on 
organizing. In contrast, emotion cycles research considers the “reciprocal 
interpersonal influence of emotion” and proposes that “one person’s emotion is a 
factor that can shape the behavior, thoughts, and emotions of other people and 
that emotion operates in cycles that can involve multiple people in a process of 
reciprocal influence” (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008, p. 36). Thus, emotion cycles center 
on the social influence and social construction of emotion between individuals in 
organizations. During emotion cycles, emotions are displayed by an agent through 
nonverbal and verbal behavior and these emotions affect others in the 
organization (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008). Interestingly, the emotion expressed can 
influence the person to whom it was directed as well as to third party observers. In 
municipal courtrooms, where individuals observe interactions among judges, 
bailiffs, and other defendants, third party observers may be influenced by emotion 
cycles that occur chronologically before their own specific interaction with a 
judge. 
 Emotion is cycled through organizations in myriad ways. First, as 
mentioned, emotions can be transferred between people through emotional 
contagion or mimicking. Second, individuals may engage in emotion 
interpretation, or “perceive an agent as feeling a particular emotion and react with 
complementary or situationally appropriate emotions of their own” (Hareli & 
Rafaeli, 2008, p. 41). Third, emotion cycles can help organizational actors draw 
inferences about the meaning of emotion and about the individuals who express 
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the emotion (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008). In other words, employees attribute 
meaning about emotional behavior and characteristics of other employees based 
on the cycling of emotion. Importantly, emotion cycles are dependent upon the 
perceived authenticity of others’ emotion display (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008)—
suggesting that the initial agent’s convincing performance of emotion is important 
to the success of the cycle. However, there is less known about the impact of 
other organizational agents on the cycle of emotion besides the initiating agent. 
Thus, an examination of multiple individuals within the emotion cycle and their 
influence on work outcomes is important because it provides a more detailed 
picture of the life cycle of emotion—revealing how employees work together to 
construct cycles for the benefit of individuals visiting the organization. 
 The literature has discussed connections between the expression of 
negative emotions by employees and emotion cycles. For example, researchers 
investigating “toxic decision processes” explored the emotion cycles of negative 
emotions and identified a three stage process of inertia, detonation, and 
containment (Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004). These findings highlight that negative 
emotions are likely to continuously cycle through organizational environments 
that are repetitive and mundane because employees may be burned out and 
stressed by their work. In a similar study of negative emotion, emotion cycles of 
employee emotional abuse (EEA) were described to detail the ways employees 
resist and respond to instances of workplace abuse such as workplace bullying 
(Lutgen-Sandvik, 2003). In some cases, the cycling of negative emotions has been 
found to be destructive to organizing. However, research has revealed less about 
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the cycling of emotions with a positive valence such as pride, humor, or 
compassion. An investigation of emotion cycles of various types of emotion can 
shed light onto the ways certain cycles benefit and hinder organizing in 
courtrooms.  
Emotion cycles exemplify the relationship between rationality and 
emotionality because they illustrate the ways employees attribute meaning to the 
emotional displays of coworkers. Yet there is still more to understand about the 
ways emotion cycles can cue employees and individuals who the organization is 
servicing, such as defendants, into how to make meaning and not make meaning 
about organizational life. Thus, organizational sensemaking serves as an 
important phenomenon to consider in relation to the concept of emotion cycles—a 
topic I examine next. 
Organizational Sensemaking  
Sensemaking as a cognitive phenomenon occurs at the intrasubjective 
level, or individual level (Weick, 1995). In other words, sensemaking as a 
cognitive phenomenon is an everyday occurrence that happens inside an 
individual’s head when they “make sense” of something. In contrast, sensemaking 
as a theoretical perspective is much more complex than sensemaking as a 
cognitive phenomenon because it not only considers the individual level of 
meaning but also the relational, the group, and the societal levels of meaning. 
Essentially, sensemaking as a theoretical perspective is concerned with the 
movement of meaning between these various levels (Weick, 1995).  
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 The individual level refers to individual level perceptions that occur within 
people’s heads. The relational level refers to the shared perceptions and meanings 
that occur between dyads and groups and exist outside of any one individual. 
Next, the group level is categorical and abstract. It includes collective level, 
structural understandings that go beyond individual and relational meanings 
(Weick, 1995). Terms such as organizational norms, organizational culture, 
structuration, and organizational identity reside at the generic subjective level. 
Finally, the extrasubjective level involves societal and global levels of meaning. 
These levels are important to the study at hand because they highlight the ways 
meaning can move among individuals, dyad, and groups in organizations such as 
the courtroom through sensemaking. Specific characteristics of sensemaking also 
illustrate the importance of meaning making in court. 
 In Weick’s (1995) groundbreaking book, Sensemaking in Organizations, 
he proposed seven properties of sensemaking. These properties suggest that 
sensemaking is: 1) grounded in identity construction, 2) retrospective, 3) enactive 
of sensible environments (enactment), 4) social, 5) ongoing, 6) focused on and by 
extracted cues, and 7) driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. These 
properties are related to this study in that courtroom sensemaking is inevitably 
grounded in the individual identities of the judges, the relational identities among 
the judges, bailiffs, and defendants, and the organizational identity of each 
specific courthouse. In addition, courtroom sensemaking is a social process that 
occurs due to the collective understandings of numerous employees. Indeed, 
sensemaking in the courtroom is a never-ending, ongoing process, in which 
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organizational members make sense of ambiguous and uncertain situations 
through the extraction of emotional and environmental cues. 
 In later research, sensemaking is discussed as a three part, circular process 
that includes enactment, selection, and retention (Weick, 2001). Enactment 
addresses the “what I say” part of the question and occurs when people create the 
environments that they face through encounters with raw data. Selection 
addresses the “until I see” part of the question and occurs when members perceive 
and choose plausible interpretations (Weick, 2001). The organizational members 
attempt to determine not only “what is the story here” (Weick, 2001, p. 237)? But 
more appropriately, “what is a story here” (Weick, 2001, p. 461)? Finally, the 
retention phase of sensemaking addresses the “what I think” part of the question 
and occurs when selected meanings are retained to bring to bear on future 
sensemaking situations (Tracy et al., 2006; Weick, 2001).  
 In the courtroom, specifically, the raw data of enactment is created most 
often when the judges and defendants are interacting during arraignments 
(enactment). Next, the judge selects a plausible explanation for defendants’ 
ambiguous or uncertain behaviors. For example, if the defendant swears at the 
judge and calls her a name, then she must decide the meaning she will ascribe to 
this behavior (selection). In this example, let’s pretend the judge decides to hold 
the defendant in contempt for swearing at her. Finally, the judge retains the 
memory of how she made sense of this previous ambiguous situation (e.g., the 
defendant is upset about their case and taking it out on the judge) and may recall 
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on this memory in future sensemaking interactions when other defendants swear 
at her during arraignments or trials (retention).  
 As aforementioned, sensemaking has been studied in a variety of 
organizational contexts and found to have numerous influences on the processes 
of organizing. Sensemaking is a “fundamentally social process” (Maitlis, 2005, p. 
21), meaning that employees rely on the social construction of their environments 
to make sense of uncertain or ambiguous events in organizations and that the 
process of sensemaking depends upon the real or imagined presence of other 
individuals (Weick, 1995). Past research on sensemaking has discussed the 
process of sensemaking in extreme situations, how specific groups or individuals 
influence other organizational members’ ability to engage in sensemaking, and 
connections between communication, sensemaking, and organizing. 
 Studies of the social processes of sensemaking have primarily explored 
how individuals make sense of chaotic or ambiguous situations. For example, in 
an archival analysis of the death of thirteen firefighters in the Mann Gulch 
disaster, research examined the breakdown of social structure and social roles 
during a crisis (Weick, 1993). Other studies have revealed how collective action 
occurs through “heedful interrelating” on an aircraft carrier (Weick & Roberts, 
1993). Most of these studies have explored situations where individuals need to 
make sense of an event extremely quickly. Furthermore, these studies usually 
involve tightly coupled systems in which “members’ interpretations and actions 
typically have direct and relatively immediate consequences” on other 
organizational members (Maitlis, 2005, p. 23). This research is applicable to the 
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study at hand because it reveals the ways in which employees must make sense of 
situations quickly and efficiently. Additionally, the research suggests that 
employees may work together to make meaning and that their work relationships 
depend upon the meanings that are made. During trials and arraignments, judges 
also must make sense of situations in relatively quick ways—in order to process 
large numbers of individuals in a short amount of time. 
 Sensemaking can shed light onto a myriad of other organizational and 
communicative practices as well. For example, human service workers use humor 
as means to make sense of their identities, highlight, and interpret workplace 
situations in distinctive ways (Tracy et al., 2006). Examinations of humor and 
sensemaking also reveal the effect of humor on organizing, socializing, and 
organizational learning and knowledge (Tracy et al., 2006). This research 
illuminates that the ways in which employees are trained or not trained to 
communicate may have an important impact on their appropriate and effective use 
of humor in the courtroom. Moreover, specific types of humor have been 
described as impacting sensemaking including humor as production control, 
humor as concertive control, humor as resistance, humor as safety valve 
resistance, and humor as reification (Lynch, 2009). Humor allows organizational 
members to “collectively engage in sensemaking and cope with uncertainty and 
pressure at work” (Lynch, 2009, p. 462). Thus, humor may be especially relevant 
in high stress and fast paced environments such as courtroom arraignments. These 
studies reveal the importance of investigating sensemaking in relation to specific 
communicative processes, such as humor, and furthermore, they reveal that these 
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specific communicative behaviors could have both positive and negative effects 
on organizing and identity construction in the courtroom.  
 In sum, research on organizational sensemaking has spanned a variety of 
disciplines and topics. Particularly in communication and management, 
sensemaking has been explored as a key component of organizing and employee 
life. In studies that examine giving or breaking down the sense of others, there has 
been discussion of other concepts related to sensemaking including sensegiving 
and sensebreaking. These are important to the sensemaking process—and 
particularly relevant to this dissertation—because they reveal the ways in which 
employees make sense of situations while also breaking down meaning and 
giving meaning to other present individuals through their communicative 
practices. 
Sensegiving and sensebreaking. Sensegiving and sensebreaking 
processes are related to sensemaking in interesting ways. Sensegiving, 
specifically, is similar to the concept of framing from the organizational 
communication literature. This study focuses on sensegiving rather than framing 
because it intends to investigate the processual relationship amongst sensegiving, 
sensebreaking, and sensemaking. However, framing will be defined in order to 
differentiate it from sensegiving.   
Framing, as discussed by Fairhurst (1993), involves the creation of visions 
and framing devices that assign meaning to organizational situations. Framing can 
occur when managers use metaphors, stories, traditions, slogans, artifacts, 
contrast, and/or when they spin a particular organizational issue (Deetz, Tracy, & 
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Simpson, 2000). Framing is a necessary communicative practice for leaders and it 
is specifically related to organizational change (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996). During 
framing leaders use “words, images, and meanings to mobilize followers to 
support and enact his or her vision” (Shapiro & Ward, 1998, p. 64). Additionally, 
framing devices can include communicated predicaments, possible futures, jargon 
and themes, positive spins, and agenda setting (Fairhurst, 1993). For example, a 
manager could put a positive spin on a corporate merger suggesting that 
employees will receive higher yearly bonuses in the long term even though they 
have to move physical locations in the short term. 
 Sensegiving, like framing, is often employed by leaders during strategic 
change (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). The term was created to understand 
management’s role in the sensemaking process (Caasus, Marensson, & Skoog, 
2009). Sensegiving is defined as “attempting to influence the sensemaking and 
meaning construction of others towards a preferred redefinition of organizational 
reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442). So, for example, a manager would 
engage in sensegiving when she explains recent layoffs as “right-sizing” rather 
than “down-sizing” for the company. And while sensegiving and framing are 
similar because of their focus on leaders, visions, and organizational change, 
sensegiving highlights the process between sensemaking, sensebreaking, and 
sensegiving which is of particular interest to this study. 
 As I review below, sensegiving has been studied by scholars concerned 
with a variety of topics within organizational life including accounting reports 
(Caasus et al., 2009), strategic learning (Voronov, 2008), identity and image 
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(Gioia & Thomas, 1996), psychological contracts (Snell, 2002), and 
organizational change (Vaara & Monin, 2010). Researchers have centered on the 
ways sensegiving occurs through storytelling (Dunford & Jones, 2000), in the 
work of middle managers (Balogun, 2003) and board of directors (McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999), and during organizational change (Corley & Gioia, 2004) and 
organizational development (Bartunek, Krim, Necochea, & Humphries, 1999). 
Moreover, sensegiving allows individuals to redefine situations in ways that are 
beneficial to leaders. Below I discuss how these studies specifically frame the 
current research. 
 Sensegiving helps normalize and legitimize certain organizational realities 
while delegitimizing others (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). The process of sensegiving 
“shuts down alternative interpretations of reality, constrains sensemaking, and 
limits who can participate in the sensemaking process” (Voronov, 2008, p. 201). 
In the courtroom, the process of sensegiving by judges and bailiffs may limit how 
defendants can make sense of events. Furthermore, sensegiving is intricately 
related to power and also helps shape and reshape organizational identities 
because it is usually employed by individuals who hold power within 
organizations (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Voronov, 2008). Indeed, while there is not 
necessarily an officially titled leader in the courtroom, sensegiving most probably 
evolves from the communication of judges or bailiffs rather than defendants.  
 As sensegivers provide new information about meaning in the 
organization, other employees create, recreate, and expand its actual 
organizational identity. Sensegivers in leadership roles create “mental models” 
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that shape the individual and collective identities of their followers (Gioia, 
Schultz, & Corley, 2000). For example, when courthouse administrators value 
efficiency, they may encourage judges to move through cases quickly and/or 
encourage courtroom staff to treat defendants as customers of the court.3 When 
this occurs within organizational life, the process of sensegiving has the potential 
to eliminate “desire to protest, resist, or even pose questions” (Hardy, 1994, p. 
560). In other words, organizational members in the courtroom are faced with 
powerful communicative processes about meaning making that help to shape and 
define the way not only employees but also defendants understand the courtroom 
processes.  
 Recent research on sensegiving has named anticipated gaps in 
organizational sensemaking processes as triggers of sensegiving (Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007). Additionally, enablers, or items related to the effectiveness of 
sensegiving, have been found to include the communicative ability of leaders and 
routines within the organization (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). In other words, 
leaders who communicate effectively with their followers are more likely to 
enable sensegiving to occur. Understanding the sensemaking gaps that 
sensegiving creates could be especially relevant to understanding courtroom 
dynamics. This dissertation examines the way judges and bailiffs respond to gaps 
in understanding from the defendants and use those moments to provide 
information about the proper conduct, behavior, and processes through emotion 
cycles between various actors in the courtroom.  
                                                 
3
 The courthouse administrators at the courthouses I have studied ask courthouse employees to 
treat defendants as “customers of the court” an issue that will be discussed in the analysis. 
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 In addition to sensegiving, sensebreaking is relevant to this study because 
it highlights the ways organizational members must break down sense in order to 
give sense. That is, judges may have to first break down the way defendants make 
sense of specific situations before they attempt to influence their subsequent 
meaning making. In my site specifically, defendants have an expectation for how 
the courtroom process will proceed; however, their perceptions about the flow of 
action (often based upon television shows) are usually not the same as what 
happens in reality. Indeed, the judge may use sensebreaking to break down the 
misconceptions about courtroom processes that defendants learn from watching 
television court shows (i.e., Judge Judy) and then give sense to courtroom 
members in ways that help them move through the system quickly or create 
feelings of fair treatment. 
 Sensebreaking is the opposite of sensegiving. It involves the “destruction 
or breaking down of meaning” (Pratt, 2000, p. 464). Research on Amway 
distributors introduced the purpose of sensebreaking as a disruption in individual 
identity through the creation of a gap in meaning (Pratt, 2000). At Amway 
specifically, sensebreaking occurred by making employees feel like their current 
identities were lacking and that they needed to strive and dream for more (i.e., 
dream building) and sensegiving practices took the form of positive programming 
(Pratt, 2000). This research found that when both sensebreaking and sensegiving 
were successful employees positively identified with the organization. However, 
if either sensegiving or sensebreaking failed, the Amway distributors either 
deidentified or experienced ambivalent identification with the organization (Pratt, 
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2000). Thus, this research suggests that sensemaking and sensegiving are 
processes that work together with sensemaking to help achieve organizational 
goals and outcomes while simultaneously assisting employees to embody 
organizational values.  
Relating Emotion Cycles, Sensegiving, and Sensebreaking 
 Emotional expression and suppression is a daily part of work in the 
municipal courtroom. Judges must manage their individual and others’ emotions 
in ways that help defendants leave with a perceived sense of fairness. Similarly, 
bailiffs may have to match the emotional tone of judges in order to effectively 
perform their jobs. Of particular interest for this dissertation is how the individual 
emotional roles of judges and bailiffs influence and work together as emotion 
cycles throughout the courtroom. Furthermore, this dissertation explores how 
these emotion cycles simultaneously relate to sensegiving and sensebreaking of 
defendants and how they help employees attend to organizational challenges such 
as high caseloads. Indeed, emotion cycles “evoke a process of sensemaking, 
members of an organization make sense of and interpret the emotions of other 
people which influences their own emotions and behaviors as well as processes 
and outcomes of the involved organizational dyads, groups, and teams” (Hareli & 
Rafaeli, 2008, pp. 37-38). But how do emotion cycles impact sensegiving and 
sensebreaking? And what can the study of judges and bailiffs show us about the 
entire life cycle of emotion?  
It would be interesting to understand the ways that judges break down 
sense and give sense to defendants through emotion cycles that include 
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expressions from bailiffs—given the demands for quick and efficient 
communication in municipal court. This dissertation attempts to provide insight 
about the relationship amongst sensegiving and sensebreaking in relation to 
emotion cycles and emotional expression. Therefore, the following research 
questions are posed: 
RQ3: How do emotion cycles facilitate sensegiving and sensebreaking in 
municipal court? 
RQ4: How do judges and bailiffs work together to create emotion cycles in 
municipal court? 
Summary 
 This chapter introduced the municipal courtroom as an important context 
for studying the relationship between emotionality and rationality. This chapter 
reviewed research on emotional expression, emotional contagion, and emotion 
cycles. I highlighted the importance of understanding the interpersonal influence 
of emotion and the emotional roles of courtroom employees. This chapter then 
explored sensemaking, sensegiving, and sensebreaking literature to illustrate the 
ways meaning making occurs in various settings. Finally, I discussed potential 
ways sensegiving and sensebreaking may be related to emotion cycles and I 
offered research questions throughout the chapter. The next chapter details the 
methods I employed to conduct this dissertation and reveals my analysis 
procedures.  
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Chapter 4 
A DAY IN COURT: METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
This dissertation provides an investigation of emotional expression, 
including emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking in municipal 
courtrooms. The research incorporates different types of qualitative methods 
including participant observation, and ethnographic and semi-structured 
interviews to study these phenomena. In the following paragraphs, I explain the 
importance of employing qualitative methods in this study. 
 First, qualitative methods allowed me to capture multiple points of view in 
context (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984; Van Maanen, 1979). Denzin and Lincoln (2005) 
argue that qualitative researchers are able to “get closer to the actor’s perspective 
through detailed interviewing and observation” (p. 12). This dissertation focused 
on situations that were specific to the courtroom context and therefore, it was 
imperative that I observed communication practices occurring in the site as they 
happened. Qualitative researchers also attempt to experience reality, empathize, 
describe, and identify with the people they study in order to understand (Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1984). Throughout my dissertation research, I investigated the context 
and communication in municipal courtrooms to gather a variety of perspectives 
and viewpoints to understand the communicative practices of organizing (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1995; Weick, 1995). 
 Second, qualitative methods attempt to search for theory through a process 
of induction and action toward a certain phenomenon (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). 
Within this approach, theory and method have a shared relationship with each 
  39 
other and the movement between theory and method is iterative (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). The researcher does not start out to prove a theory; but instead 
examines ideas that emerge as most salient from the research (Altheide & 
Johnson, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Thus, as I conducted my observations 
and interviews at the two courthouses, I used the concepts of emotional 
dissonance, emotional deviance, organizational sensemaking, and identity as 
sensitizing concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), but the key findings are grounded 
in the data. During the early time in the field, I employed the notion of requisite 
variety (Weick, 2007) because “it takes a complicated sensing device to register a 
complicated set of events” (p. 16). In other words, I utilized a wide range of 
theories to assist in understanding the complexity of the courtroom. However, in 
this dissertation I ended up focusing on the relationship between emotion cycles, 
sensegiving, and sensebreaking, and the how the emotional roles of judges and 
bailiffs work together to create emotion cycles in municipal court. 
 Third, through qualitative research I utilized crystallization (see Ellingson, 
2009, Richardson, 2000) and relied heavily on participant observation and the 
interaction between the researcher and the people I studied (Lincoln & Guba, 
1995; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Crystallization is a postmodern alternative to the 
traditional conception of validity through triangulation. It suggests that there are 
an “infinite variety of shapes, substances . . . and angles of approach” 
(Richardson, 2000, p. 934) to any research project. Moreover, it proposes that 
each angle of the experience makes the final project more complex and provides a 
deeper understanding of the context under study. In fact, through the use of 
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crystallization researchers do not apologize for “inevitably partial accounts . . . 
[instead they] celebrate them as additional points of view or facets of the crystal” 
(Ellingson, 2009, p. 87). Thus, researchers employing qualitative methods 
recognize and present the partiality of their research in ways that create 
complexity and deeper understanding. 
 In the remainder of this methods section, I provide a description of my 
ethical and self-reflexive considerations, research sites, protocol and logistics, 
data collection procedures including participant observation and interviews. 
Furthermore, I explain my data analysis procedures.  
Ethical and Self-Reflexive Considerations 
 I am personally interested in the topic of courtroom communication 
because I was raised in a family where law enforcement was valued and discussed 
frequently. My father was a criminal defense attorney for my entire childhood and 
teenage life. And although he never discussed specific cases with me due to 
ethical responsibilities to his clients, I was still exposed to lawyers’ behind the 
scenes work. Furthermore, I have always been fascinated with the legal and 
judicial system generally and crime specifically. I am an avid watcher of true 
crime television shows as well as unrealistic but popular legal shows such as Law 
and Order. Despite my high level of appreciation for the criminal justice system, I 
am frustrated with the legal presentation and understanding of courtroom 
proceedings and the overreliance and privileging of rationality in the courtroom in 
past research (e.g., research focusing on legal decisions and outcomes). As a 
communication scholar, I recognize there is much to learn about the 
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communicative practices and organizing during courtroom proceedings and also 
behind the scenes, especially in relation to emotional communication. 
 Originally, I was granted access to the municipal courthouses because my 
father works at both sites as a Judge Pro Tempore, a part time judge that fills in 
for full time judges in a way similar to a substitute teacher. There are several 
potential values and weaknesses, along with ethical implications, of receiving 
access this way and holding this researcher role. 
 The strengths of this researcher role include higher levels of access to an 
infrequently studied population and gathering behind the scene details and 
comments from participants that I may not have been privy to if I was not related 
to a judge. There have been few studies that have acquired the degree of access 
that I have to either municipal judges or other courtroom staff. In fact, there is a 
great deal of mystery around what judges and bailiffs really think and, as 
aforementioned, most legal and criminal justice articles rely primarily on 
speculation and quantitative data on sentencing rather than detailed qualitative 
methods to understand this context. Furthermore, with recent calls to consider 
professional workplaces and identities (see Cheney & Ashcraft, 2007), my 
researcher role provided me unique insight into how judges “do the professional” 
in everyday work situations. Finally, since my father lives in Arizona, he served 
as a key informant during the data collection process. This is beneficial because 
he clarified questions I had about legal proceedings and laws that allowed me to 
understand the context under study in new ways. 
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 However, there are also some weaknesses to my researcher role. 
Participants who know my father may have felt obligated to interview with me or 
tell me “specific” versions of events – especially bailiffs who are in subordinate 
organizational positions and have worked with my father. In the municipal court, 
some of the employees know my father personally and have worked with him at 
some point and others were simply aware of who he was. However, the 
participants I interviewed did not communicate a sense of discomfort with me 
about revealing certain information. Additionally, I am aware that my father’s 
opinions may have influenced the types of data collected and presented in this 
dissertation. Therefore, I was open and self-reflexive during the process of data 
collection about the types of data included and why I have decided to include it. 
Lastly, because I personally know municipal judges, I may have been viewed as a 
“management spy” by bailiffs and I was careful to avoid these perceptions while 
simultaneously reflecting on the types of data collected and how my positionality 
impacted the collection of this data. 
 Some of the ways that these weaknesses and other ethical implications 
were addressed are detailed below. First, I employed relational ethics (Ellis, 
2007), or an ethics of care, by treating participants with respect, conducting 
interviews and discussions around their schedules, and providing follow up thank 
you cards and reports. In addition, relational ethics helped me to focus on 
protecting my participants’ confidentiality. Second, I understood and was 
cognizant that judges and bailiffs did not feel comfortable discussing the specific 
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and/or highly sensitive nature of cases with me and instead, I focused on learning 
about their own communicative behaviors during interviews.  
 Third, and finally, it was difficult to get access to both judges and bailiffs 
and therefore, in many cases I only had “one chance” to get a good interview. 
Therefore, I engaged in practice mock interviews before the actual interviews so 
that I was more fully prepared. Additionally, I made sure to ask questions that did 
not implicate the judges in violation of their ethical codes of conduct. For 
example instead of asking, “What is the biggest mistake you made as a judge?” I 
asked, “Can you tell me about a challenge that you faced at work and how you 
overcame it?” In summary, I took the strengths and weaknesses of my researcher 
position into consideration continually throughout my dissertation study through 
careful thought about the way participants viewed my role in the scene. 
Description of Research Sites 
 The sites of research included two municipal courthouses, Equitas and 
Curia.4 The two courthouses are located in two cities in a large southwestern state 
in the United States (see Table 1 for more details on the research sites). Municipal 
courthouses handle cases which include traffic violations, misdemeanors, small-
claims cases, pretrial hearings, domestic violence cases, assaults, and other civil 
and criminal misdemeanors. 
 Equitas municipal courthouse. The Equitas Municipal Courthouse is 
located in a suburban town. It is a much smaller municipal courthouse than the 
Curia Municipal Courthouse with a total of only about six full-time judges. The 
                                                 
4
 The names of the courthouses have been changed to protect confidentiality. 
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Equitas Municipal Court provides orders of protection and injunctions against 
harassment and addresses criminal misdemeanors including civil traffic violations 
and petty offenses. The Equitas Municipal Court files an average of about 13,000 
cases a year or about 1000 per month.5 
 Curia municipal courthouse. The Curia Municipal Courthouse is 
included within the top ten busiest municipal courts in the United States. The 
court process an average of 300,000 cases a year, including up to 78,000 criminal 
cases. In addition, the courthouse has a large number of employees including 
about 30 full time judges and hearing officers. The maximum punishment 
imposed by judges is a penalty of six months in jail and a $2,500 fine. 
Table 1 
Summary of Research Sites 
Name Location 
Type 
Types of 
Situations 
Observed 
Number of 
Cases (FY 
2010-2011) 
Data 
Collection 
Time Periods 
Equitas Municipal 
Courthouse 
Arraignments, 
non-jury trials, 
jail court 
15,000 Jan 2009-
May 2009, 
Jan 2011 – 
Oct 2011 
Curia Municipal 
Courthouse 
Arraignments, 
pre-trial 
conferences, 
traffic court, 
jail court 
350,000 Jan 2009- 
May 2009, 
Jan 2011 – 
Oct 2011 
Data Collection Procedures 
 I employed multiple qualitative methods of data collection including 
shadowing and participant observation, informal/ethnographic interviews, and 
                                                 
5
 All information about the courthouses was obtained from their websites and from their 2010-
2011 fiscal year workload reports. I rounded up the numbers to protect the courthouses’ 
confidentiality. 
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semi-structured/audio-recorded interviews. Data was gathered during two separate 
time periods (January 2009 – May 2009 and January 2011 – October 2011) for a 
total of 13 months in the field. The data collected included a total of 153 research 
hours and resulted in 441 single-spaced pages of data (see Tables 2 and Table 3 
for research hours and data and Appendix A for a description of participants). 
Table 2 
Summary of Research Hours 
Type of Data Hours Spent Collecting the Data 
 Equitas Municipal Court Curia Municipal Court 
Shadowing/participant 
observation 
45   62 
Interviews – informal  7  17  
Interviews – semi-
structured/audio-
recorded/transcribed  
8 judges, 3 bailiffs 
(average interview length 
was 52 minutes) 
8 judges, 3 bailiffs 
Subtotal 63 90 
Total 153 research hours  
Table 3 
Summary of Pages of Data 
Type of Data Single Spaced Type Pages 
 Equitas Municipal Court Curia Municipal Court 
Shadowing/participant 
observation 
72 107 
Interviews – informal 15 28 
Interviews – semi-
structured/audio-
recorded/transcribed 
108 111 
Subtotal 195 246 
Total 441 single spaced typed pages of data  
 Participants were recruited through an e-mail announcement sent by the 
presiding judge or his or her secretary and also snowball sampling. Access was 
granted through meetings with the presiding judges at each courthouse. 
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Institutional review board approval was received and the studies were determined 
exempt for data collection. Participation in the study was voluntary and all 
participants were assigned or selected their own pseudonyms. Three main sources 
of data comprised the study – participant observation informal ethnographic 
interviews, and formal audio-recorded interviews.  
 Participant observation. Participant observation is a vital part of 
qualitative and ethnographic methodology. Lindlof and Taylor (2002) state that 
participant observers “occupy uniquely liminal positions, in which they are 
situated—both literally and existentially—between various social groups, 
psychological states, research goals, and so on” (pp. 135-136, emphasis in 
original). Additionally, Lindlof and Taylor (2002) explain that every role in the 
field has a generic and situated character. The generic character relates to the 
types of actions and obligations included in the role and the situated character 
“involves the adjustments of the self to specific people in specific situations” 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 143). Ultimately, my researcher role during 
participation observation at the courthouses most closely aligned with an 
observer-as-participant. In the courtroom, I had a detailed plan of how to collect 
data and participants were aware of my presence. However, a role as observer-as-
participant also means that “participation derives from a central position of 
observation [and] observation is primary, but this does not rule out the possibility 
that researchers will casually and nondirectively interact with participants” 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 149). In other words, I never formally participated in 
courtroom activities or procedures; rather, my participation centered on observing 
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courtroom proceedings and also shadowing courthouse employees throughout 
their work days. 
Despite this researcher position, my experience in the courtroom was 
somewhat unique to previous typologies of researcher roles. Indeed, in some 
cases the only person that knew I was collecting data was the judge and in other 
cases everyone in the courtroom was aware of my presence. For example, during 
jail court observations I sat behind the judge’s bench and was affiliated with the 
organization by my physical position. However, in other cases I sat in the 
“audience” and the only people aware of my observer presence were judges and 
bailiffs. Although I did notice that because I was taking notes in a large notebook 
and I dressed in business attire, defendants sometimes asked me questions as if I 
was an employee such as, “Can I just enter the courtroom?” Thus, even when I 
was sitting in the “audience” and only observing some defendants perceived me to 
be affiliated with an official role. 
 In the field, I sat in a variety of locations in the courtroom. As mentioned, 
locations included sitting directly next to the judge’s bench, farther away in the 
actual audience, on the side next to the bailiff’s chair, and in every row of the 
courtroom. Also, I observed at different times of the day and on different days of 
the week to gather a myriad of viewpoints on the scene. I observed at least one 
time during every hour of each courthouse’s normal hours of operation (8:30 am – 
5 pm). Municipal court observation occurred once or twice a week for two-four 
hours. Shadowing employees involved following the employee around for all or 
part of their work day. 
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 A total of 107 observation hours were collected. In municipal courts, a 
large majority of observation occurred during arraignments, or first appearances 
at court, to watch how cases were resolved or terminated in early stages. 
Additionally, some jail court, traffic court, and non-jury trials were observed. 
Field notes were transcribed within forty eight hours of observation and resulted 
in a total of 212 single spaced pages of data. 
 Interviews. I employed two types of interviews in this study: (a) 
informal/ethnographic interviews, and (b) semi-structured respondent interviews 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). I gathered 24 informal or ethnographic interviews to 
collect clarifying information about the courthouses, judges, and bailiffs. These 
interviews were not audio-recorded and they most often took place immediately 
preceding or following observations of organizational members in the courtroom. 
I often asked questions about events that had just happened during observations in 
the informal interviews. For example, I witnessed Judge Smith tell a defendant to 
sit down on the side of the courtroom before he was finished communicating with 
him. When I asked Judge Smith about this interaction later, I learned that some 
judges put defendants in “time out” if their behavior is frustrating the judge or if 
they want to “teach them a lesson”. These informal interviews followed no 
interview guide. 
 Semi-structured respondent interviews were also conducted with 
municipal court judges and bailiffs. The semi-structured interviews were audio-
recorded, transcribed, and followed a formal interview guide. These interviews 
lasted anywhere from 45-75 minutes, with an average of 52 minutes. I 
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interviewed 16 municipal court judges and I also engaged in four follow up 
member reflection interviews. In addition, I interviewed a total of six bailiffs, for 
a grand total of 22 formal recorded interviews with judges and bailiffs. The 
interviews took place in a wide range of locations including the judges’ chambers, 
coffee shops, restaurants, and over the phone and were conducted at a time and 
place convenient for the participant.  
 The interviews with municipal court judges included a variety of questions 
about emotional expression in the courtroom (see Appendix B). I considered the 
“what, why, and how” of the interview, meaning that I: 1) examined relevant 
literature before constructing the guide, 2) understood the purpose of my study, 
and 3) gained knowledge about various techniques of interviewing (Kvale, 1996, 
p. 94). The judge interview guide was separated into six sections including 
background and work history, description of daily work-life, judge behavior, 
identity, and emotion use, power and maintaining order, work-life wellness, and 
closing questions. In the background and work history section, I asked questions 
such as “How long have you been working as a judge?” The description of daily 
work life section was used to get a picture of what municipal court judge work 
entails. Thus, questions such as “What aspects of your job do you enjoy the 
most?” were asked.  
 The focus of this study centers on many of the questions asked and 
answered in the judge behavior, identity, and emotion use section of the guide. 
For example, I asked questions such as “I’ve seen some judges get frustrated and 
angry with defendants during my observations. Can you think of a specific 
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example of a time when a defendant frustrated you,” and “how does an ideal 
judge act, behave, and communicate in the courtroom?” The power and 
maintaining order section asked questions such as “How do you respond if a 
defendant is not following the rules” to understand use and abuse of power. The 
work-life wellness section asked questions revolving around stress and burnout 
including, “What are some of the ways you cope with stress?” Finally, the closing 
questions section asked if the judges had any advice for other individuals who 
wanted to become judges. 
 Additionally, I created an interview guide for municipal court bailiffs (see 
Appendix C). The bailiff interview guide included five sections—background and 
work history, description of daily work life, bailiff identity and emotion use, 
courtroom rules and behavior, and closing questions. In the background and work 
history section, I asked questions such as, “Why did you decide to become a 
bailiff?” Daily work life questions included questions about aspects of their job 
they enjoyed the most and aspects that they found most challenging. Furthermore, 
in the daily work life section I asked, “What are the primary responsibilities of 
your job” to attempt to understand the role of the bailiff in relation to the judge. In 
the bailiff identity and emotion use section, I was exploring the emotional 
expression of the bailiff and how that emotional expression impacted their 
relationships with judges and defendants. I asked questions such as, “I’ve seen 
some bailiffs go out of their way to help defendants. Can you think of a specific 
example of when you went out of your way to help a defendant through a 
challenging situation?” 
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The courtroom rules and behavior section of the interview guide explored 
rule enforcement and relationships between bailiffs. I asked questions such as, 
“How do you respond if there is a disagreement between you and other members 
of your work group?” Finally, in the closing questions section, I asked them if 
there was anything they wished people knew about being a bailiff that they had 
not already talked about. 
As the interviews proceeded, I revised questions and asked for thoughts 
about preliminary themes through member reflections (Tracy, 2010). During 
member reflections, I discussed my observations in the field with participants and 
asked for their opinions and reactions to these observations. In subsequent 
interviews and analysis, I considered the participants’ reactions to my findings. I 
transcribed all of the interviews within one week of completion. After 
transcription, I listened to the audible tapes and checked the transcriptions for 
errors. 
Data Analysis 
 Data analysis was a multiple stage process and involved iterative moves 
between examining and collecting data in the field and reading relevant 
theoretical literature on the topics of interest (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The 
stages of analysis included a data immersion phase, primary cycle coding, 
secondary cycle coding, writing theoretical memos and analytic asides, and the 
use of NVivo qualitative data analysis software.  
 In the beginning of my analysis, I spent a significant amount of time 
organizing all of my data. I chose to organize my data into large binders and also 
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into electronic files for use with data analysis software. During this data 
immersion phase, I read and re-read my data and talked to other individuals about 
emergent findings (Tracy, Forthcoming). Once the data was organized I started 
coding the data. 
The first stage of my analysis involved open coding, line by line coding 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002), or primary cycle coding (Tracy, Forthcoming). During 
this time, I examined my data line by line and attempted to create first-level or 
descriptive codes. First-level codes are primarily descriptive in nature and require 
answering the question “What is happening here” (Charmaz, 2001, p. 337)? As I 
created the first-level codes, I simultaneously created a category codebook that 
listed each first-level code, a description of each code, and an example (see 
Appendix D). For example, I employed the first-level code “humor use” to mark 
anytime that judges or bailiffs used humor in the courtroom. This code included 
examples when I observed humor use in the courtroom and also responses to the 
question from my interview that asked, “Can you think of a specific example 
when you used humor in the courtroom?” A humor use example marked in my 
codebook describes when Judge Major said, “You can have a seat; that is for 
those of you who can find one!” during an arraignment proceeding. 
During the second stage of analysis, I engaged in focused coding, also 
called secondary cycle coding (Tracy, Forthcoming). During secondary cycle 
coding, I named and organized first level codes into specific categories and 
looked for patterns within and between those categories (Charmaz 2001; Lindlof 
& Taylor, 2011; Tracy, Forthcoming). Second level analytic codes were created 
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that tied more specifically to theoretical concepts such as emotional deviance or 
sensegiving. The second level codes were also added to my codebook. For 
example, I used the second-level code “emotional deviance” to mark examples 
when judges violated norms of emotional expression in the courtroom. The humor 
use first-level code previously mentioned was placed into the second-level code 
of emotional deviance and further separated into either “privileged deviance” if 
the judge’s humor was used to draw attention to the judge’s power, or 
“unintended deviance” if the judge’s humor use was an accident (Scarduzio, 
2011).  
 The third stage of analysis involved writing analytic asides throughout my 
field notes and interviews to describe my own thoughts and preliminary ideas. 
Some example topics I wrote about in my analytic asides are bailiff rule 
enforcement, understanding why judges entered and left the courtroom when 
defendants were still present, reflections on the various uses of humor in the 
courtroom, and discussions of relationships between bailiffs and judges. 
Additionally, I wrote theoretical memos throughout the process of data collection 
and analysis in order to describe my second level codes in relation to previous 
theoretical work. For example, I wrote memos about types of emotional labor I 
was observing in attempts to distinguish them from previous theoretical work 
such as the difference between double-faced emotion management and the 
emotional roles of the bailiff. During the process of memo-writing, I conducted 
theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2001) by returning to the field to look for data to 
fill in gaps that I found in my analysis and to clarify emerging concepts. In 
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addition, I conducted negative case analyses; purposefully looking for data that 
refuted what my findings were suggesting and revising categories until I could not 
find any more negative cases (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  
 The fourth and final stage of my analysis involved the use of qualitative 
data analysis software. I imported all of my interview data and field notes into 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software creating each interview as its own case 
and field notes from each courthouse as their own case. Using NVivo, I began to 
re-code the data using free nodes based on my previous primary and secondary 
cycle coding. Through the process of coding in NVivo, I used all of the codes I 
had previously come up with and I created some new codes. During coding, I took 
a break every sixty minutes to write analytic memos about what the codes meant 
in relation to the larger goals of my study. I read over my free nodes (first-level 
codes) and organized them into categories of tree nodes (second-level codes) 
which included: 1) emotional deviance, 2) emotional control and suppression, 3) 
emotion cycles, and 4) sensemaking and emotion. Lastly, using my tree and free 
nodes, I re-created a code book which included first level descriptive codes such 
as “ideal characteristics of a judge” and second level analytic codes such as 
“emotional suppression”. The code book included the name of the category or 
theme, a definition of that category, and a real or hypothetical example of each 
category. NVivo helped me with organizing my data and quick retrieval of 
examples during the writing of my results chapters.  
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Summary 
 This chapter explained the qualitative methods employed to examine the 
courtroom context. First, I described how qualitative method’s reliance on voices, 
diverse perspectives, understanding, and crystallization made them appropriate for 
this dissertation. Second, I detailed the two research sites and the participants in 
this dissertation. Third, I offered descriptions of my three methods of collecting 
data—participant observation, informal interviews, and formal audio-recorded 
interviews. Fourth, I revealed the data analysis practices this dissertation utilized 
including data immersion, primary and secondary cycle coding, theoretical 
memo-writing, member reflections, negative case analysis, and NVivo data 
analysis software.  
The next three chapters provide a detailed picture of the results of this 
dissertation. In chapter five, I describe the nature of municipal court—explaining 
the types of proceedings I focused on, what a day in court is like, and four 
organizational challenges that judges and bailiffs face on a daily basis. In chapter 
six, I investigate the emotional roles of municipal court judges and bailiffs and I 
begin to explore how their emotional expression is used to respond to 
organizational challenges. Finally, in chapter seven, I illustrate the emotion cycles 
of municipal court and reveal how these cycles allow judges and bailiffs to give 
sense to and break sense of defendants. Together, these chapters illuminate a story 
of emotional expression by judges and bailiffs and the emotional sensemaking 
processes of courtroom proceedings. 
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Chapter 5 
THE NATURE OF WORK IN MUNICIPAL COURT 
Judges and bailiffs at the Curia and Equitas municipal court agree that 
most individuals in the general public are not aware of how the courtroom 
functions on a daily basis—a fact that the literature also reiterates (Anleu & 
Mack, 2005). Indeed, many of the participants I interviewed frequently mentioned 
defendants had little understanding of how court processes worked. The confusion 
about daily courtroom organizing created tension and added responsibilities for 
judges and bailiffs. Additionally, macro-level issues and elements of daily work 
life in the courtroom created organizational challenges for judges and bailiffs.  
This chapter begins by describing the types of proceedings in municipal court. 
Next, I briefly describe a typical day in court for judges and bailiffs. Finally, I 
focus on three organizational challenges associated with emotion that impact 
organizing in municipal court. These descriptions of municipal courtrooms 
provide a background explanation for the judge and bailiff emotional roles and 
also for how employees give sense to and break sense of defendants through 
emotion cycles.  
Types of Proceedings 
The job of a municipal court judge includes presiding over a range of 
proceedings in their daily work. Judges work at: a) arraignments, b) pre-trial 
conferences, c) trials, d) order-to-show cause hearings, and e) in-custody dockets. 
Bailiffs, similarly, work during various types of proceedings. During trials and 
pre-trial conferences lawyers are usually present in the courtroom. In both cases, 
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the judge is working with only one defendant at a time and he or she does not 
have the ability to communicate directly with the defendant but must speak to the 
defendant through the lawyer. Trials last from one to five days. Pre-trial 
conferences are faster than trials—lasting from ten minutes to an hour. In some 
cases, I included examples from in-custody dockets in my analysis. In-custody 
dockets occur the morning after defendants have been arrested. Defendants are 
held overnight and in the morning a judge decides whether the person will be kept 
in jail or released. Since this study is centered on the direct communication among 
judges, bailiffs, and defendants, I focused primarily on two specific types of 
proceedings in the analysis that offered the most frequent number of interactions 
among these group members. The two courtroom proceedings that I focus on are 
arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings which I explain below. 
An arraignment, or initial appearance in court, is the time set for 
individuals to be seen initially after charges have been filed against them. For 
example, an individual who is pulled over and given a ticket for driving with a 
suspended license is given a court date. On that date, the person charged with the 
crime, called a defendant, must show up to court at any time during normal 
business hours (8:30AM – 5:00 PM). When the defendant shows up at court, they 
check in and are then assigned to a courtroom. In the courtroom, the defendant is 
seen by a judge. The arraignment courtroom usually includes, at any given time, 
one judge, one bailiff, and between 10-50 defendants waiting to have their cases 
processed. The interactions between the judge and defendants usually last 
between one to five minutes.  
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 The second type of proceeding I focused on was order-to-show cause 
hearings. These are times set for the judge to make decisions on cases where 
defendants have become non-compliant in paying their fines. Thus, defendants are 
asked to “show cause”, or provide the judge with a reason why they are 
delinquent, in order to avoid being held in contempt of court. Similar to 
arraignments, the defendants are given a date to come in to the court. However, 
the time judges talk to individuals in these hearings is usually longer than 
arraignments because the judges ask defendants more questions about their case. 
As Judge Nixon explains, “both arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings 
are walk-in dockets.” This means defendants can walk in to the court at any time 
of the day rather than having a scheduled appointment. Because defendants can 
walk in, certain times of the day and days of the week are usually busier such as 
mornings, after lunch, and “payday Fridays” (Judge Lewis). As Judge Hocum 
explains, “Fridays are busier because people are trying to clear things up.” 
Additionally, most people in order-to-show cause hearings owe the court money 
and thus, they may come to the court on “payday Fridays” because that is when 
they have the available funds to pay the court.  
As aforementioned, I focused on arraignments and order-to-show cause 
hearings because of the large number of individuals who must be seen by the 
judge and bailiff and the prevalence of direct communication among the judge, 
bailiff, and defendant. As I’ll explain next, the typical work day of judges and 
bailiffs and the various organizational challenges they face influence daily work 
life and provide a backdrop for understanding emotion use in the courtroom.  
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A Typical Day in Court 
 Municipal court judges at the Curia and Equitas courthouses have a range 
of tasks and responsibilities depending upon which division they work. A division 
typically includes a judge, and one to two bailiffs. Each division handles different 
types of cases and situations. For example, the divisions I primarily observed 
were courtrooms where criminal misdemeanor arraignments occurred. In these 
courtrooms, cases primarily included driving with suspended licenses, shoplifting, 
driving under the influence of alcohol, and/or domestic violence charges.  
 The typical work day of a judge varies depending upon the division in 
which he or she works. Judge Hocum, a judge in the civil traffic division, explains 
her typical day below: 
 I have four dockets. That’s an eight thirty, a ten thirty, a one thirty and a 
three o’clock docket. Those dockets are people who actually have set 
appointments, so they’re set arraignments, set motions for the default, or 
set sentencing, then in between those just as people come, then we just 
have the walk-in people. So it’s a steady day. 
Judge Hocum’s day includes four dockets, or times where defendants have 
scheduled appointments to meet with the judge. The rest of the day includes 
interactions with walk-in defendants. Thus, depending on the day, her level of 
busyness can vary tremendously.  
 In contrast to Judge Hocum, some of the other judges I interviewed 
worked in different types of proceedings throughout the day. Judge Warchol 
describes, “My average work day is basically starting dockets at 8:30 and ending 
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them at 5 o’clock, meaning I do arraignments, I do pre-trial conferences, I do non-
jury trials, and I do in-custody dockets in the afternoon.” As Judge Warchol 
explains, a typical work day can include numerous types of proceedings. Thus, 
judges must have the versatility and flexibility to work through different 
challenges that arise due to the nature of the court proceeding. Bailiffs also are 
faced with a work environment that changes frequently. 
 In the courtrooms I observed, bailiffs were rotated weekly. For example, a 
bailiff would be assigned to work in one judge’s courtroom for a week and then in 
another courtroom the next week and so on until the cycle started over. Bailiff 
Mary described, “In the arraignment courts we move from courtroom to 
courtroom and judge to judge each week.” She went on to explain that during her 
typical work day she, “works in the courtroom for half the day and then I switch 
with one of the other bailiffs. For the second half of the day, I work on paperwork 
and another bailiff works in the courtroom.” From this description, we learn that 
the bailiffs spend half of their days in the front stage and half of their days in the 
back stage—a workplace reality that is unique to the work of bailiffs and not 
applicable to judges. During an informal interview, Judge Yorker explained that 
“We process so many cases. They [bailiffs] can’t both be in the courtroom 
because there is too much paperwork that needs to be done behind the scenes.” 
These examples describe that bailiffs must also be flexible because they work 
with different judges and different proceedings each week. Additionally, beyond 
the actual structure of their work days, judges and bailiffs face several types of 
organizational challenges associated with emotion. I share these here to set the 
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stage for my later findings and analysis about how and why judges and bailiffs 
engage in sensegiving and sensebreaking.  
Organizational Challenges Associated with Emotion 
Over the course of my observations of various courtroom proceedings, I 
noticed judges and bailiffs respond to organizational challenges associated with 
numerous issues. However, for the purpose of this study I chose to focus on three 
organizational challenges associated with emotion. The first of these challenges 
was the defendants’ lack of understanding of courtroom processes. The second 
challenge included the need to process a large number of cases while treating the 
defendants as customers of the court. The third challenge involved balancing the 
emotional mood of a formal and serious situation with the actual tedium and 
monotony of the courtroom environment. 
Defendant Confusion about Court Processes 
Many defendants come into municipal court without a clear understanding 
of how it works. First, the confusion is partially related to the fact that many 
defendants have never been in the courtroom. As Judge Fortune suggests, “the 
vast majority of the cases we have are first offenses.” In reality, approximately 
75% of court cases include first offenders (Equitas Municipal Court Fiscal Report, 
n.d.). Second, most of the defendants in municipal courts generally and in 
arraignments and order-to-show-cause hearings specifically are not represented by 
attorneys. Bailiff Leslie stated, “If you have a lot of people in here not 
represented, a lot of them come in here very confused.” One particular area where 
I noticed the defendants’ confusion was about the judge’s ability to resolve cases. 
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Time after time, defendants would expect the judge to solve their problem when 
in reality it was not within the judge’s job to completely resolve the case.  
Judges have little discretion to make decisions about cases during 
arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings. In other words, during 
arraignments the only option is for judges to accept guilty pleas—if the defendant 
wants to plead not guilty the judge is required to schedule a pre-trial conference or 
send the defendant to speak to a prosecutor depending on the type of charge. The 
purpose of the defendant seeing the judge is to eliminate, or at least reduce, the 
number of individuals in the system by resolving the cases where guilty pleas can 
be taken during initial appearances. During order-to-show cause hearings, judges 
can only decide if the defendant is in contempt or is not in contempt related to 
their delinquency on fines. For example, someone charged with shoplifting will 
not have their case resolved during an arraignment. Rather, the judge will call 
them forward and ask them if they would like to speak to a prosecutor about a 
diversion program, or a class they can take to have their charges dropped. 
Because many defendants believe their case will be further resolved than is often 
the case in these initial hearings, a great deal of confusion can arise in the 
courtroom on the part of defendants. 
For example, I witnessed as a defendant became confused while Judge 
Suarez attempted to get his plea. 
Judge Suarez reads the man his rights and explains all the maximum and 
minimum penalties for the charge looking at him directly in the eyes. The 
judge then asks the men what he pleads. The man hesitates to respond and 
  63 
looks down at the ground. The judge queries, “What are you worried 
about?” The man replies, “I don’t want to go to jail.” The judge retorts, 
“You’re not going to jail. So what do you plead?” The man admits, 
“Guilty, I guess.” 
As evidenced in the above example, the defendant seemed unsure about what to 
plead. He did not understand what the consequences were for pleading guilty and 
was therefore reluctant to admit guilt. Indeed, even when the judge assured the 
defendant he would not be going to jail he still was hesitant to plead guilty adding 
the qualifier of “I guess.” Repeatedly, I witnessed similar situations in the 
courtroom where defendants responded hesitantly to requests, asked for 
clarification, and needed assistance making decisions about their cases.   
During interviews, judges explained why they believe defendants may be 
confused. For example, Judge Ryne stated:  
Arraignment is not the time when a person can tell their story and a lot of 
time defendants don’t understand that. That’s just a time when a person 
can either plead guilty or not guilty. So a judge has to be able to explain to 
the person, you can’t tell your story today but do it in a way so that you 
are not rude. 
As Judge Ryne suggests, many defendants come to court expecting to explain 
their case directly to the judge. The defendants are excited and nervous to explain 
what happened and tell their side of the story. However, due to the large number 
of individuals that the court processes during arraignments there is not enough 
time to provide each defendant the opportunity to share their point of view. 
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Instead, defendants have their initial appearance at an arraignment at which time 
they either plead guilty or not guilty. If they plead guilty, the judge can take their 
plea. If they plead not guilty, they are assigned to come back for a pre-trial 
conference. Thus, unlike presentations on popular television shows like Judge 
Judy and The People’s Court, defendants actually do not have the opportunity to 
tell their stories until their pre-trial conferences and by this time they have either 
hired a private attorney or are assigned a public defender who speaks for them.  
Judges also discussed that having to “cut defendants off” during 
arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings was particularly challenging. 
Judge Costello elaborated: 
 They’re trying to tell you their whole life story and you really can’t allow 
them to do that and still process everybody who needs to get through that 
day and it’s sometimes hard to kind of cut people off, because there are 
some people who are bound and determined or hell bent on telling their 
story and you know taking all this time to tell you whether they want to 
plead guilty or not guilty and that’s really the only question you need to 
get answered at that moment. So that’s a challenge. 
Similar to Judge Ryne, Judge Costello explains that arraignments are not a time to 
let defendants tell their stories. She expands on this by revealing that the judge 
really only needs to get the plea from the defendant. Additionally, the lack of 
understanding that defendants bring with them to the courtroom creates a 
communicative challenge for the judges and bailiffs. As a consequence, the 
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judges have to find ways to explain how the courtroom works to defendants and 
simultaneously process their cases quickly. 
Indeed, defendant understanding is complicated by external discourses 
such as courtroom dramas. For example Judge Costello mentioned, “It’s (Judge 
Judy) as much of a distorted view of what you get in say Law & Order. I think 
those kinds of shows skew people’s perspectives of how they are going to be 
treated and how things go in court.” Conversely, Judge Hocum offered a positive 
perspective, “I have my catch phrase one of my jokes in the back with the staff is, 
‘zip it’. That’s going to be my catch phrase; they’re going to start doing the zip it, 
and then I’ll get my own T.V. show.”  Thus, Judge Hocum uses a characteristic of 
Judge Judy’s communication—her catch phrase “zip it”—in her own courtroom. 
Indeed, the judges recognized and were aware that defendants come in shaped by 
external influences and larger discourses of what court will be like—another 
factor that influenced defendant perceptions of how court was supposed to work 
that did not match organizational reality. 
 The challenge of communicating the nature of court processes to 
defendants is further complicated by the sheer number of defendants who need to 
be seen over the course of a typical day. On average, the judges I interviewed 
were expected to resolve or process about 40 defendants a day. However, in 
arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings that number jumps up to 
approximately 70-200 defendants. As aforementioned, defendants in both types of 
proceedings are primarily walk-ins. Each division is expected to process all the 
defendants who arrive in the courtroom and stay until each defendant has been 
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seen by the judge. In other words, if it is 5 o’clock and defendants are still waiting 
to be seen, the judge and bailiff must stay to finish processing the cases. Bailiffs, 
specifically, usually stay even longer because they are responsible for completing 
the paperwork for each case after the judge makes his or her decision. Moreover, 
judges and bailiffs must process the large number of cases while simultaneously 
treating the defendants as customers of the court—an issue I turn to next. 
Processing Customers of the Court  
The second challenge is the macro-level pressure judges and bailiffs feel 
to process cases quickly while simultaneously treating defendants like customers 
of the court. Judges explained that they are expected to get defendants “in and 
out” (Judge Smith) and “go as fast as possible” (Judge Meyers). These facts 
suggest that judges and bailiffs are given limited amounts of time to communicate 
how the process works and what the appropriate and inappropriate types of 
behavior are in the setting. During an informal interview, I recognized the 
importance of processing cases quickly when Judge Yorker asked me how Judge 
Black read her pleas and if she used any shortcuts that he could incorporate into 
his own pleas. Indeed, judges were interested in cutting time off of each defendant 
interaction through small changes in their communicative behavior. Interestingly, 
courthouse administrators not only expect judges and bailiffs to process cases 
quickly but also to provide a type of customer service.  
The Curia and Equitas municipal courts specifically encouraged judges to 
treat defendants like “customers.” As one presiding judge explained, “I mean 
obviously customer service is a really important part of everything we do, 
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whether it’s dealing with defendants or witnesses, whoever, anybody who comes 
in here is a customer of the court.” The pressure to treat defendants like customers 
was created by various norms related to customer service. At each courthouse, 
there is a customer comment card box outside the courtrooms where defendants 
can file complaints about the way they are treated in court. These complaints are 
compiled and saved for each judge. The defendant complaints have the potential 
to create organizational punishments on a large scale such as prohibiting a judge 
from receiving reappointment at their formal reviews every other year and also on 
a smaller scale. For example, during an informal interview, Judge Major 
mentioned that she had been brought in for a meeting about courthouse concerns 
by her presiding judge when she received two complaints in the comment card 
box within a month. She was told to treat the defendants more respectfully 
because there had been complaints about her demeanor. Judge Major was 
disciplined for not being fair and given the opportunity to change her behavior 
before her reappointment review. Indeed, judges and bailiffs are held accountable 
by defendant opinions and therefore they must adequately perform fairness so that 
the defendants do not claim otherwise. 
Another norm related to customer service is the expectation to treat 
defendants respectfully. Furthermore, the norm is complicated by the number of 
defendants the judges and bailiffs process daily. In other words, judges and 
bailiffs must not only process cases quickly but also treat each defendant with a 
certain degree of respect due to their customer status. Judge Fortune elaborated, “I 
just start out with the idea that everybody comes here is worthy of respect . . . 
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[and] we can make a difference now.” Thus, the mandate to treat defendants like 
customers complicates communication among defendants, bailiffs, and judges 
because it puts pressure on courtroom staff to not only make defendants feel as if 
they are treated fairly but also to influence the defendant’s future behavior by 
making a difference now.  
While most of the judges and bailiffs agreed that defendants should be 
treated fairly they did not agree with the idea that defendants are customers. Many 
of them explained that this was because defendants do not “choose” to come to 
court. Judge Major reiterated: 
A customer is somebody who has the choice to go somewhere, the choice 
to shop at Target or the choice to shop at Wal-Mart, or the choice to not 
shop at all. I am adamant about the fact that I do not consider these people 
customers. I consider them defendants and I don’t mean that in a 
derogatory sense. Again they are not customers, they are not here because 
they want to be here. They are not here because they are choosing to come 
to court, they are here because they are in a bad situation and they have to 
come here and get a resolution.  
As Judge Major explains, a defendant’s experience is uniquely different from a 
customer’s experience because they do not usually have a choice about coming to 
court. Other judges pointed out similar reasons why they do not view defendants 
as customers. 
 Judge Lewis said, “And so even if you are rude to them they might have to 
still come back where most customers wouldn’t.” Indeed, judges have more 
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leeway than typical customer service clerks to express their emotions to 
defendants without penalty. Judge Darson also emphasized, “A customer is not 
compelled to come into a place and buy a product or service.” Similar to past 
research, the judges and bailiffs face a dialectic of service—where the 
organization asks them to be respectful but actual courtroom interaction is 
different than customer service (Tracy, 2005). Thus, judges and bailiffs must 
provide a service, perform fairness, and create satisfaction for individuals who do 
not typically want the service in the first place. Furthermore, judges, who are in a 
high status position, face the difficulty of serving and being respectful to low 
status others—similar to the work of correctional officers (Tracy, 2005). In 
addition to the challenges mentioned above, I want to share one more 
organizational challenge, and it is related to the emotional moods of the 
courtroom itself. 
The Emotional Mood of the Courtroom  
Environments can communicate a mood or emotional feeling simply by 
the way they are organized visually. In the arraignments and order-to-show cause 
hearings I observed, the environment conveyed a sense of seriousness and 
solemnity, similar to what has been described in past research as “grim formality” 
(Waldron, 2000). In the excerpt below, from one of my first observations at the 
Curia Municipal Court, I describe my initial impression of the physical set up of 
the scene: 
When I walked into the courtroom, no judge or bailiffs were present, only 
people sitting in rows of wooden seats. A large bench spans the front of 
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the room where the judge sits along with two seats on the side that have 
computers and printers (for the bailiffs). Interestingly, the judge’s seat is 
significantly higher than the ones on the side. An American flag is 
positioned on the left side of the bench and the state flag is on the right. 
Also in between the rows and bench are two smaller tables where 
defendants sit and fill out the paperwork that the judge gives to them. The 
defendants waiting for their turn sit in wooden rows behind the railing and 
they often do not sit next to each other unless they came together or there 
are no other seats available. As I sit and wait, I notice how quiet it is in the 
courtroom. I can literally hear the lights buzzing and the clock ticking. I 
can sense the uncertainty, apprehension, and nervousness of the people 
around me. 
The description above mentions at least three ways that defendants are cued into 
the mood of the courtroom environment. First, the defendants are visually cued to 
the importance of the judge through the height of his or her chair in comparison to 
other individuals. Also, the physical arrangement of judges and bailiffs seated in 
chairs that are separated by a railing and looking down upon defendants highlights 
a separation between the two groups and suggests the notion of insiders and 
outsiders. Second, the quietness of the courtroom sends the message that this 
environment is serious and as described communicates a feeling of uncertainty 
about what is about to happen in the scene. Third, the American flag and state flag 
cue the defendants into the larger ideals of justice and government that align with 
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the organizational identity of the court. In addition to the physical set up, the 
actual appearance of the judge also impacts the mood in the courtroom. 
Defendants are cued into the position of the judge and the seriousness of 
the situation through the formal black robe that judges wear in the courtroom. 
Indeed, judges themselves are also aware of the importance and symbolism of 
their robes. Judge Yorker explained, “When you put on the robe, people just treat 
you differently” and Judge Darson suggested, “[People] think it’s a big deal when 
the robe goes on and you are in the courtroom.” Furthermore, judges were quick 
to mention that their position and the robe symbolize the judicial branch of 
government and should be respected as such. Thus, defendants are cued into the 
mood of the setting (serious) and the position of the judge (powerful) through the 
physical set up of the environment before any verbal communication actually 
occurs.  
 In contrast to the grim formality and perceived seriousness of the 
courtroom, the emotional mood of municipal court is characterized by a great deal 
of tedium and monotony. As an observer, I described this monotony in my field 
notes. For example, during one observation, I wrote: “Time drags in this place, 
even for me and I am not even waiting to be seen by the judge. I wonder how the 
defendants feel. You have to have a lot of patience in this place.” A reason why 
time can drag during arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings is because 
individuals are processed in waves. For example, let’s say a group of twenty 
people is waiting to be seen by the judge during an arraignment. The judge walks 
into the courtroom and stays present until he or she has processed the files—
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meaning the judge has reviewed the defendants’ cases and taken their pleas. As 
the judge has processed the files, new defendants have walked in but their files 
have not arrived from downstairs so the judge leaves the courtroom until the new 
files have arrived. Meanwhile, the new defendants have sat through the 
processing of up to 20 other people which could take up to an hour or more, then 
watched as the judge left the courtroom usually without an explanation of where 
s/he was going or when s/he will return, and then sat there in anxious silence for 
up to ~30 more minutes without any discernable activity.  
In other words, there is a lot of tedious down time when the judge is not in 
the courtroom and the defendants are just waiting to be seen. A reflection in my 
field notes exemplifies the feelings of sitting in the courtroom: 
This courtroom has lots of breaks in what is going on. The judge comes in 
and calls about five to seven names and then the judge leaves out of the 
back doors behind his bench. This gives the impression that the judge’s 
time is important but the defendant’s time is not. The judge can get up and 
leave to go to the bathroom or hang out in the hallway behind the 
courtroom but the defendants have to sit and wait because they do not 
know when the judge will come back and they do know when their name 
will be called. They cannot afford to miss their time in front of the judge. 
Defendants are cued in to the mood of the scene when the judge enters and leaves 
the courtroom. As mentioned, the judge could enter and leave several times before 
seeing a defendant. Further, because the actual interactions between judges and 
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defendants are relatively short (1-5 minutes) many defendants spend more time in 
court waiting to speak to the judge than actually talking to him or her. 
 For example, during an observation I watched a man wait for his turn to 
see the judge for about an hour. When the judge finally called the man forward, 
he simply said, “You need to go downstairs and post your bonds or I am going to 
put you in jail.” The man turned to walk out of the courtroom—sighing and 
rolling his eyes as he stormed by me. This man had waited an hour to have an 
interaction with the judge that lasted less than a minute. In other cases, the tedious 
nature of the courtroom impacted courthouse employees. 
 Judges and bailiffs discussed the monotony of court especially in relation 
to the repetitive and routine nature of the cases. Time and again I watched 
defendants being called forward for driving with a suspended license charges. 
Bailiff Tammy stated that, “You get really tired of seeing the same thing over and 
over.” Judge Costello affirmed: 
I think it can be hard not to get cynical and jaded. Also sometimes 
particularly in arraignments kind of everything is different but a lot of it’s 
really the same, so on some mornings in arraignments I come in like, “Did 
I really go home last night? Or did I just have a short dream that I went 
home.” So it can be repetitive. 
On the same note, Judge Adams mentioned that there have been days when he 
wanted to “poke his eyes out” because he has to see a large number of civil traffic 
charges (i.e., speeding tickets). Furthermore, Judge Fortune reiterated that, “You 
can look around and say what you are hearing now is what you are going to be 
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hearing 20 years from now, it’s not going to change dramatically, and especially 
in municipal courts, players don’t even change.” In other words, the proceedings 
judges work may vary but the actual content of what they are dealing with does 
not change that often.  
Bailiffs also appeared bored by the repetitive structure of their work days. 
During an observation of arraignments, I watched as Bailiff Penelope kept 
nodding off in the middle of a trial. Additionally, I witnessed Bailiff Mary and 
Bailiff Tim staring into space while judges engaged in discussions about 
delinquent fines with defendants. On a similar note, Bailiff John mentioned, “I 
sometimes zone out when the judge is reading pleas.”  Pleas can be especially 
monotonous because they include the same statements and questions each time 
and judges can read guilty pleas to 5-10 defendants in an hour. Common 
questions during a plea include: 1) Have you had any drugs, alcohol, or 
medication in the past 24 hours? 2) Has anyone forced you or threatened you to 
plead guilty? 3) Do you give up your rights to an attorney? The judges also ask 
about immigration status and explain how to appeal a decision. The examples 
above reveal that the tedium and monotony of the courtroom at the municipal 
level is inevitable because of the repetitive nature of the types of cases, the 
defendants who are being seen, and ultimately the structure of the courtroom 
itself. 
 The previous descriptions of the mood of the courtroom highlight both the 
formality and seriousness of courtroom proceedings coupled with the tedium and 
monotony of daily work life. These issues suggest an interesting question in terms 
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of how judges and bailiffs deal with the reality of these two moods—something I 
turn to in the next chapter when I explain the emotional roles of courtroom 
employees. 
Summary 
 This chapter introduced the courtroom environment and explained three 
organizational challenges associated with emotion. First, the lack of defendant 
understanding about courtroom processes compels the judges and bailiffs to find 
ways to communicate a great deal of information in a short amount of time. 
Second, the judges and bailiffs face pressure to resolve cases quickly and treat 
defendants like customers. Third, they must do so in a very formal organizational 
setting that is marked with tedium and monotony. These challenges set the stage 
for the heart of my analysis which discusses the emotional roles of judges and 
bailiffs and how the emotional roles cycle and influence each other to help give 
sense to and break sense of defendants. In the next chapter, I detail how the 
judges and bailiffs have integrated emotional roles into their communication to 
deal with these organizational realities. 
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Chapter 6 
THE EMOTIONAL ROLES OF MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES AND 
BAILIFFS 
The emotional expression of employees is an important part of daily 
organizational life. As documented, many employees are expected to employ 
emotions—both formally and informally—to reach organizational goals 
(Hochschild, 1983; Tracy, 2004a). In many cases, the emotions employees 
express align with organizational expectations (Pugh, 2001). However, often 
times the requirements of emotional display discussed formally contradict with 
the ones actually manifest during organizing (Tracy, 2005). In the courtroom 
specifically, emotional behavior is frequently discussed as something to be 
avoided by courthouse administrators and even some employees (Spohn, 2009). 
Despite this, observations and interviews with judges and bailiffs reveal various 
emotional interactions common in municipal court. Due to the fact that emotion is 
rarely discussed in regard to legal workers and the reliance on performances of 
rationality, the emotional experiences of judges and bailiffs highlight a new way 
of understanding these organizational positions.  
 In this chapter, I explore judges’ and bailiffs’ emotional expression in the 
courtroom and the roles this emotion employs. Emotional roles explore the way 
employees use emotion to accomplish tasks at work. Emotional labor 
performances and emotion management allow judges and bailiffs to embody these 
emotional roles. I provide answers to the questions, “How do judges and bailiffs 
talk about emotional expression at work?” and “What are the emotional roles of 
  77 
judges and bailiffs?” This chapter also begins to answer the question, “How does 
the emotional expression of judges and bailiffs help them manage organizational 
challenges?” Judges’ experiences in the courtroom reveal how the emotional roles 
they occupy vary widely from the organizational mandate to be neutral. Bailiffs’ 
emotional roles illustrate the importance of their position as a buffer between the 
emotional expression of judges and defendants. 
The Emotional Roles of Judges 
Municipal court judges at the Curia and Equitas courthouses are not 
formally expected or required to express emotion in their daily communication. 
This is apparent through the judges’ responses to the interview question, “How 
are you trained to communicate emotionally with defendants?” For example, 
Judge Darson explicitly stated that she was trained to “NOT be emotional” and 
Judge Adams claimed that his demeanor must be “dead-pan.” Additionally, as 
Judge Ryne explained, “As a judge, you are neutral. Neutral party. You just sit 
neutrally listen, make rulings when people object, make a ruling on their case at 
the end.” Judge Nixon echoed by stating, “We are trained to use logic and reason 
and leave emotion out of it.” Indeed, the courthouses administrators officially 
only require judges to display neutrality. However, the way judges talk about their 
work and actual observations of courtroom interactions contradict with the 
mandate of neutrality—revealing that emotions are not required but frequently 
expressed in court.  
One way judges expressed the emotional nature of their work was through 
their use of metaphors. Judges compared their work in municipal court to “factory 
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work,” “being an air traffic controller,” “groundhog’s day every day,” and the 
“principal’s office for grown ups.” Judge Black, in her description of 
arraignments stated that, “It’s like an assembly line. Processing the widget.” 
Additionally, Judge Ryne elaborated: 
Especially this type of court, this is the principal’s office for grown ups. 
The people that come in here they are grown ups, but they are people who 
can’t comply with society’s rules. In school you might have somebody 
getting in a fight with another kid, or running through the hallway, or not 
getting to class on time. Well these are the same types of rules. These are 
people who can’t comply with rules.  
These metaphors touch on the characteristics of the defendants and also highlight 
the repetitive and tedious nature of municipal court. What’s more, they hint at the 
types of emotional expression that is necessary to control this monotonous 
environment. For example, the description of the courtroom as a “principal’s 
office for grownups” suggests that judges may need to emotionally communicate 
a combination of authority and compassion. The descriptions of their work as 
“factory work” and “processing the widget” implies that judges view their jobs as 
repetitive and perhaps routinized, but also that they may need to communicate 
helpfulness to keep the cases moving quickly. The metaphor of “groundhog’s day 
everyday” suggests similarly that a judge’s work lacks variety and emotional 
expressions that break up monotony may be appropriate such as humor. And the 
metaphor of “air traffic controller” hints at the stress judges may feel and the time 
they spend directing defendants about how to properly navigate the court system. 
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In all cases, the metaphors indicate a role for communicating emotionally—
whether that is through sternness, authority, compassion, or helpfulness.  
 Interestingly, judges often talked about the use of specific emotions as a 
characteristic of an ideal judge which contradicts with their discussion of how 
they are trained. For example, Judge Costello stated that, “Empathy for someone 
who has experienced a tragedy is okay.” Moreover, Judge Yorker claimed, 
“Humor can help put individuals at ease” and Judge Hocum said, “I think you 
have to have a sense of humor on the bench and in your communication.” 
Additionally, Judge Warchol explained a judge’s demeanor should, “I think be 
stern but not overbearing.” Thus, judges talked about the need to express certain 
emotions as part of their work even though they were only asked to be neutral. 
Consequently, it is important to learn about the emotional expression that 
emerged in judges’ work roles to better understand how these displays help judges 
navigate their daily work lives and respond to organizational challenges. 
Judge as Tension Reliever  
 Humor, especially tension relief humor, was used in the courtroom 
frequently by judges. Tension relief humor is employed to help individuals relax 
and to alleviate stress, strain, or pressure in the workplace (Lynch, 2002). When 
asked the interview question, “Can you provide an example of the type of humor 
you used in the courtroom,” most judges provided an example of a comment or 
statement that eased tension.  
During observations, the judges often employed tension relief humor in 
response to an event occurring outside of their control. For example, I watched 
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Judge Meyers use humor in response to the organizational challenge of a tedious 
and slow-moving environment.  
There are no more files left in the courtroom and the defendants are still 
waiting to be seen by a judge. Judge Meyers smiles, “Your files are on the 
way. As soon as they get in, I will be with you.” A baby cries out loudly in 
the courtroom, “AAAAHHHH!!” “I don’t blame her,” the judge says as he 
winks and the ten people waiting to be seen laugh. 
In this case, Judge Meyers used the unexpected baby cry as an occasion to make 
light of the tedium of the courtroom and the possible frustration that people felt 
because they had not been seen by a judge yet. As a consequence of this 
comment, the defendants and staff were able to laugh at an otherwise frustrating 
situation imposed by the macro-level structure of the court (i.e., movement of 
files). Therefore, in this case the tedium and monotony that occurred through 
waiting for files was in some ways alleviated through Judge Meyers’ tension 
relief humor.  
Other judges also expressed humor to make light of the structure of 
arraignments. For example, Judge Costello stated: 
I give the general spiel and there are people who hear it more than once 
and they are tired of hearing it and I will say I am going to call you up 
individually and if you’re not the person to whom I am speaking you can 
go back to thinking about whatever you were thinking about—and that 
always gets a chuckle, and sometimes people will come toward the bench 
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and they’ll stop way back and I’ll say, “Come on up here I’m not going to 
bite you.” 
Similar to the previous example, Judge Costello expressed her humor in response 
to the larger macro-structure of the court (e.g., defendants waiting to be seen due 
to no files). Her humor made fun of the fact that defendants have to hear the 
repeated instructions from the judge. Also, she encouraged defendants to stand 
closer to her, promising she would not “bite” them. In this case, the humor use 
communicated that it is appropriate to stand closer to the judicial bench and as a 
consequence Judge Costello was able to provide directions about appropriate 
courtroom behavior.   
Judge Major also discussed her use of humor during arraignments to 
improve the mood. She explained how the courtroom can be particularly crowded 
and that she has made light of this by saying when she entered, “You can have a 
seat, that is for those of you who can find one!”Again, Judge Major is using her 
humor to laugh with the defendants about something outside of her control. 
Indeed, Judge Major also stresses the importance of using humor “sparingly” 
when interacting with defendants. Thus, Judge Major thinks humor is appropriate 
but put specific parameters on the type and kind of humor that should be 
employed. She believes the humor can be used in regard to the situation or the 
process but should not be utilized to make fun of defendants. Other judges agree, 
such as Judge Adams who explained to me, “We are making fun of the situation, 
not the individual.”  
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Judge Warchol’s opinion on the use of humor is similar and she says 
humor should be “harmless” and “not offend anyone.” In an example of a jury 
trial, Judge Warchol explained how she made the comment, “Whoa officer, be 
careful about the comments you make about us over fifty folks” to make light of a 
police officer’s statement about aging. This comment was directed toward the 
“over fifty folks” in the courtroom, including the judge, lawyers, and jury and in 
Judge Warchol’s words was meant to bring some “levity” to an otherwise serious 
proceeding. Thus, the comment made light of the officer’s comment and also 
made fun of her own age. The humor was unexpected and provided a break in the 
monotony and seriousness of the trial. 
 In observations, I also noticed judge’s using humor in response to 
defendants’ nervous or accidental behavior. In the following observation at 
Equitas Court, Judge Smith responded to a defendant’s verbal slip. 
 A shorter, stocky, slightly balding man waddles up to the male judge and 
when asked, “Can you afford a lawyer?” The man’s response is “No 
ma’am.” The judge replies with a twinkle in his eye to the man, “Ma’am? 
Do I look like a woman?” “No sir,” the man shakes his head quickly. “I 
don’t usually get called ma’am unless my hair grows out,” the judge 
laughs. “Well my hair doesn’t grow out at all,” the man retorts and both 
the judge and defendant laugh. 
Judge Smith, in this case, responded to an accidental slip by the defendant with a 
humorous response rather than becoming angry or upset. Through his response, 
the judge downplayed the significance of the defendant’s mistake. The judge’s 
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expression of humor in response to the defendant’s embarrassing moment helped 
the judge perform fairness toward the defendant.  
During a plea in the Curia Court, Judge Suarez also chose to use humor in 
response to a female defendant’s verbal slip.  
 The judge asks, “So do you plead guilty?” The woman shakes her head 
no—her eyes are open wide and I can see her right hand shaking slightly. 
Judge Suarez looks at her directly, “You are not going to jail. So do you 
plead guilty?” The woman smiles and shrugs her shoulders, “Shit, yeah.” 
The judge looks wide-eyed at the woman and there is a silent pause. The 
woman interjects, “I mean sure.” The judge laughs, “Did you just say ‘shit 
yeah’? I am supposed to ask you if there is anything else you want to say 
but I am afraid to ask you.” 
Here Judge Suarez’s response to the woman was humorous and served to relieve 
tension. The judge could possibly tell the defendant was nervous from her 
nonverbal behavior. Similar to the examples presented above, an event occurred 
outside the judge’s control and the judge had to quickly come up with a response. 
Indeed, when the defendant expressed something accidentally an ambiguous 
situation was created and the defendant was unsure of how the judge would 
respond. Instead of holding her in contempt, scorning her, or ignoring the 
behavior, the judge filled in a gap in meaning by providing a humorous response.  
 The examples of humor use above highlight times when the judges’ 
emotional behavior fit the role of tension reliever. In these cases, using humor 
serves to lighten up a serious and tedious environment, helps defendants 
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understand their mistakes are not that serious, and creates perceptions of fair 
treatment. Humor in these cases is being used in response to accidents and 
situations outside of the judge’s control. The situations judges are responding to 
include macro-level issues and challenges such as the tedium of the courtroom, 
the mandate to treat defendants like customers, and a lack of defendant 
understanding but also micro-level issues such as responses to unexpected 
comments in the courtroom. Being a tension reliever is one important emotional 
role of judges; however, in the next section, it becomes apparent how emotions 
expressed to enforce order in the courtroom are also necessary in the work of 
judges. 
Judge as Order Enforcer 
Judges incorporated the expression of sternness, anger, frustration, and 
sometimes even rudeness to help enforce order in the courtroom. In some cases, 
the emotions expressed to maintain order were communicated by judges to help 
them avoid putting defendants in contempt of court. For example, Judge Costello 
explained: 
 I had a non-jury trial and I found against his client and he was just flipped 
out about it and he was just going off and I said you know I understand 
that you don’t agree with me. And he literally started coming toward the 
bench and he was hollering. So I put up both my hands and said in a loud 
voice, “You need to sit down and you need to do that now,” and thankfully 
he did. 
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In this situation, Judge Costello’s expression of anger cued the defendant to stop 
coming toward the bench. The judge did not hold the man in contempt of court 
but rather expressed an emotion which assisted with enforcing order in the court. 
In a similar example, Judge Hocum told me: 
 I had to yell at a defense attorney because he was physically in the 
officer’s face, and I started with the Mr. Banta, Mr. Banta, and the officer 
is trying to leave and the man is huge in front of him, and finally loud 
enough that it caught him off guard I’m like, “Out of my courtroom now.” 
And he left. 
In both of the previous examples, the judges verbally displayed an emotional tone 
of anger or frustration. As a consequence, the judges’ behaviors helped maintain 
order in the courtroom and allowed the judges to not put the people in contempt—
a behavior they tried to avoid. As Judge Warchol explains, “Contempt really 
should just be a last resort” and Judge Adams echoes, “I’ve only held one person 
in contempt in ten years.” As evidenced, the judges viewed the ability to control 
their own courtroom as a badge of honor—being proud of the ability to put the 
lowest number of individuals in contempt as possible. And the judges’ verbal 
behavior (i.e., yelling) and nonverbal behavior (i.e., raising their hands) was 
employed in response to threatening behavior as a way to avoid contempt and 
enforce order in the court. 
 Judges also enforced order by expressing frustration toward defendants 
who were not acting appropriately in court. For example, after asking a twenty-
something blonde defendant if she could afford a lawyer, the defendant paused. 
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Judge Black responded, “If you have to pause, you can’t afford one.” In this case, 
the woman nodded in agreement, was handed a form to fill out, and shuffled to 
the side of the courtroom. In another interaction, Judge Donovan snapped, “Don’t 
show me those documents like you are in charge of this room” to a lanky male 
defendant in a Harley Davidson t-shirt who was explaining why he did not show 
up for a previous court date. In response, the man stopped talking, slouched 
slightly, and pulled back from handing the judge his documents. And finally 
during an arraignment interaction, Judge Yorker told an average height and build 
male defendant with stringy brown hair, “Don’t lean on the bench. This is not a 
bar, it is a courtroom,” to which the man quickly stood up and apologized with his 
head down and his hair slightly covering his face. As described previously, one 
organizational challenge of the municipal court is defendant confusion about 
courtroom processes. In the examples above, judges used quick and frustrated 
comments to communicate something about the courtroom process and 
defendants responded by following the judge’s instructions. Indeed, the emotional 
tone of anger/frustration helps judges maintain order through their demeanor and 
cue defendants into appropriate and inappropriate behavior. 
 Judges’ emotional responses to defendant excuses also served to enforce 
order in the court. For example, in an order-to-show cause hearing, I watched an 
interaction where the judge expressed an emotional tone of frustration in response 
to an excuse. 
 Judge Monroe asks the defendant, “Why aren’t you paying this?” The 
defendant looks down, “I don’t have a job.” The judge queries, “Have you 
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been looking?” And the defendant continues, “Yes, and there are no jobs 
out there.” The judge rolls her eyes, “Oh there are jobs out there.”  
In this example, the judge expresses an emotional tone of frustration in response 
to a delinquent defendant. Judge Monroe seems to be verbally communicating to 
the defendant that his behavior is unacceptable. Additionally, Judge Monroe’s eye 
roll nonverbally communicates a sense of frustration. After Judge Monroe’s 
expressed frustration both verbally and nonverbally, the defendant stopped 
providing excuses for his behavior. Thus, one consequence of the emotional 
expression was resolving the case faster and maintaining order in the court by 
quashing the defendant’s repeated excuses. 
 Another example from my field notes at the Equitas court highlights how 
Judge Adam’s responded to a defendant who did not pay his fine on time.  
 Judge Adams questions, “Well what happened?” The defendant shrugs his 
shoulders, “I had applied for a pension and I am still waiting to hear.” The 
judge starts, “I don’t see that you came in…” The defendant interrupts, “I 
was hoping that…” The judge talks over the defendant, “Hoping, sir, is 
not communication. That is something going on in your mind.” The 
defendant looks down and mumbles, “I figured.”  
As evidenced above, in response to Judge Adams’ interruptions (a communicative 
action that signals frustration), the defendant stops talking and interrupting the 
judge. In this way, the judge’s use of an emotional tone of frustration, while 
perhaps not intentional, serves to ultimately speed up the processing of the 
defendant’s case. If the judge would have let the interruptions continue, the 
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defendant may have spent more time in front of the judge and held up the other 
defendants. It is also important to note that this observation took place during the 
in-custody docket where defendants who have been arrested the night before are 
waiting to find out if they will be released or stay incarcerated. As I learned from 
Judge Darson during an interview, “It’s [the in-custody docket] really like kind of 
the cleanup crew and a lot of people have a lot more serious things going on. You 
can just kind of dispose of a lot of crap. It’s nice to conclude it.” Thus, judges feel 
a sense of urgency to “resolve it,” or process cases during these types of 
proceedings and maintain order because defendants have usually been 
incarcerated over night and are sometimes in a more agitated state than defendants 
in arraignments and hearings. Importantly, judges did not only respond to 
defendants with emotional comments or displays that were angry or frustrated. 
Some judges also expressed care and compassion in response to confused 
defendants, unique types of cases, and distressed victims—as I describe next.  
Judge as Care Taker  
Judges faced the challenge of working with many defendants who were 
confused about court processes. In response, judges employed an emotional role 
of care taker to help assist defendants. For example, I watched a judge offer 
advice to a man who seemed confused about how to plead to his charges. The 
man who was charged with theft and burglary in another case was pleading guilty 
to a driving with a suspended license charge. The judge consistently tried to 
persuade the defendant that he should not plead guilty to the lesser charge because 
it could impact his other case later on. The defendant was asking repetitive 
  89 
questions, squinting his eyes, and furrowing his eyebrows—behaviors that the 
judge recognized as possibly meaning he was confused. Additionally, the judge 
related to the defendant by attempting to understand the confusion he might be 
feeling through an empathetic emotional tone. Finally, the judge (re)acted to the 
defendant’s situation by offering legal advice in a situation where doing so was 
not within his job characteristics. The judge recognized not only what the 
defendant spoke verbally but what was not being communicated—a key 
component of compassion (Way & Tracy, In Press). Furthermore, the judge 
related to the defendant by listening, identifying with, and making a connection to 
his problem. Finally, by (re)acting, or demonstrating action before feeling (Way 
& Tracy, In Press), the judge displayed compassion toward the defendant but also 
as a consequence helped the case process more efficiently by decreasing the 
defendant’s confusion.  
 Judges displayed compassion toward defendants not only about cases but 
also in regard to their personal issues. For example, an observation of Judge 
Yorker from my field notes reads:  
 A man with crutches hobbles up to the bench. Judge Yorker says, “So 
what is wrong?” The man replies, “I have traction in my back and have 
been in and out of the hospital.” The judge banters with the man about 
having a similar problem and then says, “I am going to continue this [the 
case] for 30 days because of your pain. If not, you could be here all day 
trying to get this resolved.”  
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Similar to the previous example, the judge recognized something unique about the 
defendant’s situation, related to the defendant by describing a similar situation he 
had been through, and (re)acted by continuing the case (Way & Tracy, In Press). 
The judge engaged in care work by showing his desire and ability to be flexible. 
Additionally, the judge’s expression of compassion and care even shifted other 
defendants’ viewpoints about him. After observing the previous example I 
overheard two defendants, waiting to be seen, speaking in the row in front of me. 
One woman, referring to the judge, stated, “Nice man.” And the other responded, 
“Yeah I thought he was going to be a jerk but not anymore.” Thus, as a 
consequence of the expression of compassion and care, judges helped defendants 
before them and in the “audience” see their willingness to clear up any lack of 
defendant understanding. 
Judges also demonstrated care through their responses to defendants’ 
comments about their personal lives. During an observation of Judge Lewis, I 
watched her provide an extension on payment toward a female defendant who had 
just had a baby. Additionally, when faced with defendant comments about their 
family or life situations, Judge Lewis took the time to ask questions and respond 
with care. For example, I watched this interaction: 
Judge Lewis asked a male defendant, “How are you doing?” The 
defendant begins to talk about his life, “It’s been rough for me, my father 
is sick.” Judge Lewis soothes, “How is he doing now?” The judge and 
defendant spent a few minutes discussing the health of his father before 
moving back to a discussion of his case. 
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As evidenced above, Judge Lewis spent extra time making concessions and 
engaging in conversations to offer care toward the defendant. Interestingly, the 
requirement to provide care and compassion does not fall within the judge job 
description; however, it was an emotion many of the judges did employ in court 
and it assisted judges with performing a degree of fairness toward defendants. 
My field notes, observations, and interviews revealed a variety of 
interesting ways that judges served in the emotional roles of: a) tension relievers, 
b) order enforcers and 3) care takers. Humor was used to relieve tension when 
situations outside of the judges control (i.e., the number of people in the 
courtroom) created stress for defendants and/or courthouse employees and to 
either break up the seriousness or tedium of the courtroom environment. The 
expression of anger and/or frustration helped enforce order in situations when the 
judges wanted to avoid putting people in contempt of court, when they may have 
felt unsafe, or when defendants were offering excuses. Compassion and care were 
employed, often when the judges noticed a lack of understanding about courtroom 
processes or when the defendants otherwise expressed the need for empathy. 
While the judge’s emotional roles in the courtroom are important, an emotional 
picture of municipal court is incomplete without an understanding of the 
emotional roles of municipal court bailiffs—an issue I turn to next.  
The Emotional Roles of Bailiffs 
The work of municipal court bailiffs includes numerous tasks and 
responsibilities. Primarily, they are expected to be present in the courtroom while 
the judge is reviewing and resolving cases. Once the judge has reviewed a file, 
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seen a defendant, and taken a plea, the defendant is asked to “step to the left”—
meaning that they are essentially passed to the bailiff. At that time, the bailiff is 
expected to schedule the defendant for the next appearance in court (if necessary), 
provide appropriate paperwork, and give directions about any other final steps the 
defendant should take. Additionally, before the judge enters, while the judge is 
present, and after the judge leaves the courtroom, bailiffs are responsible for 
enforcing informal and formal courtroom rules. Thus, bailiffs use emotional 
expression to engage in their role as rule enforcers.  
Bailiff as Rule Enforcer  
 The Equitas and Curia Municipal Courts have specific rules and 
procedures that they ask defendants to follow in the courtroom. Formal rules of 
each courthouse are listed outside the courtroom for the benefit of defendants and 
other visitors. Additionally, the bailiff usually reiterates the formal rules at the 
beginning of the day verbally in court. The formal rules of both courthouses 
include: 1) No talking when court is in session, 2) No food or drink, 3) Cell 
phones must be turned off, 4) All rise when the judge enters the courtroom, and 5) 
No hats. Most of the time it was the bailiff’s job to enforce these formal rules and 
emotional expressions of seriousness are usually used to enforce them. For 
example, in one field note observation I commented: 
 As I sit in the courtroom, I notice that the bailiff is watching everyone like 
a hawk. She has her glasses slid down to the tip of her nose. With every 
noise she looks up to see who created the sound. 
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Thus as my notes describe, the bailiff watches the behavior of the defendants and 
in doing so, helps ensure they are following the rules. In other words, the bailiffs 
express sternness or authority in regard to the importance and enforcement of 
rules. However, even though rule enforcement falls within the bailiff’s emotional 
roles they do not have the ability to override or break the rules as judges 
sometimes do. For example, a defendant asked Bailiff Mary when it would be his 
turn to see the judge. Mary said that the judge “goes in the order that she 
wants,”—a comment that received a sneer from the defendant in response. And 
after explaining the rules of the courtroom to defendants, Bailiff Leslie quipped, 
“You would rather I tell you then the judge because he will definitely tell you.” 
By this she was suggesting that her response would be less severe than the judges 
at an interpersonal level and possibly in terms of the consequences imposed. In 
being the messengers, both Mary and Leslie faced the brunt of the negative 
reaction to rule enforcement rather than the judge. The experiences of Mary and 
Leslie are important because they show the in-between nature of the bailiff role—
they are unable to make formal decisions about defendants and rather serve as a 
buffer—dealing with negative emotional responses from judges and defendants. 
Bailiffs are also expected to enforce specific rules that are not formal. These rules 
are not visually listed in the courtroom and can vary from judge to judge. I 
learned about informal rules during my interviews with bailiffs when I asked them 
“Do the judges you work with include any other rules besides the ones listed?” 
For example, Bailiff Michelle told me about one judge’s tendency to comment 
when women were dressed in revealing clothes—even though, besides hats, none 
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of the formal rules include restrictions on defendant attire. In response, Bailiff 
Michelle explained that she encouraged defendants that they should be dressed 
“appropriately”—yet she mentioned that the definition of appropriate depended 
on the judge she worked with.  
I learned about the informal rules of the courtroom through observations. 
For example, when observing both Judge Suarez and Judge Berry on separate 
occasions I witnessed their comments about public displays of affection. Judge 
Suarez said, “Sir, please remove your arm from around the woman; this is not a 
drive-in theater” and Judge Berry similarly stated, “Keep your hands to yourself,” 
to a couple seated in the courtroom. Since I had already seen the established list of 
formal rules, I was curious about how the informal rules of judges impacted the 
work of bailiffs. Thus, I paid attention to other informal rules during observation. 
Over time, I noticed other informal rules. For example, in Judge Smith’s 
courtroom I witnessed defendants being asked to uncross their arms when 
standing before the judge. Judge Black asked defendants not to lean on the 
judicial bench and Judge Lewis requested that children wait outside with another 
related adult whenever this was possible.  
While the type of informal rule is not necessarily important, each judge’s 
ability to create these rules highlights the flexibility and leeway bailiffs must 
incorporate into their emotional work depending on the judge they work with. In 
other words, the bailiffs only have the ability to enforce what the judge they are 
working with wants them to, serving simply to reinforce or counter-balance for 
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courtroom to courtroom illustrate how bailiffs must learn to be flexible and 
adaptive depending on the judge. These variations create challenges for bailiffs 
who may not work with the same judge all the time. Furthermore, bailiffs are 
often left to clean up the messes that judge’s leave behind—an emotional role I 
discuss next. 
Bailiff as Toxin Handler  
The work of bailiffs includes emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983) and dirty 
work (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999) due to the emotional roles required. Bailiffs are 
specifically faced with the emotional work of managing the negative and positive 
reactions of defendants who are feeling specific emotions created by the 
communication of the judge and/or the organizational challenges described 
previously, but not the bailiff specifically. For example, a field note excerpt 
illustrates: 
 As Louise [the bailiff] turns to leave, a defendant quickly approaches her 
and says, “We are supposed to talk to the prosecutor.” Louise responds, 
“Well, you will talk to the judge and he will tell you what to do.” The man 
looks frustrated and walks back to his seat. As he does, he mumbles, “I 
can tell they really are a lot of help here.” 
In this example, Bailiff Louise must manage her emotions appropriately in 
response to this frustrated defendant who is venting toward her for a situation that 
is outside of her control. Louise and other bailiffs must remain caring and 
respectful during these interactions—serving as a buffer and as other research has 
suggested as toxin handlers, or individuals who manage organizational messes 
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(Frost, 2007; Frost & Robinson, 1999). Even though the defendant is upset about 
something that only the judge can control, Louise serves as a filter between the 
judge and the defendant absorbing the brunt of the emotional work. Meanwhile 
the judge is able to pass the stress of this emotional management to coworkers.  
 A longer example from an observation at Curia court illustrates a similar 
situation where the bailiff must “handle toxin” in an interaction between Bailiff 
Penelope and a defendant. 
 A woman is called and she asks to have her fine dismissed and the warrant 
quashed because she says she was in jail. The judge and the defendant 
banter back and forth and the judge eventually refuses to quash the 
woman’s warrant. The woman sighs, turns around, and stomps to her seat 
in the front row. As the judge goes to leave the courtroom he turns to the 
bailiff and says, “You may have to check on her [referencing her 
paperwork].” After he leaves, Penelope walks over to the woman and asks 
her for her paperwork. The woman sighs loudly and shakes her head in 
disagreement, “But these are different charges and have nothing to do with 
why I am here today.” Penelope sits down next to the defendant and states, 
“It doesn’t matter ma’am. The judge still needs the paperwork from your 
previous charges in order to make an informed decision. I understand this 
is confusing for you.”  
Again, this example reveals the ways in which an emotional encounter between 
the judge and a defendant is ultimately dumped onto Penelope. The defendant 
who appeared frustrated and angry because of the way the judge treated her is 
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now lashing out at the bailiff. Penelope has no control over either the judge’s 
behavior or the defendant’s response leaving her to simply try to diffuse the 
reaction and remain calm in the face of an angry defendant. Indeed, one role of 
toxin handlers is to listen empathetically (Frost & Robinson, 1999), a behavior 
Penelope clearly demonstrated above. 
Bailiffs also handle toxin by remaining calm and performing fairness 
toward confused defendants. For example, in an interview Bailiff Leslie explained 
a time when she was frustrated by a defendant who just “didn’t get it” and she had 
to compensate for a lacking explanation by the judge. 
 I told him that he had already paid his fine and he did not owe any more 
money but he just didn’t seem to understand. I think he was confused 
because when the judge spoke to him he was not being very clear. He 
asked me, “Do I need to make monthly payments?” I said, “Look at me. 
You do not need to pay any more money. You are done paying money.” I 
think he finally got it after we went back and forth about ten times. 
Bailiff Leslie describes this example which highlights the challenge of being an 
employee situated between the defendant and the judge. She is frustrated because 
the defendant does not understand and she blames his prior communication with 
the judge at least partially for this misunderstanding. However, Bailiff Leslie 
suppresses her emotional reactions, and instead simply helps the defendant make 
sense of his case quickly and efficiently. In this situation, the judge’s 
communication left the defendant confused and Bailiff Leslie was left to clean up 
the mess. 
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Bailiffs also try to console or calm down the defendants when they are 
upset about a judge’s decision. In another example, Bailiff Michelle must work as 
a disciplinarian toward a defendant who is misbehaving in regard to a decision 
from a judge. 
 As the defendant walked back to his seat, he secretly raised his middle 
finger, flipping off the judge, so that his friends seated in the “audience” 
could see him. His friends snickered and laughed. The defendant sat down 
and moved his right index finger across his throat in a slitting motion. 
Suddenly, Michelle noticed his behavior and glared at him, “That’s 
enough. You know better than that.” 
Similar to the previous examples, Bailiff Michelle must manage the outburst of a 
defendant who is angry at the judge. The emotional management included 
disciplining the behavior and screening the defendant’s emotional response to 
sanctions imposed by the judge. The work of bailiffs is uniquely challenging 
because they have to manage their own and other’s emotions with little control 
over the decisions that cause such emotional reactions to begin with. Additionally, 
they bear the brunt of emotional outbursts in reaction to the judges’ decision-
making, engaging in work that is sometimes emotionally tainted (Rivera, 2010). 
In other words, the work is objectionable because it falls within socially tainted 
work of serving low status individuals. Not only do bailiffs have to enforce rules 
and handle organizational toxin, their work involves matching the judge’s 
expectations for their behavior in the emotional role of “do gooder”.  
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Bailiff as Do Gooder 
Judges revealed their expectations for bailiffs’ behavior in the courtroom 
in a number of ways and bailiffs strove to be “do gooders”, or individuals who 
consistently met the demands of these expectations. For example, after telling a 
defendant to sit on the side and wait for his paperwork, Judge Nixon quipped, 
“Looks like John (the bailiff) is going really slow. Let’s see if he can get you out 
sometime today.” Later in an interview with Bailiff John he commented that, “I 
feel pressure to move people out at the same speed as the judge. When some 
judges move too fast, I can’t always keep up.” Thus, in this case Bailiff John feels 
as if he must keep up and move as fast as the judge expects him to or he could be 
publicly ridiculed. His emotional expression must match the expression of the 
judge and he must perform “doing good” in order to keep the cases moving.  
Similarly, during several observations, I noticed that Judge Monroe often 
said, “Bailiff Tim will be happy to assist you now,” which usually received a sigh 
or eye roll response from the bailiff himself. Yet, he still complied with the 
judge’s request by smiling and assisting the defendant. In this case, Bailiff Tim 
expressed a sense of frustration that he should be happy to assist simply because 
the judge has claimed that he feels this way. Taken together, these observations 
reveal the work bailiffs must do to “keep up” and engage in the types of the 
behaviors that the judge actually describes about their work. In other words, the 
judge sets the tone for how the bailiff should behave through these comments and 
the bailiff must do good by matching that tone. As a consequence of these 
comments the judge dictates the speed that the courtroom workgroup moves and 
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also forms an initial impression of the bailiff and their work ability for the 
defendants. Furthermore, the judges’ comments reinforce the bailiff as a person in 
a position of little power over the defendant.  
Defendants observe this treatment and then frequently treat bailiffs with an 
emotional response that is a result of their treatment by the judge or is a response 
to a comment by the judge—frequently showing more disrespect toward bailiffs 
than toward judges. For example, judges would even jump back into 
conversations between bailiffs and defendants to stop disagreements. 
Judge Major gets up to leave the courtroom. As she does, Bailiff Adam 
tries to explain to a defendant that he must be back in 30 days for his pre-
trial conference. The defendant begins to try and convince Bailiff Adam 
otherwise asking, “Can I just come back in 40 days?” Bailiff Adam says, 
“No, the judge said it had to be 30.” The defendant shrugs, “It’s not that 
much difference.” Judge Major overhears this and says, “You will be back 
in 30, you are only coming from California,” and she walks out. 
This example highlights the ways in which Bailiff Adam’s behavior was restricted 
by his inability to make formal decisions. In this case, Adam was unable to 
change the judge’s decision and instead only reinforce the response. Therefore, 
Judge Major chose to jump back in to stop the defendant from bantering with the 
bailiff, using her authority—almost like a parent would step into a child’s 
squabble—to stop the disagreement.  
Bailiffs must also do good by displaying similar emotional feelings as the 
judge. Indeed, judges expect their bailiffs to engage in emotional work that aligns 
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with their own emotional displays. This is especially evident in judge comments 
such as, “I guess I was a little bit spoiled in my old division where bailiffs just 
kind of took care of that [enforcing the rules]” (Judge Costello), “They sometimes 
forget that they’re the bailiff and I’m the judge” (Judge Hocum), “If you don’t 
know what is going on, come talk to my bailiff” (Judge Harris). These comments 
reveal how judges deflect responsibility onto the bailiff when they do not want to 
deal with situations in the courtroom (i.e., enforcing the rules, dealing with 
difficult defendants). Also, the comments reveal that judges expect bailiffs to 
know what their job includes and do good by performing their work roles 
appropriately with little guidance from the judge. Similarly, in another example, 
Judge Major explained her disappointment in a bailiff who did not do the 
emotional work she expected, saying: 
 I have a very young bailiff, who does a really good job but there’s a 
maturity evolution still in process. When I am not there things are a little 
more “woohoo” than when I am in there, not because of anything he does 
but because he is probably less inclined [to enforce the rules]. 
These comments reveal that judges regard bailiffs as working effectively when 
they take care of disciplinary issues and emotional outbursts in the courtroom. In 
short, judges view the emotional messes they leave behind as a job that the 
bailiffs should “handle” for them evidenced in the comment from Judge Hocum, 
“You do your job and I’ll do my job.” The implications of this comment are that 
bailiffs must know and understand how to do good at their jobs even though the 
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roles, rules, and expectations can vary depending upon which judge they are 
working with. 
Bailiffs are also expected to laugh at both defendants’ and judges’ jokes. 
Bailiff Tim explained that, “The judge I work with makes a lot of jokes, some that 
are inappropriate, and I feel like I should laugh even if I don’t want to.” Bailiff 
Mary said: “Defendants try to be funny. I had one say, ‘thank you please come 
again,’ when I was finished helping him (implying a customer service 
interaction).” I witnessed many interactions where bailiffs laughed at what I 
perceived to be inappropriate jokes by judges. For example, during a field 
observation Judge Yorker told a defendant to exit the courtroom go left and walk 
to the prosecutor’s office. In response, the defendant exited the courtroom and 
walked to the right. The judge laughed and stated loudly, “He walked the wrong 
way,” and in response, Bailiff Louise laughed as well. In this example and others, 
bailiffs’ emotional work serves to help it appear as if the judge’s behavior is 
“right” or acceptable. Bailiffs seemed to mirror or applaud judges’ behavior even 
in cases where they might be making fun of defendants or acting inappropriately. 
 As described in the examples above, bailiffs serve as a) rule enforcers, b) 
toxin handlers and c) do gooders. The work of bailiffs is socially tainted not only 
because it involves regular contact with people who are stigmatized by society 
(e.g., defendants), but also because they must clean up the messes that the judges 
leave behind. They emotionally smooth over situations that are largely out of their 
control—helping them to deflect blame back onto the judge while simultaneously 
managing the emotional outbursts of defendants. Furthermore, the bailiffs have to 
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listen to defendants’ problems calmly, suppress their own negative responses, and 
treat defendants with respect by doing good and meeting the expectations judges 
have for their behavior. 
 Within the emotional roles described above, bailiffs expressed and 
demonstrated two primary emotional displays/responses that I am calling: 1) 
complementary and 2) compensatory. The complementary emotional response 
occurred when bailiffs emotionally reinforced a similar positive or negative 
emotional display as the judges. For example, if a judge expressed anger, a bailiff 
could complement the judge’s emotion by expressing a similar emotion such as 
anger or frustration or if a judge expressed humor the bailiff could complement by 
laughing or nonverbally expressing amusement. The compensatory emotional 
response, in contrast, involved the expression of emotion that counterbalanced or 
made up for the judge’s negative emotional display. For example, a bailiff may 
express compassion or kindness to balance an angry expression by the judge. 
The two emotional types of displays/responses by bailiffs imply that they 
must simultaneously manage their own emotions and help ease the emotions of 
the defendants as they communicate with one another. Interestingly, and what 
differentiates bailiff work from “double-faced emotion management”, or 
managing of one’s emotions in an attempt to manage others (Tracy & Tracy, 
1998, p. 407), is that the emotional responses of bailiffs are expressed when they 
serve as filters or screens between the emotional expression of the defendants and 
the emotional expression of the judge. It is important to recognize the types of 
emotional responses bailiffs employ because they help to shed light on the way 
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emotion cycles through the courtroom among judges, bailiffs, and defendants—a 
phenomenon I explore in the next chapter. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have highlighted the emotional roles of judges and 
bailiffs. I described three emotional roles of judges as tension relievers, order 
enforcers, and care takers. In addition, I examined the emotional work of bailiffs 
through their roles rule enforcers, toxin handlers, and do gooders. Furthermore, I 
provided and named two types of emotional displays/responses of bailiffs 
including complementary and compensatory. Along the way, I detailed how these 
emotional roles helped judges and bailiffs navigate organizational challenges. In 
the next chapter, I explore how these emotional roles interpersonally influence 
each other and the organization in emotion cycles that help and hinder organizing, 
sensegiving, and sensebreaking in municipal court. 
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Chapter 7 
EMOTION CYCLES, SENSEGIVING, AND SENSEBREAKING IN THE 
MUNICIPAL COURTROOM 
As described in the previous chapters, emotional expression in the 
courtroom by judges and bailiffs includes a range of different emotional roles 
employed in response to organizational challenges associated with emotion. In 
this chapter, I explore how the emotional roles of judges and bailiffs work 
together to cycle through the courtroom environment and cue defendants into 
appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Emotion cycles take the focus of 
emotional display away from a within-person view, and in contrast, center on the 
“reciprocal interpersonal influence of emotion” (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008, p. 36). In 
other words, emotion cycles reveal how the emotional displays of one individual 
can influence and shape the emotion, attitudes, and thoughts of other people. On 
the other hand, sensegiving includes influencing the meaning-making or 
understanding of others to fill in gaps in understanding (Gioia & Chittepeddi, 
1991) and sensebreaking involves the “destruction or breaking down of meaning” 
(Pratt, 2000, p. 464). The following chapter explores the questions, “How do 
emotional cycles facilitate sensegiving and sensebreaking in municipal court,” 
and “How do judges and bailiffs work together to create emotion cycles in 
municipal court?”  
Sensegiving and Sensebreaking via Emotion Cycles 
Through interviews, I learned that the judges engaged in specific 
communicative behaviors to have an impact on defendants. Judge Darson 
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explained, “You must absolutely not let the first defendant act out without 
checking them because defendants in that setting are like a room full of 
elementary children that take cues from each other.” In other words, here we see 
that Judge Darson believes that if she allows a defendant to act out and express 
rudeness without punishment, other defendants may assume that this type of 
communication with the judge is appropriate when it is not. This quote is 
significant because it reveals that judges are aware of the impact their 
communication has on both primary defendants, or defendants directly before 
them, and third party defendants, or those seated in the audience.  
Judges also understand defendants can learn how to act by watching 
interactions before their actual turn and this affects their behavior in court. As I 
heard during an interview with Judge Major, “As a judge you get a secondary and 
a third awareness. I have to keep an eye on what’s happening over here [directly 
in front of her bench], and I have to keep an area of what’s going on out there 
[further away in the group of people in the audience]. So it’s sort of a whole 
awareness of in front of me, beside me, and beyond.” This comment suggests 
Judge Major’s work includes noticing, communicating with, and responding to 
primary and third party defendants. 
During field note observations, I also watched judges behave in ways that 
suggested their potential awareness of the impact of their behavior on primary and 
third party defendants. For example, the following interaction between Judge 
Monroe and a defendant during an order-to-show cause hearing explains. 
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Judge Monroe calls up a defendant and says, “It looks like you made some 
payments and then stopped. Since this is a DUI you have to pay a 
minimum of 100 dollars cash. Why didn’t you see a judge for an 
extension?” The defendant shrugs, “I didn’t know I could,” The judge 
smiles, “But you do now?” The defendant nods, “Yes.” Judge Monroe 
states, “Because you have been listening.” The defendant nods his head in 
agreement. 
In this example, Judge Monroe implies that because the defendant has “been 
listening,” and heard her communicate about extensions with previous defendants 
he should now be aware of this fact and use it in his future encounters with the 
court. Thus, Judge Monroe engages in similar and repetitive verbal 
communication with defendants and as a consequence helps them understand by 
explaining that extensions are available. The defendant came into the interaction 
unaware of his ability to get extensions. Judge Monroe breaks the sense of the 
primary defendant by dispelling the incorrect assumption that he cannot get an 
extension. Thus, the judge’s behavior breaks down the way the primary defendant 
is making sense through her verbal directions. Furthermore, her communication 
may break sense of third party defendants who are also unaware of their ability to 
get extensions until they hear Judge Monroe communicate about them. If Judge 
Monroe can communicate the information about extensions effectively, she can 
possibly decrease the number of people who come into court with warrants for not 
paying their fines. As I learned during an interview, she becomes frustrated when 
defendants frequently return to court. 
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 In one specific case, Judge Monroe had seen a defendant who owed the 
court money and told him what he needed to do to resolve his problem. However, 
the defendant did not follow the judge’s orders and was summoned to court again. 
Judge Monroe explained, “I told the guy, ‘I saw you two months ago and I didn’t 
make an impression?’ I basically suggested that he already knew the drill and that 
I don’t like it when people come in so many times.” In this case, Judge Monroe 
described the cues she provides to defendants in court. She has learned from 
courtroom experience that when defendants who have been in her courtroom do 
not learn from her cues, there is a strong likelihood they will have to return to 
court—a behavior she is trying to discourage. Thus, to help defendants 
understand, Judge Monroe repeats directions the same way to each defendant—
something I noticed during several different observations. For example, she 
repeated the same comment verbatim to different defendants, “You will return on 
the next court date and bring your 100 dollars cash. You can come anytime during 
the day to see a judge and it will probably be me.” As I learned during her 
interview, she repeats directions because, “The more I say something the better 
likelihood that it will get through to someone.” As the examples above explain, 
judges seem to be aware of their communicative influence on both primary and 
third party defendants.  
The rest of this chapter explores how the cycles of emotion between 
judges and bailiffs give sense to and break sense of both primary and third party 
defendants. First, I detail emotion cycles that attempt to influence meaning-
making of defendants through judge and bailiff sensegiving. Second, I explore 
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situations where the sensebreaking of defendants is enabled through emotion 
cycles.    
Emotion Cycles to Sensegive  
Judges and bailiffs filled in gaps in meaning, or gave sense, through 
communicating feelings of pride and compassion. Additionally, when defendants 
seemed confused about the rules and procedures of the court, their own cases, or 
courtroom behavior of judges and/or bailiffs, sensegiving occurred. Here is one 
example from my Equitas field notes: 
A defendant’s name is called and she walks up to the bench. Judge Suarez 
smiles, “Oh somebody with good news. You got your license back and 
you are smiling.” To my surprise, the judge requests, “Let’s all give a 
round of applause for the girl who got her license back.” Everyone claps 
loudly for the girl, including the bailiff and the defendants in the audience. 
As the girl shuffles to her left with a sheepish smile, the bailiff, Louise, 
says, “Way to go,” loud enough for everyone in the courtroom to hear.  
In this example, the emotion cycle begins with the public display of praise by 
Judge Suarez—the organizational member who holds the highest position of 
coercive power, or the ability to punish (French & Raven, 1959). Judge Suarez 
expresses pride in such a way that the primary defendant is rewarded verbally and 
nonverbally but also the third party defendants watching witness this interaction 
and are asked to participate. Judge Suarez’s communication also hints at what 
behaviors are valued in this organization (i.e., abiding by the laws) and his 
comments underline a value that when you obey the law, you get rewarded, both 
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materially and relationally. Per the request of Judge Suarez, the entire group of 
third party defendants and Bailiff Louise participate in the display of praise by 
clapping for the defendant, smiling, and cycling emotion throughout the 
courtroom back to the primary defendant. The defendant’s response seems 
pleased, embarrassed, and slightly confused by the initial emotional display of the 
judge—unsure about what to make of the behavior. In response, Bailiff Louise 
mirrors the emotional display of the judge by providing a complementary 
emotional response—the verbal comment “way to go” that signifies praise. In this 
case, Bailiff Louise’s emotional response to the defendant reinforces and 
complements the judge’s emotional display—helping to clarify and give sense to 
the defendant that getting her license back is appropriate and positive. Thus, the 
primary defendant is cued that she will be publicly praised and rewarded for 
behavior that aligns with the organizational identity of appropriate moral conduct. 
The third party defendants watching are cued that receiving public praise from the 
judge results in praise from the bailiff and other defendants as well. Therefore, we 
can see how the judge’s and bailiff’s praise provides meaning about the nature of 
appropriate conduct and following rules in court when the judge asks individuals 
to engage in an unexpected behavior (i.e., clapping for the defendant). 
 Judges and bailiffs offered praise and encouragement when individuals 
acquired new driver’s licenses but also when they communicated about getting 
their lives back on track. For example, an observation in Curia court revealed this 
emotion cycle: 
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A man is called forward to pay his fines on three cases. Judge Black says, 
“It looks like you have 560 dollars of penalty fees.” The defendant replies, 
“I was laid off from a company, but I got a new job and I get paid on the 
5th. I could bring something like 200 dollars on that day.” The judge 
smiles and says, “Okay sounds good. It seems like you are getting your 
life back on track financially and that’s a good thing. If you step to the left 
Leslie (the bailiff) will help you.” As the defendant grins and walks to the 
left, Bailiff Leslie nods and smiles back at him. 
In this case, the emotion cycle started with the praise by the judge and moved 
straight to the bailiff’s complementary expression of that praise through the 
nonverbal reinforcement of smiling. Unlike the previous example where 
defendants were asked to clap, the third party defendants were not specifically 
asked to provide praise. However, even though they were not asked to verbally 
express emotion that mirrored the judge, I noticed some of them leaning in with 
serious nonverbal displays. These nonverbal displays suggest that the third party 
defendants were listening and perhaps cued into the importance of physically 
paying the court on time—and given sense—through observation of  the 
communication before them. Also, the judge praised the defendant for gaining 
employment and starting to acquire financial security—giving sense to the 
defendant about the importance of an American dream and appropriate moral 
conduct in relation to the court’s organizational identity. Emotion cycles were not 
only used in response to defendants who were getting back on track financially 
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but they were also employed when defendants avoided providing excuses—
unexpected behaviors during order-to-show cause hearings.   
 Judges and bailiffs talked frequently in interviews about the large number 
of excuses that defendants provide on a daily basis. For example, Bailiff Jamie 
stated that she was “making a book of defendant excuses” and Judge Hocum said, 
“I play a little game with myself called the best excuse of the day.” In my own 
observations, I recognized that a frequent excuse, at least for failure to pay, was 
unemployment. Furthermore, I also noticed that judges heard many of the same 
excuses repetitively throughout their work days such as “I am unemployed” or “I 
never received the bill in the mail.” In the following example, a female defendant 
chooses to avoid using excuses—an unexpected behavior—and Judge Meyers 
employs an emotional display of praise in response. 
Judge Meyers queries, “It looks like you have 2 separate cases. Why 
haven’t you paid?” The woman admits, “I have no excuse judge. I should 
have been here and now I am trying to be responsible and I have done my 
community service hours.” Judge Meyers’ eyes widen and eyebrows rise 
as he replies, “I’m impressed with you. I’m impressed that you did not try 
to make an excuse, so I am going to quash the warrant. We all should be 
impressed with you.” Bailiff Mary says with a smile, “I definitely am,” 
and the pleased defendant steps over to her. 
The emotion cycle in this example again begins with the emotional display of 
praise by the judge toward the defendant. In this case, the judge actually allows 
the defendant’s warrant to be quashed because of her honesty and her lack of 
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excuses—something that is noteworthy and unexpected because I rarely 
witnessed judges quash outstanding warrants especially when the defendant had 
multiple charges. The emotion transferred from Judge Meyers to Bailiff Mary 
when the bailiff also expressed pride toward the defendant. Through this 
interaction, the judge gives sense to the primary defendant and the third party 
defendants watching that excuses are not necessary or appropriate in some cases. 
In other words, when the primary defendant engaged in an unexpected behavior 
(i.e., taking responsibility), the judge and bailiff used that moment to give sense 
about how this behavior would be rewarded and appreciated in court.  
By watching interactions, the defendants can learn through judge 
emotional displays and emotional reinforcement from the bailiff that irrelevant 
excuses are not tolerated and accepting responsibility for one’s actions may help 
secure a lesser punishment. Thus, being accountable serves as a moral behavior 
that aligns with larger ideals of justice and the court’s organizational identity. 
Furthermore, defendant accountability is continually rewarded in the courtroom 
through emotional displays and in turn these emotion cycles enable the 
sensegiving of defendants to occur in response to unexpected situations. 
Situations where defendants were confused by judge and bailiff behavior 
also occurred in the courtroom. During observation, I noticed the ways judges and 
bailiffs used emotional displays of compassion and as a consequence gave sense 
to defendants. For example, judges and bailiffs communicated compassion by 
taking extra time to make sure a defendant’s case was being handled correctly. 
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A man with dark curly hair and blue jeans saunters up to the judge’s bench 
after hearing his name read. He is charged with a zoning violation, which 
is a rare occurrence in this courtroom. Judge Warchol re-reads the file 
several times and appears stumped about what to do in regard to this 
man’s case. She says something to Bailiff Penelope and they are chatting 
back and forth. Bailiff Penelope gets up and exits the back door of the 
courtroom. The judge tells the man to have a seat. The man’s eyebrows 
raise and he meanders back to his chair. Noticing the defendant’s 
perplexed gaze, the judge explains they are trying to find out if they can 
have the man talk to a special prosecutor who would be able to possibly 
help him resolve his case today. Bailiff Penelope re-enters the courtroom 
and Judge Warchol asks if she found out about the special prosecutor. She 
nods. The judge says with a hopeful tone, “Good that gives the guy a 
chance, you know what I mean?” Bailiff Penelope smiles and nods at the 
judge and the defendant. 
The judge and bailiff work together in this example to demonstrate care and 
compassion toward the defendant. Rather than moving through the case quickly, 
the judge spends extra time helping this defendant through the search for a special 
prosecutor—someone trained to deal with zoning cases. The defendant appears 
confused by the unexpected behavior of the judge—perhaps because he has 
watched the interactions before him and no one else has been asked to sit on the 
side. The judge notices the defendant’s confusion and gives him sense. She 
verbally reassures the defendant and explains that the request may result in the 
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resolution of his case. Through the conversation with the bailiff, we learn that the 
judge wants to give the defendant a chance to succeed. 
 Bailiff Penelope’s behavior is complementary to the judge as she 
demonstrates, similar to the judge, her willingness to go above and beyond to help 
the man. The third party defendants watching this interaction have also seen the 
ways the judge can have a positive impact on their experiences in court. In this 
specific instance, the emotion of compassion was displayed by the judge toward 
the defendant, in response the defendant communicated confusion, and finally the 
bailiff communicated calmness and compassion toward the defendant. These 
quick emotional displays communicate to the defendant and also the audience in 
an efficient manner. This helps the judges and bailiffs to avoid extensive verbal 
communication in a situation where they are pressured at the macro level to move 
individuals through the system quickly but still treat defendants as “customers of 
the court”. 
 The above examples depict judges and bailiffs giving sense to defendants 
in the courtroom. As described, sensegiving was enabled through the initial 
emotional displays of the judges and the emotional responses of the bailiffs. 
Furthermore, judges and bailiffs gave sense to defendants when unexpected 
behaviors and gaps in what those behaviors meant emerged during interaction. In 
contrast, the next section describes situations where defendants are making sense 
of courtroom situations incorrectly and in response judges and bailiffs must break 
down how they are making meaning.  
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Emotion Cycles to Sensebreak 
Judges and bailiffs employed sensebreaking when defendants’ behavior 
did not align with moral ideals of justice or courthouse expectations. Most often, 
the judges and bailiffs used emotion cycles that disciplined defendants in response 
to bad behavior. For example, Judge Yorker scolds a defendant for not having her 
child in a car seat. 
A woman is having her judgment decided and the judge scolds, “Why 
were they [her children] not in a car seat? That is unacceptable. You don’t 
want to kill or hurt your kids. Did you see the guy in here earlier? He was 
in a DUI going 10 miles per hour and his face was all scratched up. I am 
going to impose a 25 dollar fine because you need to be taught a lesson.” 
The defendant looks with wide eyes at the judge, “I didn’t know I had to.” 
The judge continues scolding the woman when he finishes he says, “Okay 
Tammy might snarl at you a little bit for not having her in a car seat too. 
Just step to your left.” Bailiff Tammy raises her eyebrows, smiles at the 
defendant, and nods as she steps over. 
The judge in this example uses this defendant’s mistake as a time to lecture her 
about the importance of using a car seat. The emotion cycle starts with an 
emotional display of frustration from the judge toward the primary defendant—
who appears embarrassed and shocked but remains respectful—to the bailiff who 
expresses care and/or pleasantness and then back to the primary defendant. The 
primary defendant’s sense is broken when the judge still punishes her despite her 
claim that she did not know she legally had to use a car seat. Interestingly, similar 
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to past research, Bailiff Tammy compensates for the judge’s emotional display by 
smiling and counterbalancing the judge’s stern expression in response to the 
defendant who has demonstrated embarrassment rather than defiance (Hareli & 
Rafaeli, 2008). Furthermore, the judge publicly scolds the defendant for not 
taking care of her children suggesting that her behavior is not moral or 
appropriate. And not only is the judge labeling bad behavior, he is breaking sense 
of the primary defendant and the larger group of observers about what appropriate 
mothering behavior should include. In this case, appropriate mothering behavior 
should align with the legal requirements of the court which includes keeping 
children in a car seat. Additionally, the third party defendants may have learned 
that if they demonstrate deference and embarrassment they will be rewarded by 
the bailiff. 
Judges and bailiffs, in this sense, are doing far more than enforcing the 
laws. Rather, they are breaking sense of defendants in regard to their 
preconceived notions about what courtroom processes include and what behaviors 
are punished despite awareness of laws. As mentioned, first offenders often have 
little or no interaction with courtrooms except for television shows (i.e., Judge 
Judy) and therefore may think that providing any type of excuse could be 
beneficial to them. Thus, judges and bailiffs had to break sense through messages 
and emotional displays which implied that good citizens pay their fines, avoid 
being arrested, and show respect and deference in court. A good citizen follows 
the laws and rules of the system. During interviews, judges explained the 
challenges of instilling defendants with these messages. Judge Nixon stated, 
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“Everybody comes in with different levels of experience, different levels of 
caring, which has a lot to do with whether they understand what I am 
communicating with them or not.” Judge Donovan explained that many of the 
defendants are “really floundering through life and I tend to believe that most of 
them you could talk to them all day and they wouldn’t understand anyway.” 
These examples reveal that judges enter into communicative situations in court 
with preconceived notions about the defendants’ behaviors, their ability to 
understand the judge, and their desire and/or ability to fix their own problems. 
These preconceived notions impact the way defendants act in the courtroom and 
how they respond to the communication of judges and bailiffs. In response, judges 
and bailiffs break the sense of defendants about their behavior and attempt to help 
them understand how the courtroom process actually works. As a consequence of 
increasing defendant understanding, courthouse employees are able to also move 
through case files more efficiently.  
 For example, the observation below highlights the way Judge Berry 
demonstrates frustration which in turn breaks the sense of a defendant during an 
order-to-show cause hearing. 
The defendant is called and Judge Berry asks, “Why didn’t you pay your 
fine?” The defendant explains that he is unemployed and he has three kids 
to take care of all by himself. The judge states that financial enforcement 
will not put him on a payment plan if he is not working. The defendant 
says he has no one to watch his kids because they are on summer break. 
Judge Berry, sighs loudly, and says, “That is not a good excuse. You are 
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ordered to pay 110 dollars. Talk to financial enforcement and the bailiff 
will call you in a minute.” The bailiff, Adam, rolls his eyes toward the 
defendant in such a way that the entire audience sees what is happening. In 
response, the defendant huffs loudly and saunters to his seat—waiting to 
be called. 
The emotion cycle in this case begins when Judge Berry sighs loudly at the 
primary defendant communicating a sense of frustration. The judge also 
reprimands the primary defendant by suggesting his excuse is “not good enough” 
because the court has the option of a payment plan for individuals who are having 
financial difficulties. Thus, the defendant’s sense is broken in regard to how 
payment plans work and whether one will be available to him. Instead, he learns 
from the judge’s emotional display of frustration and public reprimand that 
excuses about unemployment are not acceptable in this setting—a fact that 
frustrates him as evidenced through his sulking back to his seat.  
Third party defendants also might have their sense broken in regard to 
what type of excuse to use or whether to use one at all based on the interactions 
among judges, bailiffs, and other defendants before their turn. In the above 
example, the defendant is not provided a chance to respond and is rather subjected 
to a complementary emotional visual display of frustration from the bailiff when 
he rolls his eyes. Additionally, because Bailiff Adam rolled his eyes in such a way 
that the entire audience saw him, the behavior allowed the other defendants to 
also participate in the emotion cycle. Some defendants reinforced the bailiff’s 
expression with smirks or smiles of their own and others did not participate in the 
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cycle by ignoring the behavior. The emotion cycle broke the sense of the primary 
defendant by highlighting that his excuse would not be tolerated and his fines 
would not be reduced—correcting his perception that being unemployed would 
make a difference. The example also shows how third party observers can 
actively participate in the emotion cycles by offering emotional displays which 
reinforce or contradict the original emotional displays of the judge and bailiff and 
by serving as an appreciative audience for the primary defendant’s huffs and 
sighs. Moreover, this example depicts how the bailiff can continue to 
complement, or match, the judge’s emotional display when the primary defendant 
seems to be defiantly responding to the judge’s emotional behavior.  
 Emotion cycles also helped to break the sense of primary and third party 
observers about courtroom consequences when defendants were arrested directly 
from the courtroom.  
A woman steps forward and Judge Smith says, “You haven’t served your 
one day. You are going to jail right now.” The judge leaves the courtroom 
and the woman sits down and lays her head down with distress. About 15 
minutes later, two uniformed officers walk in and ask the woman to 
remove her jewelry before they handcuff her. One of the officers looks out 
at the “audience” and says, glancing down to the cuffs, “This is why you 
always bring money to court people.” He smirks at Bailiff Tim and they 
both laugh softly. Then, as the man who came in with the woman begins 
to walk out of the courtroom with the woman’s belongings, he mumbles to 
everyone, “The judge is an asshole guys; be careful.” 
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The frustration Judge Smith demonstrated toward the female defendant helps 
break her sense and that of other waiting defendants because it communicates that 
defendants who do not serve their time when they are ordered to do so will not get 
away with avoiding charges. Judge Smith’s decision to have the defendant 
arrested directly from the courtroom also breaks the sense of the defendant about 
her identity as a defendant and what being a defendant means in this setting.  
The emotion cycle continued when the officer and Bailiff Tim expressed 
humor in regard to the officer’s joke about the situation. In this part of the cycle, 
the officer and Bailiff Tim shared a joke about the tendency for individuals who 
do not bring money to be arrested from the courtroom. The joke illustrated to the 
primary and third party defendants the importance of paying fines on time but 
also that there could be public embarrassment as a consequence for 
noncompliance. Interestingly, the primary defendant’s friend also made a 
comment that may have influenced third party defendants’ opinions about the 
relationship between the judge and the defendants. The “watch out” comment 
may similarly have broken the sense of defendants who believed that the judge, 
bailiff, and officers would do their best to assist them throughout the process 
instead communicating an us versus them mentality.  
The above examples and interpretations presented a picture of emotion 
cycles that give sense and emotion cycles that break sense in municipal court. In 
the last section of this chapter, I extend these findings by discussing two specific 
types of emotion cycles in detail. 
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Two Types of Emotion Cycles 
 The examples and discussion presented above highlight the relationships 
among emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking. Hareli and Rafaeli (2008) 
described emotion cycles as beginning with an agent who expresses the initial 
emotion. Other individuals in the cycle observe and interpret the emotion 
expressed by the agent. The findings of this chapter suggest that emotion cycles 
that give sense or break sense depend on the emotional expression of not only the 
primary agent (i.e., the judge) but also what I am calling the intermediate agent 
(i.e., the bailiff), and the responses of  what I am calling the primary recipient 
(i.e., defendant before the judge). Additionally, I noticed two types of cycles—
deferential and defiant (see Figures 1 and 2). 
 
Figure 1. Deferential Emotion Cycle 
  123 
 In the deferential emotion cycle depicted above, the centrality of power 
resides with the primary agent—meaning that the primary agent (the judge) starts 
the cycle and has the coercive power to punish the primary recipient (the 
defendant) if his/her response is not appropriate. In this case, the primary recipient 
provides a deferential response and the intermediate agent (the bailiff) could 
respond to the primary recipient in one of two ways. The first way an intermediate 
agent could respond to the deferential behavior is with a complementary 
emotional display and/or response. For example, if the primary agent’s emotional 
display is humorous a deferential response by the primary recipient could include 
laughing at the joke. The intermediate agent observes this interaction and 
complements with a happy or agreeable emotional display.  
The second way an intermediate agent could respond to the deferential 
behavior is with a compensatory emotional display and/or response. For example, 
if the primary agent’s emotional display includes anger, a deferential response by 
the primary recipient may include showing embarrassment and/or being quiet and 
respectful. The intermediate agent observes this interaction and compensates for 
the judge’s anger through an emotional display of compassion or helpfulness.  
 As evidenced in the examples in this chapter, defendants did not always 
respond to the judges and/or bailiffs with deferential behavior. Instead, some 
defendants expressed confusion, anger, and frustration in the courtroom. The next 
type of emotion cycle I discuss explores what happened when defendants 
responded in defiant ways. 
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Figure 2. Defiant Emotion Cycle 
 Similar to the deferential emotion cycle, the defiant emotion cycle also 
starts with an emotional display from the primary agent. For example, the cycle 
starts when the primary agent displays anger or frustration toward the primary 
recipient. A defiant response from the primary recipient could include not 
appearing properly chagrined after being reprimanded or even responding with 
their own display of anger. In another situation, a cycle started with an emotional 
display of humor by the primary agent could receive a defiant response of not 
laughing at the joke from the primary recipient. In either case, my data suggests 
that in these cases, the intermediate agent observes the response of the primary 
agent and complements the primary agent’s emotional display. Thus, the 
intermediate agent mirrors or matches the primary agent when the primary 
recipient responds defiantly. 
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 Importantly, through the various emotional displays and responses, the 
primary and intermediate agents are able to cue primary recipients and also third 
party recipients into appropriate behavior and help them make meaning. As 
aforementioned, judges and bailiffs gave sense to defendants when an unexpected 
or confusing situation occurred in the courtroom. The unexpected situations 
manifested in regard to defendant’s cases, defendant behavior, and judge and 
bailiff responses. On the other hand, judges and bailiff broke sense of defendants 
when their behavior or assumptions about courtroom processes needed to be 
corrected. For example, judges broke sense of defendants when they had incorrect 
assumptions about payment extensions, payment plans, making excuses, and 
following specific laws (i.e., seatbelt laws). 
Sensegiving or sensebreaking occurs in both types of emotional cycle. In 
other words, sensegiving and sensebreaking—depicted with the solid and dashed 
lines in the figures—are occurring as emotion is cycling through the 
organizational setting. The sensegiving and sensebreaking of the primary 
recipients is depicted with the solid lines in the figures and the sensegiving and 
sensebreaking of the third party recipients is depicted with the dashed lines in the 
figures. The use of sensegiving or sensebreaking depends upon whether there is a 
gap in the defendant’s understanding (in which case, the primary agent engages in 
sensegiving) or the defendant is making sense of a situation incorrectly (in which 
case the primary agent engages in sensebreaking). The primary and intermediate 
agents’ emotional behavior helps break down the incorrect expectations of 
primary and third party recipients for how the courtroom works. Additionally, the 
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quick emotional displays of primary and intermediate agents give sense to 
primary recipients when situations that have unclear or multiple meanings arise.  
Summary 
 This chapter explored emotion cycles in municipal court and examined 
how the expression of emotion by judges and bailiffs influenced organizing. I 
revealed that the use of emotion by judges and the emotional responses by bailiffs 
help give sense to and break sense of defendants about their own individual 
behavior and how this behavior aligns with appropriate moral behavior and the 
larger group identity of the municipal court. Lastly, I provided two visual displays 
of the emotional cycles in municipal court to highlight the importance of primary 
and intermediate agents and primary recipient responses in relationship to 
emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking. In the next chapter, I reflect on 
the importance of these findings offering conclusions, theoretical and practical 
implications, and directions for future research.  
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This qualitative analysis of municipal courtrooms offers a unique 
perspective on the interpersonal and organizational influence of emotion cycles in 
the work of judges and bailiffs. During my time in the field, I observed three 
distinctive organizational challenges associated with emotion that employees 
grappled with on a daily basis. The challenges included managing defendant 
confusion about courtroom processes, processing a large number of cases while 
treating defendants as customers, and dealing with the seriousness and tedium of 
the courtroom environment. These challenges created numerous questions. How 
do judges and bailiffs help defendants understand the process of court? How do 
judges and bailiffs perform emotional roles in ways that create feelings of fairness 
and “customer service”? How do judges and bailiffs respond to a serious and at 
the same time tedious courtroom environment? My analysis of the municipal 
courtroom attempted to illustrate how judges’ and bailiffs’ emotional expression 
throughout the legal process is necessary and how emotion cycles in the court can 
enable sensegiving and sensebreaking.  
Summary of Dissertation 
 In summary, the formally espoused emotional expectations of employees 
in the court system are minimal. Judges and bailiffs are not trained to express any 
specific types of emotion and are given few directions regarding the impact of 
their verbal and nonverbal communication with defendants. Judges are expected 
to be neutral and fair. Similarly, bailiffs are provided with little guidance about 
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emotional expression and instead expected to focus on “moving people through 
the system” (Bailiff Tammy). While the organization does not officially describe 
emotional roles of the employees, the emotional expressions of judges and bailiffs 
serve to help manage organizational challenges.  
 In the sites studied, judges and bailiffs are faced with three specific 
challenges associated with emotion at a macro-level that influence micro-level 
interaction. First, defendants are often unfamiliar with the system and they come 
into court with misunderstandings about the courtroom process. In these 
situations, judges and bailiffs must find ways to communicate a great deal of 
information about the defendants’ cases and about how the organization works in 
short periods of time. A second challenge involves the macro-level mandate to 
treat defendants as “customers of the court” while simultaneously dealing with the 
high caseloads in arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings. Judges and 
bailiffs must treat lower status individuals (see Tracy, 2005) with respect and care 
in order to provide a service that in many cases the defendants are angry or upset 
about receiving in the first place. Third, the actual emotional tenor of the 
courtroom can be challenging to navigate on a daily basis because it is serious, 
formal, and routinized while also being tedious and boring. To reduce their own 
feelings of burnout and stress, judges and bailiffs dealt with the mood of the court 
and its influence on defendant emotional responses. 
Judges talked about the need to remain neutral in court and stressed the 
importance of emotionless behavior. However, my observations and interviews 
also revealed how judges used emotional expression in response to the challenges 
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of daily work life. First, judges used humor to provide tension relief in the 
courtroom. The humor use was most often directed at something outside of the 
judge’s control (e.g., crowded courtroom) and usually had the consequence of 
lightening the mood in an uncertain environment for defendants. Additionally, 
most judges were adamant that humor should be used sparingly and not in regard 
to the defendant’s case. The judge’s humor use appeared to ease tension when 
defendants lacked an understanding of courtroom processes. Furthermore, the use 
of humor allowed judges to help defendants relax during tense situations which 
may have instilled feelings of fair treatment and provided a break from the 
monotony of the courtroom for employees. 
Second, judges engaged in the emotional role of order enforcer. To keep 
the courtroom functioning and processing cases, judges expressed frustration, 
sternness, authority, and even anger verbally and nonverbally. Judges avoided the 
last ditch option of putting defendants in contempt by first trying to control the 
situation through raising their voices, using nonverbal displays to regulate 
defendant communication, and asking defendants to “cool down.” These 
behaviors were employed to manage the tension between maintaining order and 
treating defendants who frequently acted out as if they were customers of the 
court. Third, judges engaged in an emotional role of care takers. Since defendants 
are frequently confused about courtroom processes, judges took time to express 
care and concern by going above and beyond their job expectations. Judges hinted 
at legal advice when defendants were unsure about courtroom decisions. 
Furthermore, judges showed care and compassion for defendants’ personal health 
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and family circumstances by acknowledging traumas and rescheduling court 
appointments. 
Bailiffs also were given little direction about the emotional component of 
their work. Yet, their position as a buffer between judges and defendants shed 
light on the emotional roles they expressed on a daily basis. The first emotional 
role of bailiffs was rule enforcer. Bailiffs are expected to enforce formal and 
informal rules while the judge is present and absent in the courtroom. Thus, 
bailiffs help defendants learn about the process of court through constant 
reminders about what behaviors are appropriate and not appropriate and 
emotional displays of sternness. Bailiffs must communicate these rules in firm but 
fair tones to avoid perceptions of unfair treatment from defendants.  
The second emotional role of bailiffs was toxin handlers. Bailiffs clean up 
the messes judges leave behind and manage upset or distressed defendant 
situations. Indeed, bailiffs listen empathetically to defendant issues, help reduce 
defendant confusion, and serve as filters that bear the brunt of negative emotional 
reactions by judges and defendants.  
The third emotional role of bailiffs was do gooders. Judges expect bailiffs 
to perform certain emotional roles that match their own behavior. Thus, bailiffs 
felt pressure to “do good” and express a similar emotion as the judge even if they 
did not feel that emotion. For example, bailiffs discussed laughing at 
inappropriate jokes made by judges to meet the judge’s expectations and 
performing at similar processing speeds as judges during courtroom arraignments. 
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Last, I explored the emotion cycles of municipal courtrooms. The emotion 
cycles revealed the ways judges’ and bailiffs’ emotional displays and responses 
helped give sense to and break sense of defendants. Courthouse employees 
utilized the expression of pride, anger, frustration, and compassion, among others 
to cue defendants about the courtroom process, to reward or punish them for 
behavior that aligned with the courthouse identity, and to help them make sense of 
their cases and experiences in court. In chapter seven, I offered two visual 
displays which showed how emotion, sensegiving, and sensebreaking cycle 
among primary agents, intermediate agents, primary recipients, and third party 
recipients in the courtroom. Additionally, below I describe in more detail the 
theoretical extensions this dissertation provides to past research.  
Theoretical Implications 
 This study of the emotional roles and emotion cycles of municipal court 
judges and bailiffs adds to the literature on emotion cycles, sensegiving and 
sensebreaking, and previous courtroom workgroup research. The investigation of 
the connections between emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking 
highlights the importance of primary and intermediate agents in the cycle, the 
type of emotion expressed by intermediate agents, the influence of the primary 
recipient’s response on intermediate agent behavior, and the ability to effectively 
start and manage the cycle. Furthermore, this study highlights how sensegiving 
and sensebreaking can be employed toward members who are visiting the 
organization (e.g., defendants) rather than employees to help them quickly make 
sense of their roles within organizational processes and how those roles fit in or 
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do not fit in with the larger organizational identity of the courthouse. 
Theoretically, this study extends previous courtroom research by focusing on the 
legal process and the important roles of the judge and the bailiff—an occupation 
that has been overlooked in most past research.  
Emotion Cycles 
 Emotion cycle research is gaining increased attention in organizational 
literature (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008). Emotion cycle research offers a perspective 
that sheds light on the interpersonal influence of emotional expression and helps 
to expose how these cycles move emotion among individuals, dyads, and groups 
within organizations. This study takes previous research a step further by 
examining emotion cycles in situ to observe, name, and describe patterns of 
occurrence for specific types of emotional displays and/or responses of what I am 
calling intermediate agents and primary recipients.  
 The findings detailed that bailiffs, or intermediate agents, emotionally 
responded in one of two ways—by compensating or complementing. 
Complementary emotional responses involved mirroring and/or reinforcing the 
emotional display of the primary agent—in this case the judge. Compensatory 
emotional responses involved counterbalancing the primary agent’s emotional 
display. The emotion cycles also highlighted two types of primary recipient 
responses—deferential and defiant. Deferential responses included behavior that 
was respectful, courteous, and polite toward the primary agent. Defiant responses 
included behavior that was insubordinate, noncompliant, and/or uncooperative 
toward the primary agent.  
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The findings also determined that the type of response intermediate agents 
employed depended on the response of the primary recipient. A complementary 
response was used when primary recipients responded in either defiant or 
deferential ways. For example, if the primary agent expressed anger and the 
primary recipient responded defiantly through disrespect, the intermediate agent 
could complement the primary agent’s initial emotional display with a similar 
display of frustration. On the other hand, an intermediate agent could respond to 
the primary recipient’s deferential behavior with a compensatory response as 
well. For example, if the primary agent expressed humor and the primary 
recipient laughed at the joke, the intermediate agent may complement the 
expression of the primary agent and express an agreeable response. Compensatory 
responses were used by intermediate agents when the defendant acted 
deferentially. If the primary agent expressed anger and the primary recipient 
responded deferentially—with embarrassment or confusion—the intermediate 
agent compensated for the primary agent’s emotional display showing care or 
concern.  
These findings related to intermediate agents and primary recipients are 
important extensions to past research for the reasons detailed below. First, the 
intermediate agent and its complementary or compensatory responses help portray 
a more detailed picture of the life cycle of emotion from beginning to end—
showing how emotion itself can change as it is transferred and moves between 
organizational actors. For example, when a judge expresses anger or frustration, 
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then a defendant expresses embarrassment, and a bailiff responds with care or 
concern, the emotion actually shifts and changes as it moves in the courtroom. 
Second, the inclusion of the intermediary agent reveals how the 
interaction between organizational actors actually assists third party observers 
with understanding the meaning of the emotion. For example, third party 
defendants who watch the judge and bailiff praise primary defendants for specific 
behaviors learn they may be rewarded for similar behavior. In other words, the 
third party defendant learns not just from the individual emotional expression of 
the judge, the primary defendant, or the bailiff, but through the entire interaction 
and the social construction of emotion. 
Third, the intermediary agent serves as a filter and screen that helps give 
the recipients cues about how they should process the emotional expression of the 
primary agent and the meaning they could attribute to the emotion. For example, 
when judges reprimand or scold defendants, bailiffs complement the behavior if 
the defendant is being defiant and compensate for the behavior if the defendant is 
being deferential. Thus, the bailiff emotional response adds additional information 
to the environment and helping the defendant to recognize the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of their behavior and in some cases reduce their confusion. 
Fourth, the inclusion of the primary recipient responses helps shed light on 
the interplay between sensemaking and emotion. In other words, the intermediate 
agent watches both the emotional displays of the primary agent and the primary 
recipient and attributes meanings to each of their emotional displays. Then, the 
intermediate agent responds appropriately based on the effects—both intended 
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and unintended—of the primary agent’s behavior to help the primary recipient 
make sense of their situation. 
 Lastly, this study illustrated how emotion cycles cue observers into 
behaviors in court. Third party observers learned how to behave and communicate 
with the judge and bailiff by watching their interactions with other defendants. 
Judges expressed emotions in response to defendant behaviors and as a 
consequence these emotions communicated messages about the rules of the court, 
the processes of arraignments and hearings, and the appropriate conduct of a 
“good” defendant. Bailiffs complemented the judges’ emotional tones and helped 
defendants make sense of situations when the emotional behavior of the judge 
was appropriate. Also, bailiffs compensated for judge emotional displays that 
lacked clarity or left the defendant feeling confused or as if they were treated 
unfairly. The emotion cycles of the court provided a short-cut—a fast way for 
employees to give sense to and break sense of defendants who were confused 
about courtroom situations or held incorrect assumptions about how court works.  
 The extensions to the emotion cycles—especially in relation to 
intermediate agents and primary recipients—may also be relevant in other types 
of work besides courtrooms. For example, emergency room doctors may facilitate 
a similar type of situation where they work as the primary agent, the nurse works 
as an intermediary agent, the patient is the primary recipient, and the patient’s 
family constituting third party recipients. In these cases, doctors probably start the 
cycle and nurses complement or compensate for the emotional expression of the 
doctors when they are present and when they leave the room. Additionally, in the 
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work of teachers and professors, emotion cycles may help facilitate sensegiving 
and sensebreaking for the student being disciplined and also the students watching 
in the classroom. Furthermore, business meetings may be another setting where 
the work of CEOs and other executives falls into the roles of primary and 
intermediate agents with the other organizational members serving as primary and 
third party recipients. In the family setting, two parents who differentially 
discipline their children may fall into the roles of primary and intermediate 
agent—with one compensating for the over punishment of another toward their 
children.  
The extensions to emotion cycle literature may also help scholars 
understand specific issues and problems. For example, the findings about the role 
of intermediate agents could help these employees understand the importance and 
impact of their responses to primary recipient behavior. Primary recipients who 
are dissatisfied with primary agents may still leave the organization with a sense 
of satisfaction if they are treated fairly by intermediate agents. For example, it is 
important for primary and intermediate agents to understand how their roles can 
influence the perceptions of primary recipients. In addition, the extensions to past 
research on emotion cycles reveal the way intended emotions can have 
unintended effects on recipients. This finding demystifies why recipients could 
leave interactions feeling dissatisfied. Namely, the intermediate agent serves as 
someone who can double-check for the understanding level of the primary 
recipient—filling in gaps in meaning when there is confusion. Future research 
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recipients and intermediate agents in order to provide even more specific 
predictions about how emotion cycles influence organizational outcomes. 
Sensegiving and Sensebreaking 
Sensegiving and sensebreaking were introduced to the literature as 
extensions to previous research on sensemaking. Sensegiving was intended to 
highlight the leader’s role in the sensemaking process by revealing how gaps in 
meaning are filled (Gioia & Chittepeddi, 1991). Additionally, sensebreaking 
illustrates how employees break down meanings of other employees (Pratt, 2000). 
Interestingly, my research adds to previous literature on sensegiving and 
sensebreaking in distinctive ways. 
First, this study shows not only the cycle of emotion among judges, 
bailiffs, and defendants but also how sensegiving and sensebreaking moves 
among organizational actors. As the visuals depict (Figures 1, 2), sensegiving and 
sensebreaking by judges and bailiffs moved among judges, bailiffs, and primary 
defendants and also among judges, bailiffs, and third party defendants. Thus, the 
emotional displays during interactions influenced meaning-making at various 
levels (i.e., relational and group). This is important because it shows how the 
same emotional displays can impact observers differently. Additionally, the 
processes of sensegiving and sensebreaking are unique in this setting because they 
are not only coming from the organizational leader—in this case the judge—but 
from the emotional displays and responses of the judge and the bailiff. Thus, these 
findings illustrate how sensegiving and sensebreaking can be co-constructed 
between different types of employees.  
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Second, most of the research on sensegiving and sensebreaking has 
highlighted how employees use these processes to influence the behavior of other 
employees. However, in this study we learned that sensegiving and sensebreaking 
can help organizational members create and break down meaning of visitors to the 
organization. In other words, judges and bailiffs gave sense to and broke sense of 
defendants about the process of the court itself. The defendants were not members 
of the organization; however, they needed to participate in organizational 
processes. Thus, the judges and bailiffs were not communicating who we are, but 
rather who the “court” is, and who “you [defendant]” are in relation to the court. 
Judges and bailiffs collectively communicated who they were in relation to 
defendants and also help defendants understand his or her own identity and role in 
the court process. It is important to understand that sensegiving and sensebreaking 
happen in customer service-type interactions because then employees can 
recognize and use their behaviors to influence the way customers make sense 
which could create higher profits, improved customer satisfaction, and a greater 
likelihood of returning to a company for service. 
Third, this study highlights how sensegiving and sensebreaking can be 
used in fast paced organizational environments to influence meaning-making. 
Judges and bailiffs used emotional displays to immediately cue defendants into 
appropriate behavior when unexpected situations arose and to break down 
preconceived notions about how court works. Thus, this study illustrates how 
sensegiving and sensebreaking can serve as micro-level interactions that cue 
organizational visitors into macro-level meanings quickly and efficiently. Past 
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research on sensegiving has usually focused on the influence and ability of leaders 
to give sense during big organizational changes such as corporate spin-offs 
(Corley & Gioia, 2004). Also, research has shown that across contexts 
anticipation of gaps in sensemaking triggers sensegiving and enablers of 
sensegiving vary between leaders and stakeholders (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). 
My research also adds to this literature by showing how sensegiving and 
sensebreaking are enabled through the emotional displays of two groups of 
employees. Furthermore, my findings highlight how sensebreaking is triggered 
when organizational visitors hold incorrect assumptions about procedures of the 
organization.  
Judge and Courtroom Workgroup Research 
This qualitative exploration of municipal court has implications for 
understanding the process rather than the outcome of court interaction. Research 
on judges has primarily focused on sentencing (see Spohn, 2009 for review) and 
courtroom workgroup investigations have similarly centered on responses to law 
changes and sentencing outcomes (Ulmer, 2011). Additionally, municipal 
courtrooms provide defendants with the opportunity to complain and comment on 
judge behavior—ultimately impacting judges’ jobs. Yet, there have been few 
studies that explore how emotional expression of courtroom employees can 
influence the behavior, responses, and experiences of defendants. In contrast, this 
study highlighted how judges and bailiffs respond to macro-level and micro-level 
challenges through their daily emotional communication and how this emotional 
communication influences the behavior of defendants. The outcomes of court 
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cases are essential to know and recognize; yet, they do not tell courtroom 
administrators the full story of how employees actually interact with defendants in 
the courtroom. It is important to understand the nuances of how employees and 
defendants interact in order to create and sustain defendant and employee 
satisfaction in the long run.  
 Most of the research on judges and other courtroom employees centers on 
trial courts or Superior courts. This study adds to an underdeveloped area of 
research—explorations of misdemeanor, or municipal, court. Studies of municipal 
court are important because most citizens’ exposure to the court system, if any, is 
in this type of court. Interestingly, similar to past research I found that municipal 
courts are highly routinized (Lipetz, 1980). However, I extended previous 
research by demonstrating how employees use emotional communication to 
respond to the challenges of municipal court and how they work together to 
perform fairness towards defendants. Through sharing such findings in publicly 
accessible ways such as white papers, publications, and organizational summaries, 
this research might potentially demystify the how of courtroom organizing and 
illustrate important communicative behaviors that can decrease defendant 
confusion and complaints.  
 As described, research on bailiffs, especially municipal court bailiffs, is 
difficult to locate. Yet, this study shows that bailiffs play a crucial role in the daily 
process of organizing in municipal court. Bailiffs’ emotional displays influence 
judges’ and defendants’ behavior. Furthermore, their ability to smooth over 
situations may have the unintended effect of creating fewer defendant complaints. 
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Thus, this study showed that bailiffs’ intermediary roles are organizationally very 
important because it allows them to contribute the majority of guidance, support, 
and care when judges have left defendants confused. My findings demonstrated 
that bailiffs complemented and compensated for judges’ behavior while also 
serving as intermediary agents in emotion cycles and buffers between judges and 
defendants. Future research could build upon this by exploring how bailiffs feel 
about being in this role and how their feelings impact workplace morale and 
motivation. For example, a study might explore how bailiffs talk about their roles 
and interactions with defendants to de-stress backstage when the judges and 
defendants are not present.  
Other scholars have explored the ways employees can serve as buffers 
especially in the work of secretaries and paralegals (Lively, 2006). While there 
are some similarities between the work of these employees and bailiffs, there are 
also some interesting differences. Similar to paralegals, bailiffs are expected to 
“be professional” and defer to their “supervisors” (in this case, the judge). In both 
cases, the intermediaries may serve as gatekeepers to the other employees. For 
example, bailiffs in municipal court usually enter the courtroom before the judge 
and get defendants ready by announcing the rules. Thus, bailiffs serve as buffers 
before the interaction between the judge and defendant occurs.  
Furthermore, as mentioned, the work of bailiffs in municipal court 
suggests their important position as toxin handlers. Frost and Robinson (1999) 
state that toxin handlers have five roles including: 1) listening empathetically, 2) 
suggesting solutions, 3) working behind the scenes to prevent pain, 4) carrying the 
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confidences of others, and 5) reframing difficult messages. It could certainly be 
argued that municipal court bailiffs must engage in most of these behaviors in 
their daily work lives and especially in their interactions with defendants, judges, 
and other bailiffs. One important difference though between Frost’s (2007) toxin 
handlers and the bailiffs in this study is that bailiffs’ handling of toxin occurs not 
behind the scenes but publicly and in front of others. In other words, Frost (2007) 
suggested that toxin handlers worked privately to prevent the pain of individuals 
while bailiffs most often deal with defendant and judge toxin in the middle of the 
courtroom as everyone watches—a factor that potentially enables and constrains 
how they can respond. 
Another interesting difference, between bailiffs and intermediary toxin 
handlers is that bailiffs serve as gatekeepers who monitor the communication 
between judges and defendants both before the initial interaction and also 
immediately after. This requires that the bailiff engage not only in mirroring the 
judge, but in some cases, in compensating for the judge as well. Bailiffs 
communicate a sense of urgency and they deal and communicate with one 
defendant case on display in front of all the other defendants who have not been 
seen yet. In this sense, bailiffs serve as a “public secretary” who monitors the 
behavior of defendants and also monitors the communication between judge and 
defendant while simultaneously trying to move defendants through the system as 
quickly as possible. The ability to move defendants quickly through the system is 
one important consideration for contributions to practice—a discussion I turn to 
below.   
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Practical Implications 
 The courthouse is indeed an organization where emotions can and do 
assist with daily organizing. Yet, due to the legal and rational system it is built 
upon, there is still a stigma attached to suggesting that courtroom employees use 
emotion at all and that the expression of emotion could actually benefit the 
courthouse. The resistance seems to imply that an emotional judge or bailiff is 
irrational and is therefore not being fair and neutral. What this dissertation has 
revealed is that judges’ and bailiffs’ emotional expressions are often used to 
perform fairness and create defendant satisfaction. Judges who use humor to 
relieve tension can help put defendants at ease. Bailiffs who listen empathetically 
to confused defendants illustrate the processes of the court to be fair and help 
move them through the system. Thus, maintaining the illusion that the courtroom 
is only a rational place may actually provide a disservice to the organization. In 
other words, defendants and employees benefit from expressions of emotion in 
court. In contrast, pretending that emotions are not and should not be expressed 
downplays the ways they enhance organizational outcomes and defendant 
experiences. Municipal court judges are trained to follow the law and be rational 
but this dissertation further argues that judges and bailiffs should be trained about 
the appropriate and inappropriate uses of emotion in court. 
 Currently, judges and bailiffs have a large degree of variance in their 
emotional behavior. In other words, each judge and bailiff decides how much of a 
specific emotion they employ. Since the courts must move large numbers of 
defendants quickly, an emotional training program could help streamline 
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defendant experiences. For example, judges and bailiffs could be educated about 
which types of humor are appropriate in court and provided with examples of how 
to communicate compassion and care without being partial to a defendant. 
Defendants who have to watch interactions among judges, bailiffs, and other 
defendants before them may not perceive unfair treatment if the emotional 
behavior is more standardized.  
  For example, one of the largest mandates in municipal court is to process 
cases quickly. In other words, judges feel a pressure to close cases, or get guilty 
pleas, and decrease caseloads. If the organization is going to pressure employees 
to process cases, then it would be appropriate to also effectively train and teach 
strategies about how to close cases faster. As I witnessed and heard, judges read 
pleas in slightly different ways to increase their “processing speed”. For example, 
I observed one judge who read pleas to multiple defendants at once—rather than 
one at a time—to increase case processing. Therefore, judges would benefit from 
explanations of how processing speeds can be increased through specific 
strategies. For example, an announcement at the beginning of the court day about 
“what an arraignment is” may help some defendants from expecting to “tell their 
stories”.  
Courtroom employees could also benefit from an awareness of how their 
emotional roles impact courtroom processes and defendant experiences. Judges 
and bailiffs could be told how certain displays of emotion can actually help 
defendants make sense of situations (i.e., compassion). If judges and bailiffs 
understand the importance of these displays, they may be more willing to learn 
  145 
and incorporate them into their demeanors. Furthermore, this dissertation revealed 
that the influence and movement of emotion between judges and bailiffs is 
essential to the success of the emotion cycle. Therefore, it may be important that 
the same judges and bailiffs work together as much as possible so they can create 
synergy with their emotional displays. 
Another practical implication, then, involves the challenge of constantly 
moving bailiffs from courtroom to courtroom. There does not appear to be an 
official reason why bailiffs are shuffled between courtrooms constantly except to 
provide them the variety of working in both arraignments and order-to-show 
cause hearings. However, it seems from observations and interviews that the 
variation in each of these court proceedings is not vast. The effectiveness of 
sensegiving and sensebreaking of defendants and employee morale may be 
enhanced if the same bailiffs and judges work together in larger blocks of time—
rather than constantly adjusting to new coworkers. Since judges also have the 
ability to work in arraignments and order-to-show cause hearings, courthouse 
administrators may consider moving entire groups of employees from courtroom 
to courtroom rather than only the bailiffs.  
 This dissertation revealed the complexity of a serious, routinized, and 
tedious courtroom environment. Judges and bailiffs should be provided the time 
and space to dialogue about ways to address this challenge and other challenges 
of their work. As described above, if judges and bailiffs work in the same dyads 
for longer periods of time they may be able to establish stronger feelings of 
camaraderie and work task interdependence. Indeed, stronger work group ties 
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may encourage lower feelings of frustration and burnout about the job (Maslach, 
1982). Additionally, the shared space of dialogue may help the judges and bailiffs 
collectively come up with solutions or strategies for coping with the monotony of 
arraignments or other challenges of their occupations. 
 Another practical implication is this dissertation’s extension of what 
customer service means in professional work. Professional workers, such as 
judges, do not have the same types of relationships with defendants as customer 
service workers have with customers. This dissertation reveals that rather than 
“customer service”, judges provide what I am calling professional assistance. A 
customer service interaction centers on a discourse of consumption and is based 
on the fact that the “customer is always right”. In contrast, a professional 
assistance interaction involves providing help and guidance toward someone 
(e.g., a defendant) visiting an organization. In the courtroom, judges offer their 
professional assistance toward defendants in order to help them feel as if they are 
treated fairly and to process their cases efficiently. However, in the professional 
assistance interaction, the professional still has the “upper hand” to legitimately 
punish or reward the assisted individual if they do not understand—whereas 
typically, customer service clerks do not. Judges do not want repeat business; yet, 
they must still provide respectful assistance to defendants to avoid having 
complaints in the customer comment box. In this case, defendants might instead 
be called visitors or guests to highlight the respect they deserve from judges but 
also demonstrate that there is a desire to decrease future visits. Thus, this study 
has the ability to inform courthouse administrators about the problematic nature 
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of using the phrase “customers of the court”. Judges can be potentially offered the 
new metaphor of offering professional assistance as an alternative to customer 
service. Judges could also have the opportunity to dialogue with their superiors 
about their resistance to the customer service mandate and collectively brainstorm 
other alternatives. 
One problem I witnessed and pointed out during observation has already 
begun to be remedied. As I described in chapter three, judges leave the courtroom 
when they no longer have files—leaving some defendants with the perception that 
their time is not important and also contributing to the tedious environment of 
court. When meeting with the presiding judge, I pointed this out. Apparently, I 
was not the only person who had recognized the implications of these leave-
taking behaviors. Early in 2012, the courthouse started to move all the files to the 
courtroom for that day which has greatly decreased the number of times the judge 
leaves. I learned in an informal chat with one judge that the change in file 
placement has created an interesting phenomenon—judges are now complaining 
that they never get to take a break from the bench. While in some cases this could 
be resolved by taking a recess from court, judges have explained that they feel an 
even greater pressure to move through the cases faster when the files are placed 
next to them. Indeed, it appears that the practical issue of file movement is still 
something courthouse administrators will be dealing with in the future because in 
either situation, one party is unsatisfied. 
Employees in municipal court face a specific kind of stress that differs 
from employees of Superior courts. Their stress comes from the daily grind of 
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engaging in repetitive behavior. Thus, employees may not admit they feel 
stressed, as most of the participants in this study did not, but the likelihood that 
they will become burned out is inevitable—especially if they are working in 
arraignments where the routine rarely changes. Employees should not be expected 
to be robots that must turn off their emotional responses to these repetitive 
situations and types of cases. Yet, they should be aware of the negative 
consequences of expressing emotion inappropriately. Instead, judges and bailiffs 
can discuss how they each deal with burnout together and potentially be offered 
opportunities to rotate between types of proceedings as a dyad—rather than only 
rotating the bailiffs. 
To summarize, this dissertation offers several practical implications. These 
include highlighting the importance of emotion in the work of judges and bailiffs; 
streamlining the expression of emotion in interactions; reframing customer 
service work to professional assistance; creating a space for bailiffs and judges to 
talk about the challenges of their work; providing strategies for case processing; 
dealing with the movement of files; and being sensitive to employee well-being.  
Future Research, Limitations, and Reflections 
 This dissertation study had several important findings and implications. 
However, similar to most studies, there were some aspects of the study that could 
be improved in future research. Perhaps the most important strength of this study 
is its in-depth qualitative examination of the legal process in municipal court. The 
work of judges and bailiffs was explored through their own voices and centered 
on their unique perspectives and experiences rather than on the outcomes of legal 
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decisions. This study attempted to explain how judges and bailiffs respond to 
organizational challenges through specific communicative practices such as 
emotional expression—adding to the underdeveloped literature on the influence 
of emotion cycles in the courtroom. Moreover, it was only through participant 
observation that I was able to witness emotion cycles in action—including the 
observation of nonverbal behavior—because interviews with any one group of 
employees would not have captured this phenomenon. 
 The reliance on qualitative data made the final report longer and denser 
than other studies of the courtroom; however, it provided rich detail of employee 
experiences. The combination of observation, informal interviews, and formal 
audio-recorded interviews allowed multiple perspectives to be highlighted. For 
example, macro-level mandates, such as treating defendants as customers of the 
court, were identified during interviews but responses to this mandate were 
determined through observation and interviews. In other words, the multiple types 
of data allowed for a complex picture of how the mandate impacted court 
proceedings. Additionally through member reflections (Tracy, Forthcoming), I 
was able to include my participants in the construction of findings. Judges and 
bailiffs helped me to clarify what I observed and heard in ways that made the final 
report richer and more detailed. My own reflexivity in the scene also helped me 
cue into how defendants may have been feeling because in many situations I sat 
and experienced how court felt from the point of view of an audience member. 
 In addition, this analysis employed qualitative data from two different 
members of the municipal courtroom workgroup. While there are other qualitative 
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studies of the courtroom workgroup (Ulmer, 1994), there are few that center on 
the municipal court. And since a majority of the public’s courtroom experiences 
are at the municipal level, it is important to understand this setting more 
completely. In other words, this study offers a fresh perspective to the literature 
through its examination of a different courtroom setting and multiple courtroom 
occupations. The dissertation shows how two types of organizational actors—
judges and bailiffs—work together to respond to organizational challenges and 
assist defendants’ meaning-making through emotional displays and responses. 
 The original focus going into this study was to center on emotional 
deviance and emotional dissonance of judges in relation to sensegiving and 
sensebreaking. However, through observation I learned that the co-construction of 
emotion cycles among judges, bailiffs, and defendants provided a more significant 
picture of emotion’s role in the courtroom. Most of my data related to emotion 
cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking is centered on observation. Thus, because 
my focus of study was largely grounded through the long term data collection 
process, I ended up in this final report relying less on first order interview data 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) and more on observational data to discuss emotion 
cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking. Future research should continue to 
explore emotion cycles with a reliance on more first order interview data to 
examine participants’ awareness about their emotional behavior. For example, 
future research could specifically ask participants to reflect on their intention in 
regard to influencing different groups of observers of their behavior. Moreover, 
asking participants if they attempt to shape the way observers make meaning or 
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if/how they break down the meaning observers prescribe to situations may reveal 
interesting findings. 
 Another area for future research is a study centered on the primary and 
third party recipients. In this study, I was able to include observations about 
primary and third party defendants because the courtroom is considered a public 
place. However, the actual opinions of recipients were not included because I did 
not have institutional review board approval to interview defendants. Future 
research on the impact of emotion cycles, sensegiving, and sensebreaking could 
benefit from the perspectives of recipients and agents. For example, third party 
recipients could be asked if they decided to avoid or engage in specific behavior 
based on the interactions they observed between primary agents and primary 
recipients. Furthermore, primary recipients could be asked why they employed 
deferential or defiant responses and if/how their decision was impacted by the 
emotional display of the primary or intermediate agent. For example, emergency 
room patients and family members could be interviewed about their decisions to 
either silently listen to doctor and nurse instructions or interject and argue on their 
own behalf.  
This study found that primary and intermediate agents are important to the 
success of an emotion cycle—especially in situations that are ambiguous and 
uncertain for observers—such as when defendants arrive confused about who to 
talk to, what behaviors they should engage in, and what their next steps should be. 
Studies in the future should continue to explore the role of intermediate agents in 
other organizational settings where the interplay between emotion cycles, 
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sensegiving, and sensebreaking is present. Furthermore, the specific 
characteristics of compensatory and complementary emotion cycles could be 
explored and compared to other work groups to tease out further details of the two 
types of emotion cycles and to check for transferability (Tracy, 2010). Studies of 
classrooms to examine teachers, teaching assistants, and students may be fruitful 
to flesh out how emotional displays of discipline by the intermediate agent 
influence emotion cycles. Also, in classrooms, researchers might explore how the 
relationship between primary and intermediate agents impacts behavior. For 
example, do the teacher and teaching assistant get along and seem convivial 
toward each other or do they constantly engage in conflict (verbally of tacitly 
through nonverbal clash)? Additionally, corporate business meetings may provide 
a setting where additional roles besides the primary and intermediate agent can be 
explored. For example, meetings in which there is a hierarchy of employees in 
power positions may illuminate additional types of agents that influence 
recipients.  
Most studies of sensebreaking have relied on interview data to recognize 
and describe when it is occurring in organizations. However, this dissertation used 
in situ observations to recognize when sensebreaking was happening. The ability 
to watch and record the defendants’ nonverbal behavior was especially helpful for 
describing sensebreaking because it provided insight into how defendants were 
making meaning. Future studies should continue to explore the role of nonverbal 
communication in this process by describing what specific types of nonverbal 
behaviors and actions illustrate sensebreaking. 
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 The data included in this study are unique because there are relatively few 
studies that have had the chance to actually interview judges and bailiffs. Yet, 
there is still more to learn about experiences in municipal court from the 
perspectives of the employees who work there every day. Future research could 
examine how bailiff and judge experiences influence each other in different types 
of courtrooms such as Superior courts. The data presented in this dissertation 
includes only one portion of the data I collected. In the future, I hope to continue 
exploring how judges navigate between following the laws in their private lives 
and enforcing the laws in their work lives. Additionally, I could examine the ways 
bailiffs handle toxin behind the scenes and how they cope with the stress of 
cleaning up messes that are left behind. Lastly, in future studies, I hope to 
examine courtrooms where more than one bailiff is present to extend research on 
the responsibilities of each courtroom workgroup member. 
 This research examined courtroom behavior in two types of municipal 
courthouses. Future research might consider comparing and contrasting the 
courtroom experiences of municipal court with Superior court. A comparative 
analysis could highlight the similarities and differences in the experiences of each 
type of courtroom workgroup. Through an analysis such as this, we may learn 
how emotional communication relates to sensegiving and sensebreaking in 
different ways when we add an additional organizational actor—a lawyer—to the 
emotional cycle. Similar to the bailiff, lawyers potentially serve as buffers 
between judges and defendants. Yet, it may be interesting to understand how the 
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lawyers’ emotional responses are similar to and different from the bailiffs based 
upon their vested interested in the defendant’s case. 
This dissertation study reveals challenges associated with emotion that 
manifest at the micro and macro level in municipal courtrooms and illustrates how 
judges and bailiffs respond emotionally to these situations to give sense to and 
break sense of defendants. The findings highlight a complex process of emotional 
roles and emotion cycles impacting sensegiving and sensebreaking in court. My 
analysis further draws attention to the importance of considering intermediary 
organizational members, such as bailiffs, to understand the complete life cycle of 
emotion. Through an awareness of how emotion and rationality intersect in the 
courtroom, researchers learn how organizational actors and organizational visitors 
can make sense in ways that hinder and help day-to-day organizing. 
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Total number of courtroom employees within scope of study ......................78 
 
Extended observation and/or formal interview ..............................................45 
 
Brief observation or informal interview ........................................................33 
 
Organization 
 
Curia Employees ............................................................................................46 
 
Equitas Employees .........................................................................................32 
 
Type of job 
 
Judge… ..........................................................................................................27 
 
Bailiff/Clerk ...................................................................................................23 
 
Other (e.g., lawyer, police officer, interpreter) ..............................................28 
 
Sex 
 
Male ...............................................................................................................37 
 
Female ............................................................................................................41 
 
Ethnicity 
 
White/Caucasian ............................................................................................38 
 
Latino/a ..........................................................................................................34 
 
Black/African American ................................................................................5 
 
Asian American .............................................................................................1 
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A. Background and Work History 
1. What would you like your pseudonym to be? 
2. How long have you been working as a judge? 
Probe: Have you worked at any other courthouses? If so, which ones? 
Probe: What types of cases do you usually work with (criminal, civil, trial)? 
Probe: How many defendants do you see on a typical day? 
3. Why did you decide to become a judge? 
B. Description of Daily Work Life 
4. Now, can you take me through your typical work day step by step? 
5. What aspects of your job do you enjoy the most? 
Probe: Can you think of a specific example when you had a great day at work? 
6. What aspects of your job do you find the least satisfying or challenging? 
Probe: Can you think of a specific example when you had a bad day at work? 
C. Judge Behavior, Identity, and Emotion Use 
9. How does an ideal judge act, behave, and communicate in the courtroom? 
10. Do you think it takes a certain kind of person to be a judge? If so, what would 
be some qualities of that person? 
11. I’ve seen some judges get frustrated and angry with defendants during my 
observations. Can you think of a specific example of a time when a defendant 
frustrated you? What did you do? 
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12. Do you think humor is appropriate to use in the courtroom? I’ve also seen 
several judges use humor in their communication with defendants. Can you think 
of a specific example of a time when you used humor in the courtroom? 
13. I have heard that you are expected to treat the defendants like “customers” at 
this courthouse. What does that mean? Do you think that judges should treat 
defendants like customers? Why or why not? If not, what would be the 
alternative? 
14. Some of the judges I have spoken to have said that being a judge was not what 
they expected it to be. Would you agree? Why? 
Probe: Some other judges have said that being a judge is an isolated or lonely job. 
Would you agree with that? Why? 
D. Power and Maintaining Order 
15. What are the rules of conduct for the courtroom? 
Probe: Do you have any special rules that you have added to the list? What are 
they? 
Probe: Why did you add these rules? 
16. How do you respond or communicate if a defendant is not following the 
rules? 
Probe: Can you think of a specific example of a time when someone was breaking 
the rules? What did you do? 
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17. Have you ever met a judge that has robe-itis? How do they act, behave, and 
communicate in the courtroom? 
18. Almost every judge I have interviewed has had a negative reaction towards 
Judge Judy. Why do you think this is? 
E. Work-Life Wellness 
19. How does your occupation as a judge impact your life outside of work? Can 
you think of a specific example? 
20. Have you ever encountered defendants that came in front of you out in the 
community (i.e., at the grocery store)? Can you think of a specific example? 
Probe: How does the possibility of those encounters impact the way you live your 
life on a daily basis? 
21. Would you consider your job stressful? What is the most stressful part of your 
job? 
Probe: What are some ways that you cope with the stress? 
22. Do you ever get tired or burned out of being a judge? Can you think of a 
specific example? 
23. How does the amount of stress (or just the job in general) you experience as a 
judge compare to any other occupation that you have had before? 
F. Closing Questions 
24. What advice would you give someone if they wanted to become a judge? 
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25. Is there anything that you wish people could know about being a judge that 
you haven’t already told me? 
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A. Background and Work History 
1. What would you like your pseudonym to be? 
2. How long have you been working as a bailiff? 
Probe: Have you worked at other courthouses? If so, which ones? 
Probe: Have you worked in other positions in the courtroom? 
Probe: What type of court do you work in (civil, criminal)? 
3. Why did you decide to become a bailiff? 
B. Description of Daily Work Life 
4. What are the primary responsibilities of your job? 
5. Now, can you take me through a typical day at work step by step? 
6. What aspects of your job do you enjoy the most? 
Probe: Can you think of a specific example when you had a great day at work? 
7. What aspects of your job do you find the least satisfying or challenging? 
Probe: Can you think of a specific example when you had a bad day at work? 
C. Bailiff Identity and Emotion Use 
9. How does an ideal bailiff communication in the courtroom? 
10. How does an ideal judge act, behave, and communicate in the courtroom? 
11. I’ve seen some bailiffs get frustrated with defendants. Can you think of a 
specific example of a time when a defendant frustrated you? What did you do? 
What did the judge and other staff members do? 
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12. I’ve seen some judges use humor in the courtroom. In what ways might humor 
be appropriate in the courtroom? When it is no so appropriate? Can you think of a 
specific example when you saw a judge employ humor? Can you think of a 
specific example when you used humor at work? 
13. I’ve seen some bailiffs go out of their way to help defendants. Can you think 
of a specific example of when you went out of your way to help a defendant 
through a difficult situation? What did you do? How did you resolve their 
problem? 
D. Courtroom Rules and Behavior 
14. What are the rules of this courtroom? 
15. What do you do if someone is not following the rules? 
16. Have you ever heard of the term robe-itis? What does this look like? How did 
the judge act and communicate? 
17. I’ve noticed that sometimes bailiffs and defendants don’t get along. Can you 
tell me about a time when you have seen or experienced this? What happened? 
How was it resolved? 
18. I’ve also noticed some disagreements between bailiffs in other courtrooms. 
How do you respond if there is a disagreement between you and other members of 
your work group?  Can you tell me about a time when you saw or experienced a 
disagreement between courtroom staff? What happened? How was it resolved? 
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19. What would you describe as the “identity” or character of this courthouse? In 
other words, what are some of its defining characteristics?  
E. Closing Questions 
20. What advice would you give someone if they wanted to work in this division 
as a bailiff? 
21. Is there anything that you wish people could know about being a bailiff that 
you haven’t already told me? 
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Municipal Court Judges Codebook 1st level [descriptive] codes 
Abbrev Code/Node Definition/Explanation Examples 
(Hypothetical—not 
direct quotes) 
Ideal 
Character
istics of a 
Judge 
Characteristi
cs of an 
“ideal” 
judge 
Answer to question about 
how would an ideal judge 
behave, act, or 
communicate observations 
of judge behavior 
Patient, emotionless, 
good listener 
Humor 
Use 
Humor used 
in the 
courtroom 
Answer to question: Can 
you think of an example 
when you used humor in 
the courtroom? 
Observations of humor use 
Jokes with defendants 
about raising the 
wrong hand when 
reading them their 
rights 
Anger Anger 
expressed in 
the 
courtroom 
Answer to the question: 
Can you think of a specific 
example when you were 
angry or frustrated with 
defendants? Observations 
of verbal and nonverbal 
anger/frustration 
When defendants do 
not have a sense of 
personal 
responsibility. 
Use of 
power 
Power use in 
the 
courtroom 
Answer to question: How 
do you react if a defendant 
is not following the rules? 
Observations of behaviors 
that draw attention to 
power 
I should be able to 
control the courtroom 
with a look, without 
saying anything. 
Abuse of 
power 
Power abuse 
in the 
courtroom  
Answer to questions: How 
does a judge with robe-itis 
act in the courtroom? 
Observations of rudeness 
and power abuse 
Yells at people, does 
not listen, is not fair 
Media 
Use 
Mention of 
Media  
Answer to questions: How 
do you think judge 
television shows impact 
courtroom 
communication? 
Observations when 
defendants actually discuss 
media 
People come in with 
the expectation that it 
is going to be like 
Judge Judy. 
Stress Stress Answer to question: 
Would you consider your 
Not as stressful as 
Superior Court. It’s 
182 
 
job stressful? Observations 
when judges appear 
stressed out 
like groundhog day in 
a good way. 
Isolation Isolation  Judges discussing how 
they feel separated or 
isolated from other 
organizational members. 
This is kind of one-
man, one riot sort of 
job. 
Eco 
Crisis 
Economic 
Crisis 
Answer to questions: How 
has the economic crisis 
impacted your courthouse? 
Repeated observations of 
defendants with no money 
to pay fines. 
More people come in 
expecting to get 
payment extensions or 
payment plans. Judges 
are more lenient 
during jury selection 
because they don’t 
want people to miss 
work 
Praise Praise Observations where judges 
and/or bailiffs give praise 
to defendants 
“I can see that you are 
getting your life back 
on track and that is a 
good thing.” 
Comp Compassion Observations where judges 
and/or bailiffs notice and 
respond to defendant needs 
“I believe it is 
important to give 
empathy and 
compassion to the 
victims” – Judge 
Ryne 
Tedium Tedium in 
the 
courtroom 
Judges/bailiffs reflect on 
the routine nature of the 
courtroom. Observations 
of monotony of site. 
“Did I go home last 
night? Or did I just 
have a short dream 
that I went home”  
Uncert/A
m 
Uncertainty/
Ambiguity 
in the 
courtroom 
Observations where 
defendants appear unsure 
about the meaning of scene 
Defendants repeatedly 
ask questions and 
keep telling their 
stories even when 
asked to stop by the 
judge. 
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Municipal Court Judges Codebook – 2nd level [analytic] codes  
Abbrev Code/Node Definition/Explanation Examples 
(Hypothetical—not 
direct quotes) 
Emot. 
Dev 
   
 Strategic 
Deviance 
Intentional uses of 
humor or anger 
Humor is used as a 
tension reliever or 
to build 
camaraderie, anger 
used to control 
courtroom 
 Unintended 
Deviance 
Unintentional displays 
of humor, anger, 
sarcasm 
Nonverbal 
communication, 
laughing at 
defendants 
 Privileged 
Deviance 
Judges deviate in ways 
that draw attention to 
their power either 
implicitly or explicitly. 
As a judge “your 
jokes are always 
funnier.” 
Emot 
control 
suppress 
   
 Gender 
Differences 
Women must remain 
calmer. 
Female judges seen 
as bitches if they 
express anger. 
 Control as 
a Badge of 
Honor 
Emotional control is 
viewed as a skill and a 
quality of an ideal 
judge. 
Avoid putting 
people in contempt 
at all costs, should 
be able to control 
the courtroom with 
a look. 
 Focus on 
Demeanor 
Ability to remain 
neutral and professional 
Must suppress your 
biases and 
prejudices from 
coming out verbally 
 Private 
Life 
Spillover 
Judges must live by 
ethical codes of conduct 
in their everyday life. 
They have the potential 
to run into defendants. 
They avoid 
breaking laws, 
don’t tell people 
they are judges for 
their safety try to 
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follow all traffic 
laws, don’t reside in 
the cities they are 
judges. 
 Intermed. 
emotion 
labor 
Bailiffs work as buffers 
between judges and 
defendants 
Bailiffs enforce 
rules and handle 
defendants’ 
emotional outbursts 
after 
communication 
with judges. 
 Emotional 
dissonance 
Judges and bailiffs talk 
about suppressing 
mismatched emotion 
Judge Major’s 
example of running 
in her office 
shutting the door 
and screaming. 
 
Coll. 
Emotion 
Cycles 
   
 Emotional 
Contagion 
When an emotional 
display is mimicked. 
Bailiffs mimic 
judges’ displays of 
frustration toward 
defendants. 
 Emotion 
Interpretati
on 
Bailiffs/defendants 
perceive the emotion of 
the judge and respond 
with a complementary 
emotion. 
If a judge expresses 
anger toward a 
defendant, that 
defendant might 
express 
embarrassment. 
SM & 
Emotion 
   
 Sensegive 
via 
emotional 
display 
Judges fill in 
defendants’ gaps in 
understanding with 
emotional cues 
Judges use tension 
relief humor to help 
defendants relax 
 Sensebreak
via 
emotional 
display 
Judges break down a 
defendant’s 
understanding with 
emotional cues 
Judges use anger to 
show when a 
behavior is 
unacceptable 
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To: Sarah Tracy  
 STAUF  
From: Mark Roosa, Chair  
 Soc Beh IRB  
Date: 02/20/2009  
Committee Action: Exemption Granted  
IRB Action Date: 
 
 
       02/20/2009  
IRB Protocol #: 0902003710  
Study Title: 
 
Emotion and Wellness in the Judicial 
System  
 
The above-referenced protocol is considered exempt after review by the 
Institutional Review Board pursuant to Federal regulations, 45 CFR Part 
46.101(b)(2) . 
 
This part of the federal regulations requires that the information be recorded by 
investigators in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or 
through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information 
obtained not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably 
place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability, or be damaging to the 
subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
 
You should retain a copy of this letter for your records. 
 
 
    
   
